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 The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, 
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven, 
 And, as imagination bodies forth 
 The form of things unknown, the poet’s pen 
 Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
 A local habitation and a name. 
 




 We dance round in a ring and suppose, 
 But the Secret sits in the middle and knows. 
 




 Obviously God was a solution, and obviously none so satisfactory will ever be 
 found again. 
 




 …the limits of the imagination are the conceivable, not the real, and it extends 
 over death as well as life. 
 




High modernism is numinous through and through, as the work of art provides 
one of the last outposts of enchantment in a spiritually degenerate world. 
 




The poet is the priest of the invisible. 
 
- Wallace Stevens, Adagia 
 
*  
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(1) ‘BEGIN, EPHEBE, BY CONCEIVING THE IDEA…’ 
 
The following thesis does not pretend to arrive at a definitive conception of what 
literary modernism was, or for that matter is, in the rigorous sense required of a 
taxonomist. Attempts to define or classify modernism have been fraught with 
contradictions and counter-examples too numerous to be resolved within the limited 
scope of the present thesis. Suffice it to say, I am in agreement with Peter Nicholls, who 
insists that it is more sensible to speak pluralistically of ‘modernisms’.1 I would, indeed, 
prefer to avoid using the term altogether, were it not for the fact that the inspiration for 
this thesis stems, as will be shortly seen, from Gabriel Josipovici’s endearingly eccentric 
study Whatever Happened to Modernism?. My preference is for the term ‘modern’, 
which, as solid an arbitration as any, I would align with the period concurrent with the 
establishment of what we commonly refer to as the language of ‘modern English’, taking 
in as it does the rise of Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment, historical 
developments that are integral to the position my thesis wishes to advance. 
Nonetheless, I will seek recourse to the use of the term ‘modernist’, simply to 
distinguish, as per convention, a period in literary history spanning the close of the 
nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth, while reserving the right to bracket 
                                                          
1 See Nicholls, Peter, (1995), Modernisms: a literary guide, Berkeley: University of California Press. Following 
Nicholls’ lead is the compendious The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, (2010), Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
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out what does not immediately concern my thesis, namely a descriptive account of what 
exactly modernism qua modernism entails. Instead, the provenance of this thesis issues 
from the implications of Josipovici’s suggestion that modernism, which he dates from 
approximately 1850 to the mid-twentieth century, might be revealingly considered ‘a 
response…to that ‘disenchantment of the world’ to which cultural historians have long 
been drawing our attention’ (Josipovici, 2010, 11). This thesis will explore the 
implications of Josipovici’s suggestion specifically in relation to the work of the so-called 
‘major’ modernist poet Wallace Stevens. 
My usage here of a circumspect qualifier is not to imply that I care to assail the 
canonical status that has been endowed upon Stevens by the academy, nor is it to 
suggest that I think it is necessarily wrong-headed to analyse his work in the context of 
modernism, howsoever this category—if that is what we can call it—has come to be 
revised and by whom. Rather, by situating Stevens in the broader historical narrative of 
disenchantment, the present thesis will throw into relief many of the tensions that 
would arise with the ascendancy of what Charles Taylor calls ‘exclusive humanism’ 
(Taylor, 2007, 19). Taylor characterises exclusive humanism as an extreme 
anthropocentrism entailing the moral and political dispensation of human society 
derived entirely from an immanent self-sufficiency no longer reliant on appeals to, or 
extrapolations from, anything perceived to transcend the mundane world.2 Arguably, 
exclusive humanism arrives at a watershed with the advent of Romanticism in the late 
18th century. Romanticism, in large part, came about as a reaction against the 
Enlightenment’s mechanistic worldview, to its tendentious scientism, sovereignty of 
reason, and post-deist marginalisation of humankind’s spiritual interconnection with 
                                                          
2 For a thoroughgoing explication of ‘exclusive humanism’ see: Charles Taylor, (2007), A Secular Age, 
Cambridge MA & London: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, esp. 19-21, 26-28, 41, 88, 98-99, 130, 
134, 221, 233-234, 242-269, 636-642, 656, 768-769.  
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the divine. This thesis will discern Stevens’ work, for the most part implicitly, as a later 
development—whether combative, cooperative or collusive—of Romanticism’s afore-
summarised reaction to the disenchantment of the world. 
As this thesis presupposes, Stevens inherits the basic dialectical conflict that his 
Romantic forebears—and, in turn, the Romantics’ myriad 19th century successors 
(French Symbolists, Victorian aesthetes, fin de siècle decadents, et al.)—had rendered 
explicit: namely the reception of discontents perceived to be brought about by 
disenchantment, and the myriad responsive strategies that are counterposed to these 
perceived discontents. For Stevens, though, disenchantment is not exclusively a source 
of discontent. The frequently invoked ‘modernist crisis of faith’ would constitute an 
alarmist hyperbole when applied to the case of Stevens. Scott Freer, to cite a recent 
instance, correctly observes that: ‘Stevens is not a disillusioned modernist and the death 
of God is a positive condition for poetic liberation’ (Freer, 2015, 185). Stevens, as we 
will come to see, believes that the world has been disenchanted (although he does not 
phrase it in these terms), and that in consequence there is a desire, a necessity even, to 
undertake a comprehensive project of spiritual renovation. Leon Surette argues that 
Stevens is quite unique among his major contemporaries: ‘Eliot, returned to orthodox 
Christianity; others, such as Yeats, Robert Graves and Ezra Pound, turned to more 
esoteric forms of belief. Stevens alone among the major figures sought to articulate an 
alternative faith, one that made shift to do without transcendence, and without divinity, 
but without surrendering the emotional intensity of religious belief. In choosing that 
route, Stevens chose the more difficult course’ (Surette, Spring 2005, 144-45). Stevens’ 
choice to dispense with orthodox and esoteric belief systems, and yet still strongly 
defend what he considers art’s spiritually compensatory function in an age in which he 
would say ‘We believe without belief, beyond belief’ (295), is what makes him such an 
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interesting poet to study from the perspective of secular disenchantment. It is primarily 
for this reason that I have chosen a similarly difficult course in taking Stevens as the 
subject of this study. 
The following series of quotations collocate a number of Stevens’ most pertinent 
claims for art’s spiritually compensatory function. In a late essay entitled ‘The Relations 
Between Poetry and Painting’, Stevens remarks, ‘that in an age in which disbelief is so 
profoundly prevalent or, if not disbelief, indifference to questions of belief, poetry and 
painting, and the arts in general, are, in their measure, a compensation for what has 
been lost’ (748). In ‘Two or Three Ideas’, another late essay, Stevens makes a closely 
worded claim for poetry in particular: ‘In an age of disbelief, or, what is the same thing, 
in a time that is largely humanistic, in one sense or another, it is for the poet to supply 
the satisfactions of belief, in his measure and in his style’ (841).  Poetry is, after all, 
Stevens’ vehicle for engaging in the compensatory activity of spiritual renovation: ‘After 
one has abandoned a belief in god, poetry is that essence that takes its place as life’s 
redemption’ (901). This attitude finds its starkest expression in section V of the long 
aphoristic poetic sequence ‘The Man With the Blue Guitar’: ‘Poetry / Exceeding music 
must take the place / Of empty heaven and its hymns, // Ourselves in poetry must take 
their place’ (136-37). According to Stevens the art can provide an alternative means to 
religion to reveal and confirm value: ‘The relation of art to life is of the first importance 
especially in a skeptical age since, in the absence of a belief in God, the mind turns to its 
own creations and examines them, not alone from the aesthetic point of view, but for 
what they reveal, for what they validate and invalidate, for the support they give’ (916).  
The poet’s ‘role, in short, is to help people to live their lives’ (661). 
The rest of this introductory chapter will elaborate upon the aforementioned 
claims Stevens makes for art and particularly poetry. This investigation will be 
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conducted in relation to further and frequently inconsistent positions Stevens expresses 
on religion and belief over the course of his adult life. This will also involve rehearsing 
some critical objections to Stevens’ claims. Beyond that, I will describe a theory of 
immanent numinosity that I will be using as a hermeneutic apparatus to interpret the 
compensations and satisfactions of belief and spirit that I infer Stevens’ poetry is 
attempting to rhetorically perform. However, before getting to this, in the next section I 
will provide an account of Max Weber’s argument for ‘the disenchantment of the world’, 
as it is a concept germane to, and corroborative of, Stevens’ previously mentioned 




(2) ‘EVENING WITHOUT ANGELS’ 
 
The German sociologist Max Weber is the widely acknowledged promulgator of the 
disenchantment of the world thesis, which ‘in its broadest terms, maintains that 
wonders and marvels have been demystified by science, spirituality has been 
supplanted by secularism, spontaneity has been replaced by bureaucratization, and the 
imagination has been subordinated to instrumental reason’ (Saler, 2006, 692). Weber’s 
argument for the disenchantment of the world posits the claim that coextensive with 
modernity the conjoined historical processes of intellectualization and rationalization 
have progressively divested the world of magic and spirit culminating in a cosmos 
devoid of meaningfulness and purpose.3 Weber articulates his argument thus: 
                                                          
3 On this last point Taylor would characterize the process as a conceptual shift from cosmos to universe. See 
Taylor, op cit.: 59-61, 300, 322-351, 361, 364, 366-367, 446-447, 531. 
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…increasing intellectualization or rationalization do not…indicate an increased and general 
knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. 
 It means something else, namely the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could 
learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces 
that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This 
means the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to 
master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. 
Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization 
means. (Weber, 1991, 139, original italics). 
 
In this passage we can discern one of Weber’s central claims, namely the ‘in principle’ 
notion of calculability; this is not to say that intellectualization is a completed project in 
Weber’s view, but that ‘in principle’ it has the potential to ‘master all things’. In the 
following passage, Weber demonstrates how this mathesis universalis in principle, 
coupled with empirical science, comes into conflict with religion: 
 
The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever 
rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of the 
world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encounters claims of the 
ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and 
ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view 
of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a 
‘meaning’ of inner-worldly occurrences. Every increase of rationalism in empirical science 
increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm… (Weber, 1991, 350-51, 
original italics). 
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Taken together, these two passages strike at the heart of Weber’s formulations on the 
disenchantment of the world. Before we proceed, though, a few distinctions must be 
made. 
First, Weber’s arguments are by no means original. At least as early as 
Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura (1st Century BCE) had the ‘notion of science as primarily a 
benign kind of weedkiller designed to get rid of religion’ (Midgley, 2001, 23) been 
propounded. Lucretius’s poem, the fullest expression of Epicurean philosophy to 
survive antiquity, presents an atomistic theory of the universe in which atoms (on this 
view the smallest, indestructible units of matter that make up all things) exist in an 
eternal flux of creation and destruction. The gods, whom are still believed to exist, are 
nonetheless entirely indifferent to human, mundane affairs. Death is conceived of as a 
mere return to nothingness, a reshuffling back into the degenerative/regenerative flux 
of primal atomic matter. Ostensibly lost for centuries, a transcription of Lucretius’s text 
was rediscovered in the early fifteenth century by Poggio Florentinus. It was 
subsequently widely disseminated, and would come to constitute one of the 
foundational texts of Renaissance humanism.4 For Lucretius, this worldview was on the 
one hand inherently wondrous (to contemplate that we are made of the same stuff as 
the stars, etcetera) and on the other hand it provided grounds for the pursuit of 
pleasure, the more intellectually refined the better, in the absence of divine retribution 
or ultimate purpose. It is not difficult to construe in Lucretius’ text Weberian (and, it 
must be said, Stevensian) disenchantment in germinal form: the substitution of random 
physical forces for divine purposeful influence; the foregrounding of matter over against 
                                                          
4 See Stephen Greenblatt’s article ‘The Answer Man’, (08.08.2011), The New Yorker, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/the-answer-man-stephen-greenblatt, for a concise 
historical account of the rediscovery and dissemination of Lucretius’ poem during the advent of the 
Renaissance.  
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spirit; the negation of superstitious belief; in short, a turn from transcendence towards 
immanence.  
Second, it is from Friedrich Schiller that Weber adapts the phrase ‘the 
disenchantment of the world’. Bruce Robbins outlines how Weber’s ‘Entzauberung’ 
differs from Schiller’s ‘Entgötterung’ in quite a crucial respect: 
 
Schiller’s version of disenchantment– it turns out that Weber was not quoting him directly– is 
“Entgötterung” (de-divinization).  When Schiller used the phrase “die entgötterte Natur” (nature 
from which the gods have been eliminated) in his 1788 poem “The Gods of Greece,” he was 
criticized for seeming to lament the end of polytheism, and he backed down. Weber’s term is 
“Entzauberung” (the elimination of magic).  It may bow gently to Schiller but, whether for 
reasons of diplomacy or not, it certainly takes the emphasis off divinity. (Robbins, 2011, 2). 
 
This leads us to a third consideration: that supposedly Weber’s version of 
disenchantment accounts only for the displacement of concrete magic from the world, 
and leaves supernatural divinity, especially the transcendent God of post-deist 
Protestantism, somewhere beyond its dismissive radius. Weber, in point of fact, makes 
the argument that ascetic Protestantism is the culmination of a long-standing religious 
agenda to eliminate magic from the world that began (at least in Western tradition) 
with the ‘old Hebrew prophets’ who ‘in conjunction with Hellenic scientific thought, 
repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin’ (Weber, 1958, 105). 
Weber collocates here what typifies for him the two prime, and in fact collaborative, 
motors of disenchantment throughout history: science and monotheism. However, in 
spite of what certain commentators might argue to the contrary, rationalisation, on 
Weber’s telling, pushes orthodox religious belief to the edges of plausibility just as 
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forcefully as it does the putatively animistic worldview of the so-called primitive savage 
and ancient pagan. 
Taylor warns against confusing ‘disenchantment with the end of religion’ 
(Taylor, 2007, 553), a trap that he believes ‘Weber seems to have fallen into…at times’ 
(Ibid). However, Taylor himself later connects ‘real, thoroughgoing disenchantment’ 
(Ibid, 708) with ‘a total escape from religion’ (Ibid). Disenchantment, then, to 
recapitulate Weber’s ‘in principle’ notion of calculability,5 if followed to its logical 
conclusion, would presumably exact the dissolution of religion, and thus the belief in 
divinity, altogether. Disenchantment, on this view, exhibits an unmistakeable 
conceptual overlap with the narratives of secularization. 
Fourth, and finally, much contentious debate among Weberian scholars has 
revolved around the extent to which Weber regards the disenchantment of the world as 
a negative and subtractive view of history, or as a positive and progressive one. H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills state the distinction (which points to a theoretically useful 
ambivalence on Weber’s part) succinctly: ‘The extent and direction of ‘rationalization’ 
is…measured negatively in terms of the degree to which magical elements of thought 
are displaced, or positively by the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence 
and naturalistic consistency’ (Gerth and Mills, 1991, 51). H. C. Greisman maintains that 
‘[t]he dominant chord sounded in Weber’s formulation of disenchantment is sober 
resignation’ (Greisman, Dec. 1976, 498), while insisting that ‘Weber strove towards 
value-neutrality’ (Ibid). Alternatively, a critical tendency to align Weber’s perception of 
disenchantment with cultural pessimism persists. Weber’s ominatio at the conclusion of 
‘Politics as a Vocation’ is often rallied in support of this view: ‘Not summer’s bloom lies 
                                                          
5 Which could be summarized as the mathematical explication of physical reality dispelling both a recourse to 
mystification and deference to a heteronomous referent (i.e. God). 
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ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness’ (Weber, 1991, 128). 
Interestingly, Stevens himself dramatizes a similar reaction on the part of the human 
species to the dissolution of the gods: ‘It was their [the gods] annihilation, not ours, and 
yet it left us feeling that in a measure we, too, had been annihilated. It left us feeling 
dispossessed and alone in a solitude, like children without parents, in a home that 
seemed deserted, in which the amical rooms and halls had taken on a look of hardness 
and emptiness’ (842). 
The dissolution of gods, the divestment of magic and spirits, the continued 
viability of religious belief in a disenchanted world—as to whether or not 
disenchantment or secularization will succeed in wiping these things from the face of 
the earth is a moot point. Any contemporary believer or practitioner of magic would 
probably argue not. We may want to ask, moreover, what might be the implications of 
disenchantment for the continued viability of the poet? Orpheus is presumably 
outstripped by the mathematician and the Large Hadron Collider at bringing into 
apparent being what had previously lain beyond the horizon of potential articulation. 
The encompassing cosmic vision of an age, such as that of Homer, Virgil or Dante, is 
inconceivable—the variables are too many and their esoteric currencies 
nonexchangeable for the common coin of lingua franca.6 The secular authority of the 
poet is rendered increasingly private, in which an alienated subjectivity encroaching 
upon the mirror-game of solipsism prevails. A poetics of necessary failure thus assumes 
                                                          
6 George Steiner points out that ‘until the seventeenth century, the sphere of language encompassed nearly 
the whole of experience and reality; today, it comprises a narrower domain. It no longer articulates, or is 
relevant to, all major modes of action, thought, and sensibility. Large areas of meaning and praxis now belong 
to such non-verbal languages as mathematics, symbolic logic, and formulas of chemical or electronic relation. 
Other areas belong to the sub-languages or anti-languages of non-objective art and musique concrète. The 
world of words has shrunk’ (Steiner, 1967, 43). 
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the throne of expressive communication. In the humanities, confusion and 
indeterminacy reign supreme. 
 The jeremiad I have improvised just now is a well-worn plaint. Its sanguine 
counter-ode is the celebration of assumed freedom, of the throwing off of the chains of 
superstition and myth, of the overturning of benighted ecclesiastical authority and 
feudal government supposedly ordained by divine fiat. Freedom and limit, however, are 
indissoluble antagonists. David Jasper, repurposing Milton, remarks that the modern 
poet writes ‘the words were all before them, which to choose’ (Jasper, 1989, 107). 
Geoffrey Hill keenly observes this choice induces the following chiasmic predicament: 
‘There is something in constraint which frees the mind, and something in freedom 
which constrains it’ (Hill, 2008, 573). Stevens himself arrives at a similar formulation in 
a letter to Norman Holmes Pearson, June 14, 1937: ‘A free form does not assure 
freedom’ (L, 323). It is in this connection that Josipovici cites (and indeed names a 
chapter of his book after) Kierkegaard’s formulation from The Concept of Anxiety, that 
‘anxiety is the dizziness of freedom’ (Josipovici, 2010, 39-47, passim; Kierkegaard, 1980, 
61). Anxiety, for Kierkegaard, ‘is altogether different from fear and similar concepts that 
refer to something definite’, emphasising that it ‘is freedom's actuality as the possibility 
of possibility’ (Kierkegaard, 1980, 42). The possibility of possibility made possible by a 
self-reliant (or, as Taylor would say, exclusive) humanism—the putative victory of 
enlightened disenchantment. In the absence of a guiding, extra-human authority, the 
human animal, decoupled from an ultimate telos, is left to his or her own anxiogenic 
devices. 
The abiding concern is that this freedom could terminate in existential vacuity 
and creative paralysis. Hugo von Hofmannsthal epitomises this existential quandary in 
his ‘Letter of Lord Chandos’, in which the fictional 17th century epistoler explains to 
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Lord Bacon the reasons for his complete abandonment of literary activity: ‘In brief, this 
is my case: I have completely lost the ability to think or speak coherently about anything 
at all’ (Hofmannsthal, 2005, 121). Chandos, at the tender age of twenty-six years, an 
erstwhile litterateur of no small accomplishment, has arrived at the belief that language 
is no longer adequate to convey his experience, and feels ashamed to accept his former 
work as belonging to him. He can no longer discourse on philosophical and moral 
matters; everyday opining and passing judgements become increasingly insubstantial to 
him; and finally, his recourse to classical models, that ‘edifice of Latin prose whose 
abstract plan and structure [had once] gladdened his heart’ (Ibid, 118), is met with utter 
incomprehension.  All of his subsequent epiphanies are irrevocably lost as soon as he 
tries to set them down on paper. Consequently, Chandos concludes that the ‘the 
language in which I might have been granted the opportunity not only to write but also 
to think is not Latin or English, or Italian, or Spanish, but a language of which I know not 
one word, a language in which mute things speak to me and in which I will perhaps have 
something to say for myself someday when I am dead and standing before an unknown 
judge’ (Ibid, 127-8).7 
 This silent language, or language of silence, capable of discoursing with ‘mute 
things’, the primordial language before the moment of speech in which the world and all 
that constitutes it is entirely trans-communicant, is one of the greatest paradoxes and 
most enticing desiderata ever to beset the poetic imaginary. ‘Poetry is the search for the 
inexplicable’ (911), Stevens would say, and propose ‘an unwritten rhetoric that is 
always changing and to which the poet must always be turning’ (790), a ‘Pure rhetoric 
                                                          
7 It is worth considering as a positive counterpart to Chandos’ unknown language, Hart Crane’s speculation, no 
less enigmatic, on poetry’s ability to reveal a supra-linguistic ‘word’ to its reader: ‘It is as though a poem gave 
the reader as he left it a single, new word, never before spoken and impossible to actually enunciate, but self-
evident as an active principle in the reader’s consciousness henceforward’ (Crane, 1982, 16). 
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of a language without words’ (324). The poet of the supreme fiction asks: ‘Is there a 
poem that never reaches words’? (343). This question is of course unanswerable. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hofmannsthal’s near coeval and fellow Viennese, echoes 
Chandos’ retreat from the inadequacy of language in the oft-cited proposition 
concluding his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘What we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence’ (Wittgenstein, 2001, 89). Wittgenstein also claims, however, that 
‘what can be said at all can be said clearly’ (Ibid, 3).8 That which can be said clearly 
would find its strongest prescription during the modernist period in the verificationist 
principles of the Vienna Circle logical positivists, Wittgenstein’s immediate (and 
contemporary) descendants.9 Victor M. Hamm as late as 1960, in his suggestively titled 
lecture ‘Language, Truth and Poetry’, argues that ‘[w]e are still living intellectually—
despite recent developments away from its crude original form—in the atmosphere of 
positivism’ (Hamm, 1960, 3). The title of Hamm’s lecture is a wry nod to A. J. Ayer’s 
Language, Truth and Logic, the book responsible for transposing the ideas of the Vienna 
Circle into the Anglosphere. According to Ayer’s arguments the only propositions that 
are cognitively meaningful are either synthetic propositions whose truths ‘could be 
conclusively established by experience’ (Ayer, 1952, 37) (e.g. ‘It rained in London 
during Ayer’s day of birth’, if in fact it did rain in London on Ayer’s birthday, which, 
being London, is quite likely); or analytic propositions, which are true either by 
tautological definition (e.g. ‘all sisters are female’) or mathematical correctness (e.g. 
                                                          
8 In a letter to Alice Corbin Henderson, March 27, 1922, Stevens would write a sentence uncannily similar to 
that of Wittgenstein’s: ‘Whatever can be expressed can be expressed clearly. Epater les savants is as trifling as 
épater les bourgeois. But one cannot always say a thing clearly and retain the poetry of what one is saying’ 
(937). See: Andrew Osborn, (Spring 2004), ‘”A Little Hard To See”: Wittgenstein, Stevens, and the Use of 
Unclarity’, Wallace Stevens Journal, 28:1, 59-80, for an exposition of the parallels between Stevens and 
Wittgenstein’s thought. 
9 It would be doing the genealogy of the Vienna Circle a disservice were one to fail to mention the influence of 
Ernst Mach, Gottlob Frege, David Hilbert and Bertrand Russell, not to mention the revolution in physics 
ushered in, primarily, by the work of Albert Einstein. 
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‘2+2=4’). What Ayers infers from these principles of verification are that all 
metaphysical utterances are meaningless, ethical concepts are at best pseudo-concepts, 
and aesthetic declarations do not state facts but merely express feelings. Ayers’ only 
sustained statement concerning the poet is in relation to, tellingly enough, the scientist: 
 
The difference between the man who uses language scientifically and the man who uses it 
emotively is not that the one produces sentences which are incapable of arousing emotion, and 
the other sentences which have no sense, but that the one is primarily concerned with the 
expression of true propositions, the other with the creation of a work of art. Thus, if a work of 
science contains true and important propositions, its value as a work of science will hardly be 
diminished by the fact that they are inelegantly expressed. And similarly, a work of art is not 
necessarily the worse for the fact that all the propositions comprising it are literally false. (Ibid, 
44-45). 
 
Hamm argues that ‘[o]n the terms of this school, therefore, poetry as a cognitive 
transaction becomes impossible, all that remains of it being, as the early I. A. Richards 
put it, “emotive utterance” and “pseudo-statement”’ (Hamm, 1960, 7). Another of (early) 
Richards’ remarks comprises a speculation that could not more neatly encapsulate the 
central anxiety of disenchantment inasmuch as poetry is concerned: ‘There is some 
evidence that Poetry, together with the other Arts, arose with [the] Magical View.10 It is 
a possibility to be seriously considered that Poetry may pass away with it’ (Richards, 
1935, 53). Notwithstanding the fact that poetry has not passed away, the rationalist 
                                                          
10 We should be familiar enough by now with what Richards means by ‘Magical View’. Nonetheless, as a 
safeguard against uncertainty: ‘By the Magical View I mean, roughly, the belief in a world of Spirits and Powers 
which control events, and which can be evoked and, to some extent, controlled themselves by human 
practices. The belief in Inspiration and the beliefs underlying Ritual are representative parts of this view’ 
(Richards, 1935, 53). Richards’ ‘Magical View’, as was common currency at the time, derives from E. B. Tylor’s 
Primitive Culture wherein Tylor reintroduced into popular circulation the concept of animism, and was to have 
an enormous influence on his disciple J. G. Frazer of The Golden Bough fame, which in turn became a 
touchstone work for countless philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, artists and poets. 
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position exemplified by Ayers and Richards is merely a late iteration of the ancient 
quarrel instigated by Plato’s banishment of the poets from his ideal republic ruled by 
philosopher kings. The poet’s imitative third-hand removal from the truth of the ideal 
forms, and their tendency to corrupt the youth and incite the passions rather than the 
faculties of reason, is simply a strong version of the claim that all that poetry is good for 
is to stir the emotions. Christopher Clausen argues that a similar reaction against poetry 
that occurs in ‘classical Greece at the coming of the age of philosophy’ occurs during the 
seventeenth century ‘in Europe on the brink of modern science’ (Clausen, 1981, 8). 
Francis Bacon, Clausen argues, finds poetry ‘too various to be characterized as either 
virtuous or vicious, [but] is in general the product of credulous ages, and as we advance 
in reason we ought to outgrow it’ (Ibid). Clausen also refers to Locke’s condemnation of 
figurative language as an abuse of words: ‘Its use was harmless where the intention was 
merely to entertain, but its presence in all other contexts served “for nothing else but to 
insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment”’ (Ibid, 9). 
Locke’s criticism is almost identical with Plato’s, only Locke’s is in service to natural as 
much as aletheic philosophy: ‘The language of the modern scientific world,’ Clausen 
glosses, ‘like its knowledge, was to be denotative, univocal, empirical. Poetry and its 
rather different attitudes toward language were a major threat to this view of 
knowledge; therefore poetry, as a major cultural force, would have to be displaced’ 
(Ibid, 9). Edmund Wilson describes this seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ‘in 
Europe as the great period of the development of mathematical and physical theory…[in 
which] Descartes and Newton were influences as important as those of the classics 
themselves’ (Wilson, 1931, 3]. Wilson traces the Romantic ‘revolt of the individual’ 
(Ibid, 2) against this period’s conception of the universe as ‘a fixed mechanical order’ 
(Ibid, 3), on the grounds that ‘it excluded too much of life—or rather, the description it 
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supplied did not correspond to actual experience. […] The universe was not a machine, 
after all, but something more mysterious and less rational’ (Ibid, 3). Wilson then points 
out how the Romantic’s organic worldview gave way to its mechanistic counterpart 
with the arrival of Darwin (Ibid, 6-7), and compares the differing tendencies of 
naturalism and symbolism in response. Nietzsche, during this late period of the 
nineteenth-century, would lob an anti-foundational powder-keg into the philosophical 
mainstream: ‘Against the positivism which halts at phenomena - 'There are only facts' - I 
would say: no, facts are just what there aren't, there are only interpretations’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003, 139). The logical positivists and their liege lord scientists would, of 
course, reject Nietzsche’s perspectivism out of hand and assert the primacy of apodictic 
fact; and so our little peregrination has come full circle. 
Stevens, familiar with these developments, acknowledges that Locke and Hobbes 
had denounced the connotative uses of words, desiring instead ‘a mathematical 
plainness; in short, perspicuous words’ (650) but asserts that, following the nineteenth-
century, ‘the connotative tendency is the tendency today’ (650). He also cites Ayer’s 
passage in which the latter discusses the fashion ‘to speak of the metaphysician as a 
kind of misplaced poet’ (Ayer, 1952, 44) and wonders whether or not ‘the imagination 
as metaphysics will survive logical positivism unscathed’ (727). Stevens uses this as a 
springboard to implore that ‘we must somehow cleanse the imagination of the 
romantic’ (727). He believes the romantic ‘belittles’ the imagination, which he conceives 
of as ‘the liberty of the mind’ (727) and ‘the only genius’ (728), because the romantic ‘is 
incapable of abstraction’ (728). Stevens’ holds the imagination’s capacity for abstraction 
and artifice, its metaphysics, to be its greatest value. Speculating upon Freud, Stevens 
wonders if a ‘science of illusions’ (728) might not provide ‘the clue to reality’ (728), in 
which ‘the deliberate fictions arising out of the contemporary mind’ (728) will prove 
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‘the forerunners of some science’ (728). Stevens, it is clear, does not necessarily 
consider the disenchantments of science and logical positivism anathematic to poetry.11 
But in a letter to Hi Simons, August 10, 1940, he expresses the following doubt: ‘I don’t 
know that one is ever going to get at the secret of the world through the sciences’ (L, 
363). Stevens would reserve the secret of the world, what I will seek to bring under the 




(3) ‘HYMNS OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE IDEA OF GOD 
AND THE IDEA OF MAN…’ 
 
Northrop Frye writes, in an early study published two years after the poet’s death: 
‘Wallace Stevens was a poet for whom the theory and the practice of poetry were 
inseparable. His poetic vision is informed by a metaphysic; his metaphysic is informed 
by a theory of knowledge; his theory of knowledge is informed by a poetic vision’ (Frye, 
1957, 353). Upon investigation one does find in Stevens’ theory and practice a circular 
causa sui, epitomised, as Frye alludes to, in section XXVIII of  ‘An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven’: ‘The endlessly elaborating poem / Displays the theory of poetry, / As the 
life of poetry’ (415). The endlessly elaborating poem self-reflexively theorises itself, and 
from this issues, in the manner of the ouroboros, its continued self-sustention. Stevens 
rearranges this construction, quasi-chiasmically, in the following stanza, and, in so 
                                                          
11 Mark Noble, for instance, in his chapter on Stevens ‘Matter at the End of the Mind: Stevens and the Call for a 
Quantum Poetics’ from his American Poetic Materialism from Whitman to Stevens, ‘traces the features of 
Stevens’s interests in materiality and modern physics in order to gather a sense of their consequences for his 
conception of poetry’ (Noble, 2015, 147). 
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doing, identifies the theory of poetry with that of life itself: ‘A more severe, // More 
harassing master would extemporize / Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory / Of 
poetry is the theory of life’ (Ibid). This is a characteristically adaptive Stevensian 
manoeuvre: in order to persuasively displace the idea of God, poetry must work to fill 
the ideational gap God’s removal would necessarily leave behind; hence Stevens’ 
rhetorical transfiguration of poetry’s capacity to do what God had been formerly 
imagined capable: to provide a self-perpetuating agency out of which everything else is 
instantiated. In his essay ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, Stevens refers to 
Shelley’s Defense of Poetry: ‘He says that a poem is the very image of life expressed in its 
eternal truth. It is “indeed something divine. It is at once the centre and circumference 
of knowledge…”’ (669-70). Kenneth Burke takes Shelley to be ‘pantheistically merging 
divinity and poetry into one’ (Burke, 1969, 226), but argues that this is not Stevens’ 
approach: ‘The next step is to drop from pantheism the theos, whereupon imagination 
equalling knowledge, one is left with the pan: Mr Stevens’ “mundo of the imagination.”’12 
(Ibid, original italics). A notebook entry, collected in Stevens’ Adagia, reads: ‘God is a 
symbol for something that can as well take other forms, as, for example, the form of high 
poetry’ (907). In dropping, or better yet, reinventing the theos, the endlessly elaborating 
poem does not become the atemporal omnipresent centre whose circumference is 
nowhere, as certain medieval scholars, and the Renaissance and Enlightenment 
theologians and philosophers who succeeded them, had held of God. It becomes instead 
an all-subsuming orationem generans, continuationem perseverans (continuation of a 
persistent speech generator).13 However, in that Stevens does not situate the endlessly-
                                                          
12 The Stevens’ quote Burke reproduces is from later in the same essay just quoted (679). 
13 This phrase is derived from the fourth definition of God proposed in the 12th Century pseudo-Hermetic text 
Liber XXIV philosophorum, and reads in full: ‘Deus est mens orationem generans, continuationem perseverans’ 
(‘God: the mind that generates utterance prolonged continually’. This text also provides the locus classicus for 
the definition of God as an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere 
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elaborating poem anywhere beyond the immanent lifeworld, it is therefore sub specie 
temporalis, and thus subject to change, modification, development—one could say to the 
imperfect contingencies of history.  
As is often the case in Stevens’ poetry, though, epitomical projections are 
tempered by a sceptical chariness, which suspends the relevant poem’s vatic utterance 
in an inchoate or provisional state, commonly bound to the futurity of a possibility as 
yet unrealised. In the example just presented, a more capable master than the poem’s 
speaker would be required to provide ‘Subtler, more urgent proof’ of the totalising 
claim.14 Nonetheless, the claim, though unsubstantiated by this conditional proof, is 
taken for granted.15 
Admittedly, this capsule reading of but a part of one section of a long poem 
coming very late in Stevens’ career might tempt the following questions: Is this what 
                                                          
(‘Deus est sphaera infinita cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam’); a definition that was taken up 
and adapted by, among others, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Nicolas Copernicus (whose application of 
the metaphor would have enormous consequences for the future of astronomy), Giordano Bruno and Blaise 
Pascal. See also: Karsten Harries, (Jan. 1975), ‘The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of a Metaphor’, 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13:1, 5-15. Harries, taking Jorge Luis Borges’ essay ‘Pascal’s Sphere’ as a 
point of departure (wherein Borges advances the following: ‘Perhaps universal history is the history of the 
various intonations of a few metaphors’ (Borges, 1999, 353)) to trace the historical development of the infinite 
sphere metaphor, specifically in regards to Nicholas of Cusa’s ‘transference of the metaphor of the infinite 
sphere from God to the cosmos’ (Harries, 14). Harries also acknowledges the ‘intelligible sphere’ variant of the 
metaphor, which Borges attributes to Alain de Lille’s discovery of it in another pseudo-Hermetic text, 
Asclepius: ‘Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam’ (‘God is an intelligible 
sphere, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere’), (See: Borges, 1999, 351-52; 
Harries, Jan. 1975, 8, n. 14). The twenty-four definitions of God recorded in Liber XXIV philosophorum are 
compiled in an editio minima, (that is to say without the commentaries), in the original Latin with 
accompanying English translations by The Matheson Trust, and can be found at: 
http://themathesontrust.org/papers/metaphysics/XXIV-A4.pdf. 
14 Stevens’ frequent, often repetitious, use of the extensional ‘more’ will afford greater attention in due 
course. 
15 Stevens composed ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ in 1949. Reiterations of the conception of absolute 
poetry as I have interpreted it here can be found in ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, a lecture Stevens gave two years 
later at the University of Chicago in mid-November 1951. Paul Weiss, the editor of Review of Metaphysics, had 
invited Stevens to contribute to the journal. This lecture would be Stevens’ contribution, which, 
dishearteningly for him, Weiss rejected (Richardson, 1988, 384-7). In this lecture, Stevens draws upon, among 
others, the thought of Jean Wahl, Jean Paulhan, and Max Planck, to demonstrate his thesis that: ‘It is often the 
case that the concepts of philosophy are poetic’ (CPP, 850). Here is one of his apposite glosses on Hegel: ‘Hegel 
called poetry the art of arts, specifically because in poetry the material of which the poem is made, that is to 
say, the language of the poem, is wholly subordinated to the idea. A poem in which the poet has chosen for his 
poem a philosophic theme should result in the poem of poems’ (Ibid, 854). 
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Stevens’ is doing? Is he trying to replace God with poetry? Or is it rather that he is 
adapting the idea of God to ‘our different intelligence’ (L, 378)? And why all of this talk 
about God anyhow in a pair of stanzas that do not apostrophise God at all? Stevens does 
not provide any easy, much less conclusive, answers to these questions. However, it 
should become shortly apparent why these questions are eminently pertinent to 
reading Stevens’ poetry, bearing in mind the claims he makes for art and poetry 
previously outlined. 
 Part of the reason why no conclusive answers are to be found within Stevens can 
be paradoxically attributed to one of the fundaments that any such answer Stevens does 
give must entail, namely, as J. Hillis Miller has it: ‘Everywhere in Stevens the reader 
confronts another proof that the sovereign law of reality is change’ (Miller, 1966,  231). 
This aligns, of course, with the second of the three imperative sub-headings of his ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’, to wit, ‘It Must Change’ (336). It is the protean, processual 
aspect of the positions informing Stevens’ poetry that are recalcitrant to a terminal 
summary; they are, by quite deliberate design, deviant, circuitously qualified, and 
extensional. The imagination’s fictions, in Stevens view, are narratives under ongoing 
emendation. These emendations are ongoing due to the imagination being subject—as 
Stevens doggedly insists in a lecture he gave at Princeton in 1941, ‘The Noble Rider and 
the Sound of Words’—to the ‘pressure of reality’: ‘By the pressure of reality, I mean the 
pressure of an external event or events on the consciousness to the exclusion of any 
power of contemplation’ (654). In effect, then, the pressure of reality is that which 
forcibly bars the mind from its will to pensive reflection. It would follow, axiomatically, 
that the mind can only contemplate the pressure of reality after the fact, if it is able to do 
so at all, depending on how overwhelming the pressure of reality might be in any given 
eventuality. Due to the sovereign law of reality being change, the imagination is coerced 
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into according with this changing reality: ‘It is one of the peculiarities of the imagination 
that it is always at the end of an era. What happens is that it is always attaching itself to 
a new reality, and adhering to it. It is not that there is a new imagination but that there 
is a new reality’ (656). 
Reality itself is a maddeningly unstable concept in Stevens’ theoretical 
vocabulary. Harold Bloom refers to Stevens’ frequent recourse to the term as ‘the 
problematic Stevensian image that he unhelpfully always called “reality”’ (Bloom, 1977, 
306), and complains that it is ‘a word I wish Stevens had renounced, since it takes away 
more meaning that it intends to give’ (Ibid). Bloom then proceeds to quote Frank 
Doggett’s account of Stevensian ‘reality’, which he judiciously characterises as the ‘best 
attempt to reduce it to order’ (Ibid, 307): 
 
Reality, in Stevens' use of the word, may be the world supposed to be antecedent in itself or the 
world created in the specific occurrence of thought, including the thinker himself and his mind 
forming the thought. Often the term offers the assumption that if the self is the central point of a 
circle of infinite radius, then reality is the not-self, including all except the abstract subjective 
center. Sometimes reality is used in the context of the nominalist position—then the word 
denotes that which is actual and stands as a phenomenal identity, the existent as opposed to the 
merely fancied. Stevens usually means by reality an undetermined base on which a mind 
constructs its personal sense of the world. Occasionally he will use the word real as a term of 
approval, as a substitute for the word true, and, therefore, no more than an expression of 
confidence. (Doggett qtd. in Bloom, 1977, 307, original italics; Doggett, 1966, 200). 
 
Stevens complicates the deterministic influence of reality on the imagination later in the 
same essay when he affirms the imagination’s ineluctable resistance to reality (reality, 
in this case, to be thought of as ‘an undetermined base on which a mind constructs its 
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personal sense of the world’). In his notebooks, Stevens writes: ‘The real is only the 
base. But it is the base’ (OP, 160). But it is a base, apparently, whose violent incursions 
upon the mind are violently opposed by the imagination: ‘It is a violence from within 
that protects us from a violence without. It is the imagination pressing back against the 
pressure of reality’ (665).16 It is, despite the bellicose rhetoric, ‘an interdependence of 
imagination and reality as equals’ (659) wherein poetic fictions are created, through 
which, according to Robert E. Doud, ‘meaning is infused into the world, and more 
meaning is derived out of the world. Imagination and reality work together to generate 
meaning: this is the great discovery of Stevens. Static facticities are transformed by 
imagination into dynamic organisms, and this does not frustrate reality, but augments it 
and helps it to reveal itself’ (Doud, Sep. 1984, 483).17 We will return later to the 
vexatious issue of what comprises these fictions in Stevens’ work; for the time being, we 
will refer to what Stevens has to say concerning the effect of the imagination on reality: 
 
The world is no longer an extraneous object, full of other extraneous objects, but an image. In the 
last analysis, it is with this image of the world that we are vitally concerned. We should not say, 
however, that the chief object of the imagination is to produce such an image. Among so many 
objects, it would be the merest improvisation to say of one, even though it is one with which we 
are vitally concerned, that it is the chief. The next step would be to assert that a particular image 
                                                          
16 It is worth remembering that ‘The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’ was composed during the beginning 
of the Second World War, but prior to America’s entry into it. Given this historical context, we may construe 
the pressure of reality as especially disruptive to the non-committal detachment so beloved of Stevens: ‘This 
much ought be said to make it a little clearer that in speaking of the pressure of reality, I am thinking of life in a 
state of violence, not physically violent, as yet, for us in America, but physically violent for millions of our 
friends and still more millions of our enemies and spiritually violent, it may be said, for everyone alive’ (659). 
Stevens, in this essay and elsewhere, idealises the Belle Époque as a period of comparative social harmony, ‘a 
time when only maniacs had disturbing things to say’ (788); see: Jahan Ramazani, (Spring, 1991), ‘Elegy and 
Anti-Elegy in Stevens’ “Harmonium”: Mockery, Melancholia, and the Pathetic Fallacy’, Journal of Modern 
Literature, 17:4, 567-82: 568. 
17 Doggett is striking at a similar point when he argues that ‘Stevens’ poetry envisions a world burgeoning in 
the flow of consciousness and created continually in his sense of it. Stevens finds the actual to be an 
intermutation of an outer reality and the life within; he knows it through an interpretation of the 
indeterminate course of perception that interpretation itself alters’ (Doggett, 1966, 201). 
~ 30 ~ 
 
was the chief image. Again, it would be the merest improvisation to say of any image of the world, 
even though it was an image with which a vast accumulation of imaginations had been content, 
that it was the chief image. The imagination itself would not remain content with it nor allow us 
to do so. It is the irrepressible revolutionist. (736). 
  
Stevens, in a letter to Bernard Heringman, July 21, 1953, refers to what he calls his 
‘reality—imagination complex’ (L, 792). Robert Rehder takes this admission to imply 
that Stevens ‘was aware of the obsessive, almost pathological quality of his interest’ 
(Rehder, 1988, 133) in ‘the relation between imagination and reality’ (Ibid). For Rehder, 
this relation contains Stevens’ ‘single subject’ (Ibid). Miller addresses the creatively 
enabling failure of this obsession: ‘After the death of the gods Stevens seemed faced 
with the relatively easy problem of reconciling imagination and reality, but such a 
reconciliation is impossible. This way and that vibrates his thought, seeking to absorb 
imagination by reality, to engulf reality in imagination, or to marry them in metaphor. 
Nothing will suffice, and the poet is driven to search tirelessly for some escape from 
struggle. This seeking is the life of his poetry’ (Miller, 1966, 258). ‘There would still 
remain the never-resting mind,’ (179), writes Stevens in ‘The Poems of Our Climate’, 
which has its irrepressibility affirmed by ‘The Well Dressed Man with a Beard’: ‘It can 
never be satisfied, the mind, never’ (224). In another letter to Heringman, March 20, 
1951, Stevens writes: ‘I have no wish to arrive at a conclusion. Sometimes I believe most 
in the imagination for a long time and then, without reasoning about it, turn to reality 
and believe in that and that alone. But both of these things project themselves endlessly 
and I want them to do just that’ (L, 710). This lack of fixity and license to improvise is 
indeed an expression of freedom from the static rigidities of a world authored by and 
ultimately terminating in God. Providential stasis is one of Stevens’ greatest anathemas: 
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Is there no change of death in paradise? 
Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs 
Hang always heavy in that perfect sky, 
Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth, 
With rivers like our own that seek for seas 
They never find, the same receding shores 
That never touch with inarticulate pang? 
    (55). 
 
There are occasions when stasis is idealized as a necessary condition for realizing 
postlapsarian paradise. The singularly outstanding example of stasis as desideratum is 
to be found in Stevens’ wonderwork of compounded superlatives: ‘Credences of 
Summer’. The speaker in this poem desires of the aestival pastoral that it be suspended 
in a midsummer pleroma, ‘Beyond which there is nothing left of time’ (322); to take the 
sun—‘the centre that I seek’—‘in its essential barrenness’ and ‘Fix it in an eternal foliage 
// And fill the foliage with arrested peace, / Joy of such permanence’ (323). But these 
occasions are rare in Stevens, and even in this abeyant idyll is ‘right ignorance / Of 
change still possible’ (323); impermanence and flux resurge as the figural mainstays. 
Stevens’ frustration, of course—if ever there was a poet more obstinately committed to 
revolving in the dark crystal of paradox—is in his desire to arrest flux in an eternal 
moment or ultimate epiphany,18 only, whether by necessity or strategic determination, 
to skeptically dismiss it on the grounds of ephemeral deficiency, and thus repeat the 
procedure over and again. 
                                                          
18 Perhaps the single most concentrated lyric expressing this desire in Stevens’ oeuvre is the marvellous 
Heraclitean-inflected poem ‘This Solitude of Cataracts’ (366). 
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David H. Hesla argues in this connection that Stevens markedly deviates from the 
tradition of philosophical realism—which Hesla traces through Plato, Plotinus, Thomas 
Aquinas, Bishop Berkeley and, somewhat egregiously, A. N. Whitehead—a lineage of 
thinkers who, in various ways, ‘grounded the being or reality of the Ideas in the Divine’ 
(Hesla, May 1985, 253). Hesla, in making his case for Stevens being a ‘philosophical 
realist for whom the ideas which inform his poetry are “unsponsored” by the holy’ 
(Ibid), continues: 
 
Because the ideas are the creatures of the poet's mind and not of God's they cannot have the 
independence and permanence of being which the philosophical tradition ascribed to them. This 
does not make them any the less real however. They are real because they are believed. God 
himself as a postulate of the ego (OP, 171) could be said to be real only so long as he could be said 
to be believed. It is, after all, the belief and not the god—the object of belief—that counts (OP, 
162). Hence, in the absence of a belief in God, the mind turns to its own creations (OP, 159). (Ibid, 
253-54).19 
 
As it would be unhelpfully digressive to rehearse these arguments here, we will put to 
one side the debate surrounding the respective merits or faults of allying Stevens with 
either a realist or nominalist position. The important thing to keep in mind is the 
restless indecision of belief, and what might comprise the object of that belief, resulting 
from Stevens’ eschewal of divine sponsorship. As he says in a letter to Hi Simons, August 
28, 1940: ‘If one no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible to merely 
disbelieve; it becomes necessary to believe in something else’ (L, 370). The speaker of 
‘Flyer’s Fall’, advancing the point, declares of the deceased pilot’s ‘nothingness of human 
                                                          
19 The citations recorded in this quotation are to the same edition of Opus Posthumous as listed in the 
abbreviations at the beginning of this document.  
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after-death’ (295), in typically equivocal Stevensian fashion, that it is the ‘dimension in 
which / We believe without belief, beyond belief’ (Ibid).  
 We have now begun to discern Stevens’ tenacity for evading any categorical 
lynchpin with which we might care to secure him. ‘Self-division, contradiction, 
perpetual oscillations of thought’, writes Miller, ‘these are the constants in Stevens’ 
work’ (Miller, 1966, 258). He goes on: ‘It is possible to develop radically different 
notions of Stevens’ aims as a poet, and for each of these it is easy to find apposite 
passages from the texts’ (Ibid). This appraisal is closely echoed by Nathan A. Scott, Jr.: 
‘So generous is the hospitality that this Connoisseur of Chaos offers to a wide variety of 
divergent perspectives and projects that one can, of course, find some basis in the 
poetry on which to ground any one of a dozen or so quite different views of his basic 
tendency’ (Scott, 1993, 10).20 As such, Stevens’ poetry is susceptible, depending upon 
one’s perspectival or prejudicial emphases (which probably amount to the same thing), 
to being variously interpreted as humanistic and/or atheistic in its basic tendency. One 
must tread carefully, however, when it comes to affixing these labels too readily to 
Stevens’ work. There are plainly too many watchwords punctuating Stevens’ own 
pronouncements on belief, elaborations of which are intertwined throughout his poetic 
oeuvre, forbidding the reduction of his poetry to a pervasively humanistic and/or 
atheistic tendency. In another letter to Hi Simons, January 9, 1940, for instance, he 
                                                          
20 Theodore Sampson is less gregarious about Stevens’ openness to diverse interpretation than Scott Jr., more 
lacerating than Miller, when discussing Imre Salusinszky’s strategy of asking ‘participants to provide an on-the-
spot interpretation of Stevens’ poem “Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself”’ (Sampson, 2000, 186-
87). On Sampson’s evaluation, Salusinszky’s interviewees—whom are comprised of such critical heavyweights 
as Harold Bloom, Jacques Derrida (who declined to offer an interpretation of the poem), Northrop Frye, 
Geoffrey H. Hartman, Barbara Johnson, Frank Kermode, Frank Lentricchia, J. Hillis Miller and Edward Said)—
‘either interpret the poem in a way that best suits his or her a priori theorizations about literature in general; 
or, lacking a theory in which to frame their argument, they proceed to bluff their way to what sounds like a 
plausible interpretation—something that almost all of Stevens’ poems allow us to do with impunity’ (Ibid, 
187). 
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writes: ‘My trouble, and the trouble of a great many people, is the loss of belief in the 
sort of God in Whom we were all brought up to believe. Humanism would be the natural 
substitute, but the more I see of humanism the less I like it’ (L, 348). The forked 
implication of this statement is that on the one hand there is an alternative to be sought 
outside of the institutionalised God of Judaeo-Christian tradition—in Stevens’ case the 
‘dried-up Presbyterian’ (L, 792) faith of his childhood—and on the other hand, that a 
reduction to humanism is unsatisfactory. In a similarly ambivalent statement made in a 
late letter to Sister Bernetta Quinn, December 21, 1951, Stevens reiterates his 
abandonment of the God of his upbringing while flatly denying an alignment with 
atheism: ‘I am not an atheist although I do not believe to-day in the same God in whom I 
believed when I was a boy’ (L, 735). But to claim, in the light of this pronouncement, 
that Stevens is hereby a theist would be entirely misguided. The poet who would write 
in one of the most centrally important of his poems: ‘The death of one god is the death 
of all’ (329),21 and would celebrate the dissolution of the gods thus: ‘To see the gods 
dispelled in mid-air and dissolve like clouds is one of the great human experiences. It is 
not as if they had gone over the horizon to disappear for a time; nor as if they had been 
overcome by other gods of greater power and profounder knowledge. It is simply that 
they came to nothing’ (842), is not a person to whom the title of theist could be 
conscionably ascribed. A good deal of the indeterminacy surrounding Stevens’ non-
theistic position can be cleared away by bearing a crucial distinction in mind: Stevens 
does believe that the world exists post mortem Dei, both the God of monotheism and the 
gods of ancient mythology are dismissed, but the idea of God emphatically remains. How 
Stevens translates this idea into our modern intelligence is, in Scott Jr.’s memorable 
                                                          
21 The poem in question is of course ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. This line is also independently recorded 
in his notebooks (see: 905), assuming there the stature of a standalone maxim. 
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phrase, ‘[t]he long meditation recorded by his poetry’ (Scott, 1993, 10). Stevens gives 
the elusive nature of this long meditation a suitably evasive description in an earlier 
letter to Sister Bernetta Quinn, April 7, 1948: 
 
I don’t want to turn to stone under your very eyes by saying “This is the centre that I seek and 
this alone.” Your mind is much too much like my own for it to seem to be an evasion on my part 
to say merely that I do seek a centre and expect to go on seeking it. I don’t say that I shall not find 
it or that I do not expect to find it. It is the great necessity even without specific identification. (L, 
584). 
 
This elusive centre that Stevens expects to go on seeking, which he concedes to 
identifying as ‘the great necessity without identification’, is the numinous target of what 
this thesis will heuristically posit as Stevens’ interrogative immanentism. AS this thesis 
will argue, interrogative immanentism is fundamentally a revisionary activity through 
which Stevens attempts to reorient a transcendent social imaginary22 to an immanent 
domain. We will discover throughout Stevens’ work, however, that this transition is not 
a simple logical procedure of replacing x with y, but might more accurately be conceived 
of as a rhetorical transfusion of x into y, with a diverse array of borrowings, 
                                                          
22 I must acknowledge an indebtedness to the work of Matthew Mutter, within which I was first alerted to the 
term ‘social imaginary’ (Mutter, 2009, 27). Mutter adopts the term from Charles Taylor’s Modern Social 
Imaginaries: ‘By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes 
people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode.  I am thinking, rather, of the 
ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them 
and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations...There are important differences  between social imaginary and social theory.  I 
adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people 'imagine' their social 
surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, legends. It is 
also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the 
social imaginary is that it is shared  by large  groups  of people, if not  the  whole society. Which leads to a third 
difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and 
a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor, 2004, 23). 
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transfigurations, eliminations, syntheses, and substitutions imbricating the passage of 
transfer. 
Charles M. Murphy, an American Roman Catholic priest and commentator, makes 
the contradistinction between Stevens and St Teresa of Avila, that whereas for the latter 
‘the divine and earthly realms are simply opposed to one another’ (Murphy, 1997, 11), 
for Stevens, spirituality ‘[t]o be believable…must be rooted in the earth to which we 
belong’ (Ibid). ‘The greatest poverty is not to live / In a physical world’ (286), opines the 
speaker of ‘Esthétique du Mal’. This ‘transcendence downward’ as Scott Jr., inverting the 
typical axial trajectory, insightfully phrases it (Scott, 1993, 10-39 passim), is what 
Murphy identifies as Stevens’ ‘most significant contribution to our present spiritual 
situation’ (Murphy, 1997, 11). 
The stirrings of Stevens’ immanentist worldview can be discerned in journal 
entries dating from his early adulthood. One such entry of August 1st, 1899, during the 
summer before Stevens’ third year at Harvard, reads: ‘I’m completely satisfied that 
behind every physical fact there is a divine force’ (L, 32). Mutter characterises the 
disposition informing this remark as ‘a Symbolist mystical attitude that would be 
completely anathema to his mind a couple of decades later’ (Mutter, Fall 2011, 765, n. 
18). Both James Longenbach and Joan Richardson infer from this statement an 
Emersonian influence, the latter suggesting that in following Emerson, the young 
‘Stevens considered the divine not as the idea of eternal or imminent being but as an 
immanent activity’ (Longenbach, 1991, 18; Richardson, 2007, 13). This inference finds a 
striking parallel with one of Stevens’ later Adagia: ‘The world is a force, not a presence’ 
(911). The shift from divine to worldly force is characteristic of Stevens’ immanentism 
(as it is of Weber’s disenchantment). However, rather than concede to Mutter’s 
consideration that the former betrays a Symbolist mysticism that is anathema to the 
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maturer Stevens’ naturalism, I would contend that it is more constructive to 
acknowledge the fundamental continuity between these two propositions, namely that 
they are both posited as occurrences within the world—whatever the ontological 
identity of the agency of the force might be, neither configuration is postulated as, in 
fact neither can be, transcendent. It is in keeping with this logic that Stevens can write: 
‘God is in me or else is not at all (does not exist)’ (911). This apothegm does not amount 
to an admission that God exists, but asserts that the condition for God’s existence is that 
it is immanent or else it is not at all. It is only a short stride from this position to stating, 
as Stevens also does in his Adagia, that ‘God is a postulate of the ego’ (910), to: ‘This 
happy creature— It is he that invented the Gods. It is he that put into their mouths the 
only words they have ever spoken’ (906)—variants on the familiar trope of inverting 
Genesis 1:27.23 
 
                                                          
23 This notion receives its most extended prose treatment in Stevens’ essay ‘Two or Three Ideas’, in which he 
discusses the proposition that ‘the style of the gods and the gods themselves are one’ (841). Stevens claims 
this part of his discussion pertains to ‘the gods, both ancient and modern, both foreign and domestic’ (841), 
but that for the sake of simplicity he will ‘speak only of the ancient and the foreign gods’ (843). This is, of 
course, an underhanded manoeuvre on Stevens’ part in order to smuggle in implications pertaining to all gods. 
Stevens’ expatiates on the idea that in an age of disbelief ‘[o]ne attitude is that the gods of classical mythology 
were merely aesthetic projections’ (843), and asks the question: ‘Is it one of the normal activities of humanity, 
in the solitude of reality and in the unworthy treatment of solitude, to create companions, a little colossal as I 
have said, who, if not superficially explicative, are, at least, assumed to be full of the secret of things and who 
in any event bear in themselves even, if they do not always wear it, the peculiar majesty of mankind’s sense of 
worth, neither too much nor too little?’ (843). He insists that ‘[t]he people, not the priests, made the gods’ 
(843), by which he means the poets or their closest analogues: ‘he that composed the most moving of Apollo’s 
hymns’ (843). The two propositions that he examines surrounding that pertaining to ‘the style of the gods and 
the gods themselves are one’, are ‘the style of a poem and the poem itself are one…[and] the style of men and 
men themselves are one’ (844). In typical conditional fashion, Stevens proposes that ‘if there is any true 
relation between the propositions, it might well be the case that the parts of these propositions are 
interchangeable’ (844). He later proceeds to claim that ‘[i]n the presence of the gods, or of their images, we 
are in the presence of perfection in created beings. The gods are a definition of perfection in ideal creatures’ 
(847). This is all preamble to the ultimate point that Stevens’ is wanting to make, which is that if the foregoing 
propositions are interchangeable, and that ‘we use the same faculties when we write poetry that we use when 
we create gods or fix the bearing of men in reality’ (850), then ‘the unity of style and the poem itself is a unity 
of language and life that exposes both in a supreme sense. Its collation with the unity of style and the gods and 
the unity of style and men is intended to demonstrate this’ (850). In sum, Stevens’ triadic connection of god, 
poem and man in a stylistic holism, is a rhetorical demonstration of the poet’s supreme importance as both 
the creator of gods and fixers of reality. 




(4) ‘I WISH THAT GROVES STILL WERE SACRED—OR, AT LEAST, THAT 
SOMETHING WAS’ 
 
Stevens’ dissatisfactions with the consolations of the church find an early expression in 
other journal entries recorded during his young adulthood. On June 10, 1899 he 
complains that ‘[t]he mind cannot always live in a “divine ether.” The lark cannot always 
sing at heaven’s gate’ (L, 32). On August 10, 1902, he rehearses an argument inherited 
from Wordsworth, Emerson and Whitman: ‘An old argument with me is that the true 
religious force in the world is not the church but the world itself: the mysterious callings 
of Nature and our responses. […] As I sat dreaming with the Congregation I felt how the 
glittering altar worked on my senses stimulating and consoling them; and as I went 
tramping through the fields and woods I beheld every leaf and blade of grass revealing 
or rather betokening the Invisible’ (L, 58-59). Five years later, during the long courtship 
of his future wife Elsie née Moll—a still practising Christian—he confides, after a fit of 
house-cleaning during which he threw out his Bible, that ‘I hate the look of a Bible’ (L, 
102). Two years after that, in a somewhat more conciliatory disposition, he writes to 
Elsie on the subject of God’s existence: ‘I think that everyone admits that [God exists] in 
some form or other. — The thought makes the world sweeter—even if God be no more 
than the mystery of Life’ (L, 140). One could amass further examples, but the point by 
now should be sufficiently made: Stevens turn from the orthodoxies of the church to the 
search for immanence is manifestly apparent from his earliest adulthood. Three 
decades later, Stevens makes a frank admission: ‘I ought to say that it is a habit of mind 
with me to be thinking of some substitute for religion’ (L, 348). Stevens is sixty years old 
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when he writes this, and—famously a late publisher—in his mid-career as an 
established poet with three collections in print.24 The significance of this chronology is 
that Stevens, having already lived for six decades on this earth, and with only fifteen 
years remaining in his life (though he wasn’t to know this of course), could summarily 
remark that the revisionary activity of religious substitution was a habit of mind with 
him, that is to say an idée fixe, and one that would only become increasingly stark in the 
latter half of his poetic oeuvre.25 Furthermore, Stevens notably makes this statement in 
the present continuous, which would indicate that this ‘substitute for religion’ is yet an 
ongoing and inconclusive concern for him. As late in his life as when he wrote a letter to 
Thomas McGreevy on October 24, 1952, Stevens would still be no more certain of where 
he stood on the issue: ‘At my age it would be nice to be able to read more and think 
more and be myself more and to make up my mind about God, say, before it is too late, 
or at least before he makes his mind up about me’ (L, 763). In a letter to Henry Church, 
written back in October 15th, 1940, we find Stevens’ oft-cited ‘Memorandum’ (from 
which I have already briefly quoted), in which he declares:  
 
The major poetic idea in the world is and always has been the idea of God. One of the visible 
 movements of the modern imagination is the movement away from the idea of God. The poetry 
 that created the idea of God will either adapt it to our different intelligence, or create a substitute 
 for it, or make it unnecessary. These alternatives probably mean the same thing, but the intention 
                                                          
24 Stevens’ first collection Harmonium was published in September 1923 (revised in 1931) when he was already 
43 years old, succeeded by Ideas of Order (1936), The Man With the Blue Guitar (1937), Parts of a World 
(1942), Transport to Summer (1947), The Auroras of Autumn (1950), The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens 
including The Rock (1954), which taken together comprise the collections he had published during his lifetime; 
Opus Posthumous (1959) and The Palm at the End of the Mind (1967) gather together his uncollected poems, 
both late and early, as well as several items of prose, his few plays, and a miscellany of journal-culled adagia. It 
would be misleading, of course, to suggest that Stevens hadn’t begun writing poetry until well into adulthood. 
Stevens had written poems and published variously, albeit not prolifically, in magazines and journals since his 
teenage years; a poem written in adolescence entitled ‘Autumn’ (481), for instance, appeared in his high 
school magazine in January 1898, a full quarter of a century before his first published collection. 
25 Admittedly the much larger half, ranging from Parts of a World to the late uncollected poems. 
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 is not to foster a cult. The knowledge of poetry is a part of philosophy, and a part of science; the 
 import of poetry is the import of the spirit. (L, 378).26 
 
It is tempting, in light of the evidence thus far accumulated, to claim that Stevens’ 
position regarding the function of poetry is ostensibly Arnoldian. Many critics have 
done just that. Miller is among the earliest of Stevens’ critics to baldly advance this case: 
‘In defining poetry as a substitute for religion Stevens is joining himself to a tradition 
extending from the romantics through Matthew Arnold down to our own day’ (Miller, 
1966, 224). Herbert J. Stern, writing at the same time as Miller, says that ‘for Stevens, no 
less than for Matthew Arnold, the salient function of art was one we may legitimately 
call a religious function’ (Stern, 1966, 89). Adalaide Kirby Morris argues that although 
‘he plays Pater in proclaiming “the morality of the poet’s radiant and productive 
atmosphere” to be the “morality of the right sensation” (NA 58), Stevens is more like 
Arnold in the serious elaboration of his ethics. He too believed that “we have to turn to 
poetry to interpret life for us, to sustain us”’ (Morris, 1974, 7).27 So entrenched had this 
                                                          
26 Mutter, however, is insistent that Stevens’ distinctions do not mean the same thing. In fact, he erects the 
entire structure of his argument on the scaffold of a scrupulous maintenance of these very distinctions. In 
Mutter’s view, the first option—‘adaptation’—‘is a revisionist strategy. One takes what  began  as  a  religious  
concept  and  prunes  it,  reinterprets  it,  or translates it in the light of “modern knowledge”’ (Mutter, Fall 
2011, 743). He presents, by way of illustration, the examples of eschatological doctrine being transformed into 
modern doctrines of progress, or of recontextualising the doctrine of the Fall, or the alienation of man from 
God, as the alienation of the subject from the object (Ibid). He then proceeds to criticise this strategy on the 
grounds ‘that it tends to disfigure the original concepts to the point where they are no longer recognizable. It 
raises questions of legitimacy and coherence that force one to ask whether original religious ideas remain 
authentic and intelligible in an alien framework’ (Ibid, 743-44). Substitution, he argues, ‘overlaps with 
adaptation but has a different logic. Substitution shifts the attention from the content of the religious idea to 
the needs and desires that generated it’ (Ibid, 744), and claims that this ‘method is at the heart of Stevens’s 
well-known interest in a “supreme fiction”’ (Ibid). He further claims that under this model ‘secularization does 
not necessitate the expulsion of religious content, only its rearticulation outside of mythic categories’ (Ibid). 
Mutter labels the last strategy ‘elimination’, which, he argues, ‘challenges the assumptions of both the 
adaptive and substitutionary models. Elimination does not look for substitute satisfactions, but uproots the 
very needs, desires, and moral assumptions that were a part of the religious framework’ (Ibid, 745). Mutter 
rightly discerns that ‘Stevens never definitively chose among the three paradigms, but he experimented with 
them throughout his career, exploring their difficulties and limitations’ (Ibid). This thesis will assimilate, where 
appropriate, Mutter’s well extrapolated distinctions. 
27 Morris is quoting from Arnold’s famous essay “The Study of Poetry”: ‘More and more mankind will discover 
that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science 
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critical position become that Frank Lentricchia in 1975, reviewing two recent books on 
Stevens (one of them the Morris book just quoted), could parody ‘the dominant mode of 
criticism of Wallace Stevens’ (Lentricchia, March 1975, 75), in the following terms: 
‘Stevens fulfils the prophecy of Matthew Arnold that after the ravages of science had 
been totally visited upon the magical world-view, the poet (of all folk) will provide us 
“our consolation and our stay”’ (Ibid, 76). Daniel R. Schwarz, who would appear to 
remain wilfully ignorant of this commonplace, writes of Stevens in 1993: ‘To an extent 
he has a more Arnoldian temperament than has been realized and believes, like Arnold, 
that poetry can be a substitute for religion’ (Schwarz, 1993, 13). 
 There are some detractors. ‘After one has abandoned a belief in God poetry is 
that essence which takes its place as life’s redemption,’ quotes David Daiches, but 
dissents with: ‘This was not Matthew Arnold’s position, that the best part of religion is 
its poetry and that the documents of religion should be interpreted as poetry. Stevens 
had no wish to preserve a belief in Christianity by moving from a literal to a poetic 
interpretation of its biblical sources’ (Daiches, 1984, 162). Perhaps not, but Stevens, as 
we will come to see, was not shy of utilising biblical and other Christian figures as 
manipulable materia poetica. David R. Jarraway admonishes that ‘it would be a mistake 
to think that the modern poet might offer himself and his work as a replacement for the 
loss of faith as Matthew Arnold once suggested. To the contrary, Stevens remarks, “we 
do not say that the poet is to take the place of the gods” (842). To do so would be an 
argument for humanism, and Stevens is quite emphatic that “the more I see of 
humanism the less I like it”’ (Jarraway, 2007, 193-94). Jarraway, whose work on 
Stevens’ complex relationship with belief is otherwise quite cogent and meticulous, 
                                                          
will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes for religion and philosophy will appear incomplete 
without it’ (Arnold, 1970, 340). The Stevens’ quotes that Morris cites are to the same edition of The Necessary 
Angel as listed in the abbreviations section at the beginning of this document. 
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seems to be neglecting in this instance Stevens’ comments in a letter to Barbara Church, 
August 12, 1940: ‘As scepticism becomes both complete and profound, we face either a 
true civilization or a blank; and literature ought to be one of the factors to determine the 
choice. Certainly, if civilization is to consist only of man himself, and it is, the arts must 
take the place of divinity, at least as a stage in whatever general principle or progress is 
involved’ (L, 564, my emphasis). Eleanor Cook claims that ‘[a]t first, [Stevens] seemed to 
suppose, like Matthew Arnold, that poetry could take the place of religion, a vague 
humanist view’ (Cook, 2007, 20), but goes onto argue the following: 
 
Arnold’s simple substitution of poetry for religion has one great weakness: the obvious fact that 
poetry or imaginative literature simply did not have the force of religion in Victorian society, nor 
did it seem likely to attain such force. “Biblical imagination is one thing and the poetic 
imagination, inevitably, something else” (731). Imagination, Stevens said late in life, is the next 
greatest power to faith. This important qualification needs to be remembered; it turns up in 
1949: “next to holiness is the will thereto, / And next to love is the desire for love” (“An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven” III). And it turns up in 1951: “Men feel that the imagination is the next 
greatest power to faith: the reigning prince” (748, [Cook’s] italics). To be sure, Stevens’s phrase, 
“the reigning prince,” bears watching. A reigning prince is something more than a crown prince, 
though something less than a reigning king. Stevens is leaving open the question of eventual 
reign. (Ibid, 21).28 
 
What these detractions all gesture towards is the inherent problematics of advancing 
art, literature, poetry, what have you, as a surrogate for religion. It is an inevitable 
problem for any artist who would presume to arrogate for their art such a role, and as 
such is a problem for Stevens. One of the most striking aspects of this problem, as 
                                                          
28 The Stevens quotes cited in this passage are to the same Library of America edition of Wallace Stevens: 
Collected Poetry and Prose as listed in the abbreviations at the beginning of this document 
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Michael Kaufmann points out, is that ‘all versions of the Arnoldian replacement theory 
rely on an analogical paradox: to arrive at a final act of differentiation, these narratives 
must initially rely on a supposed similarity’ (Kaufmann, Autumn 2007, 616). The 
paradox turns on the presupposition that there is such a thing as essentially secular and 
essentially religious categories. Kaufmann, following the lead of Talal Asad, contends 
that although ‘[t]here is no idea, person, experience, text, institution, or historical period 
that could be categorized as essentially, inherently, or exclusively secular or religious’ 
(Ibid, 608), non-essentialist distinctions between the same terms nevertheless ‘function 
meaningfully within particular contexts or what [Asad] calls, borrowing from 
Wittgenstein, “discursive grammars”’ (Ibid, 610). ‘Since the secular and the religious 
depend on each other for meaning,’ Kaufmann continues, ‘they must always be present 
at the same time; we can never therefore trace a simple trajectory from one to the other 
because each concept is meaningless in isolation’ (Ibid, original italics). 
Returning now to the paradox of Arnoldian replacement theory: 
 
…the larger trajectory of a secularization narrative aims at a final differentiation between the 
religious and the secular, between religion and literature. And yet along the way it must assert 
that the two are so similar that they are practically interchangeable: literature can replace 
religion with very little fanfare, very little conflict. Asad helps explain this paradox in part by 
reminding us that the interplay of similarity and difference is a function of any two terms in 
binary opposition, or in an analogy. What is more important here is that these two particular sets 
of terms—religious/secular, literature/religion—are placed both in an analogy and in opposition 
in the first place. “Secular” literary culture, so goes the theory, is analogous enough to dogmatic 
religion to be able to replace, and then eventually oppose it. The initial act of identification in the 
replacement narrative enables a final and determinative act of differentiation. (Ibid, 616). 
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Kaufmann suggests a possible way out of this paradoxical bind by referring to the work 
of Colin Jager, whose ‘complex account of Romanticism…positions the literary as a third 
term, neither merely secular nor a replacement religion, but through imaginative acts of 
aesthetic representation, able to stand within and beside both categories’ (Ibid, 622). 
Stevens applies a similar logic to free himself from the either/or bind of the analogous 
categories of theism and humanism. In a letter to Henry Church, 21 April, 1943, he 
writes: ‘We are confronted by a choice of ideas: the idea of God and the idea of man. The 
purpose of the NOTES is to suggest the possibility of a third idea: the idea of a fictive 
being, or state, or thing as the object of belief by way of making up for that element in 
humanism which is its chief defect’ (Stevens qtd. in Bates, 1985, 203). We will return to 
Stevens’ ‘third idea’, as to the content of his ‘fictions’, in due course.29 
                                                          
29 Another aspect of the art as replacement religion problem is the ‘adequacy’ argument. Robert Onopa, 
attempting to push irrecoverably the discourse of art as a spiritual project into a corner of ill-repute, argues 
that ‘[a]lthough a connection between art and religion has been asserted in a variety of ways since the 
beginnings of Romanticism, the institutionalization of art into a formal religion has never taken hold’ (Onopa, 
1973, 363). To qualify Onopa’s assertion: nobody has ever made the attempt in the wake of Romanticism to 
institutionalize art into a formal religion in any socially prescriptive and binding fashion; there has never been a 
Nicene Council convened on behalf of art, nor would such an intervention necessarily be desirable even were 
one proposed. Certainly, individual exponents have attempted to extol the spiritual and compensatory value of 
art in a putative age of religious scepticism—Shelley, Arnold and Stevens, as we have seen, are but an 
exemplary triad of the case in point—but without, as Jacque Barzun argues, resultant enjoinment. ‘Art is of all 
things the worst-suited to the purpose’ (Barzun, 1974, 90), Barzun writes, of establishing a unified spiritual 
community: 
 
By its very richness and variety art cannot do the simplest things that religion, philosophy, 
and the state do by their nature. In our cant phrase, art cannot be “a way of life” because—to take examples at 
random—it lacks a theology or even a popular mythology of its own; it has no bible, no ritual, and no sanctions 
for behavior. We are called to enjoy but we are not enjoined. 
[…] 
Since art brings to life in [the] realm of Imagination a thousand unrelated truths, art cannot be the unifier of 
either the individual consciousness or mankind’s spiritual beliefs. Art is inescapably Pluralistic. It thrives on 
diversity and knows nothing of contradiction: all its opposite truths are equally true, because its type of 
knowledge is knowledge of, not knowledge about. Hence its power of endless growth. No one can tell what the 
next artist will discover and transfix as new truth, any more than one can tell him what he shall discover. He is 
not himself aware of his terminus, however conscious he may be of his means. This being the state of affairs, it is 
absurd to speak of “what all art teaches us.” Even should there be such a lesson, there are no penalties for 
deviating from it. (Ibid, 90-91). 
 
Although I find Barzun’s argument compelling, I would contend that the shortcomings of both Onopa and 
Barzun’s criticisms is in their tendency to conflate the openness of spiritual seeking with the closure of 
religious finding. 
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 When Stevens asserts, as has been illustrated, that poetry is a spiritual project, 
what he is indicating is that poetry is the medium in which he has elected to reckon 
with, speculate upon, reaffirm, challenge, reject and/or transfigure the culturally 
inherited articulations, figurations and beliefs of spiritual discourse. It does not follow 
from this that he is trying to establish a religious program for other people to follow—as 
quoted earlier, Stevens’ ‘intention is not to foster a cult’. To put it bluntly, he is making 
inquiries rather than he is proselytizing. Stevens may indeed, and does, make various 
pronouncements in his poems—provisional answers to his various inquiries—but 
nowhere deludes himself into thinking that readers will assent to his pronouncements 
as though they were authorised by divine fiat. Moreover, Stevens, a thoroughly 
discursive poet, does present arguments in his poems, but as with all arguments it is up 
to their recipients to affirm or deny the validity and applicability of the arguments in 
question.30 Leaving Stevens’ position on the matter to one side for the moment, an 
individual could declare ‘Art is my God’, and further claim to find an immanent salvation 
in the engagement with, or practice of, art. The critic, whether or not he or she might 
deem this individual deluded or naïve, would be at a loss to refute this individual’s 
claims or the validity of his or her purported salvific experience with art—such is the 
impassable way with declarative commitments of faith. 
 That said, it is by no means the intention of this thesis to construct something 
that Stevens himself, in the final analysis, does not construct: a programmatic system of 
belief. Stevens does not, in the manner of William Blake or W. B. Yeats, develop a 
systematic cosmo-mythology—an accomplished supreme fiction we might say—of his 
own making. In the letter quoted earlier, in which Stevens states that it is a habit of 
                                                          
30 Poetic argument is a phenomenon frequently neglected by critics and theorists for whom, I imagine, facing 
up to the evidence of poetic argument would prove catastrophically inconvenient for their respective theses. 
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mind with him to be thinking of some substitute for religion, he immediately qualifies 
this statement by saying: ‘I don’t necessarily mean some substitute for the church, 
because no one believes in the church as an institution more than I do’ (L, 348). In a late 
letter to Bernard Heringman, July 21, 1953, to deflect what he infers as his 
correspondent’s expectation of ‘a monumental explanation of my religion’ (L, 792), 
Stevens states, without equivocation, ‘my activities are not religious’ (Ibid). He writes in 
an even later letter, to Robert Pack, December 28, 1954, less than eight months from his 
death, ‘in projecting a supreme fiction, I cannot think of anything more fatal than to 
state it definitely and incautiously’ (L, 863), and concludes the letter with: ‘The last 
thing in the world that I should want to do would be to formulate a system’ (L, 864). 
What these late pronouncements retroactively augur is Stevens’ awareness that poetry 
and religion are functionally distinct cultural praxes. That they happen to be in 
conversation with each other does not make them essentially the same thing—an 
essential identity of either praxis, much less an essential identity of one with the other, 
we have already dispensed with. What is the case, however, is that they can, and do, 
inform one another, in all of the other’s heterogeneous articulations. 
 Now that the important problem of Stevens’ religious substitution has been 
contextualised, we can turn to outlining the particular investigation into Stevens’ poetry 
that this thesis intends to conduct, namely, Stevens’ rhetorical engagement with the 




(5) ‘AND SAY OF WHAT YOU SEE IN THE DARK…’ 
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The early twentieth century Calvinist Theologian Rudolf Otto advances a description of 
the ‘numinous’ in an attempt to account for the unique quality of religious experience in 
his 1917 book Des Helige (The Idea of the Holy).31  Otto’s account of the numinous, in 
short, is of a phenomenological cast and is posited as the idea of the ‘holy’ (or sacred) 
minus its rational and moral aspects (Otto, 1950, 1-7). The numinous constitutes an 
intuited, felt experience of something ‘objective and outside the self’ (Ibid, 11) which is 
conducive to a ‘feeling of dependence’ (Ibid, 10), or what Otto calls ‘creature-feeling’ 
(Ibid, 8-11, passim). The ‘nature and the modes of its manifestations’ (Ibid, 11) finds its 
expression in what Otto terms the mysterium tremendum et fascinans (Ibid, 12-40, 
passim), which, simply described, is the experience of a wholly mysterious other (on 
mysterium see: Ibid, 25-30), a ‘numen praesens’ (Ibid, 11), which inspires feelings of 
awefulness, overpoweringness, and urgency on the one hand (on tremendum see: Ibid, 
12-24), but also ‘shows itself as something uniquely attractive and fascinating […] in a 
strange harmony of contrasts’ (Ibid, 31, original italics), inspiring bliss, intoxication, 
rapture and grace on the other (on fascinans see: Ibid, 31-40). The underpinning thrust 
of Otto’s argument is that the experiences which he describes are unique to and 
contingent upon the presence of the divine, which, he argues, evolves over time in 
human awareness from a primeval feeling of uncanny daemonic dread, a feeling which 
endows a manifold conception of ghosts, occupant spirits, and the soul, which 
progresses eventually to a conception of gods, before culminating in worship of the God 
(Ibid, 14-17; 26-29) whose ultimate expression is found, quite presumptuously, in 
Christianity which ‘stands out in complete superiority over all its sister religions’ (Ibid, 
                                                          
31 It is Otto’s descriptions of the numinous in The Idea of the Holy whence this term enters popular modern 
discourse. The most famous exponent of the numinous after Otto is C. G. Jung, for whom the numinous 
becomes an important part of his individuation process, of the coming into consciousness of the ultimately 
unknowable Self. See: Leon Schlamm, (2007), ‘C. G. Jung and numinous experience: Between the known and 
the unknown’, European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 9:4, 403-414. 
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142). Otto also argues that human beings are universally predisposed towards a 
religious impulsion (see: Ibid, 136-142), and that numinous experience is the originary 
motive force of this impulsion (Ibid, 14-15).32 
 Otto’s foregoing account of the numinous can be stripped of its 
phenomenological and theological trappings without doing any violence to the concept 
of mysterium at its core; the mysterium is, after all, the a priori condition upon which 
Otto’s numinous phenomenology and theory of evolutionary theology is predicated: 
 
Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, mysterium would first mean merely a secret or a 
mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained; and so far 
mysterium is itself merely an ideogram, an analogical notion taken from the natural sphere, 
illustrating, but incapable of exhaustively rendering, our real meaning. Taken in the religious 
sense, that which is ‘mysterious’ is—to give it perhaps the most striking expression—the ‘wholly 
other’…that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which 
therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny’, and is contrasted with it, filling the mind 
with blank wonder and astonishment. (Ibid, 26). 
 
The implication here is that mysterium taken in its natural sense is mysterious only until 
comprehension and explanation have disclosed its secret, which is somewhat analogous 
to Weber’s principle of calculability previously outlined. Otto himself distinguishes a 
‘mystery’ from a ‘problem’ in a way that accords with Weber’s disenchantment thesis 
regarding the latter, while taking leave of it on behalf of the former: 
                                                          
32 I haven’t the space, much less the requirement, to enter into a prolonged analytical critique of Otto’s 
arguments here. I would direct the interested reader to: David Barstow, (Jun., 1976), ‘Otto and Numinous 
Experience’, Religious Studies, 12:2, 159-176, for a critique of Otto’s under-represented indebtedness to the 
philosophy of J. F. Fries, and, more importantly, of issues of coherency regarding Otto’s ‘boldness of 
attempting to unite in one movement of thought, theses of three distinct types, from the disciplines of 
philosophy, phenomenology of religion, and theology; and thereby, by implication, of grappling with the 
problems of the relations between the types of judgement made in these disciplines’ (Barstow, 1976, 160). 
~ 49 ~ 
 
 
It might be objected that the mysterious is something which is and remains absolutely and 
invariably beyond our understanding, whereas that which merely eludes our understanding for a 
time but is perfectly intelligible in principle should not be called a ‘mystery’, but merely a 
‘problem’. […] The truly ‘mysterious’ object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not 
only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon 
something inherently ‘wholly other’, whose kind and character are incommensurable with our 
own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes chill and numb. (Otto, 1950, 
28). 
 
Leaving aside the fact that Weberian intellectualization is an incomplete 
(uncompletable?) process, the compulsion to recover the mysterium of the ‘wholly 
other’—to which ‘the concepts of the ‘transcendent’ and the ‘supernatural’ become 
forthwith designations’ (Ibid, 30)—presents itself as the strategic ne plus ultra of 
challenging the empirically explicable by means of counterposing the numinously 
inexplicable. Stevens is driving at an affined notion when in his essay ‘Effects of Analogy’ 
he declares that: ‘The corporeal world exits as the common denominator of the 
incorporeal worlds of its inhabitants’ (715). The corporeal world is the empirically 
given world to which we all are commonly denominated; the incorporeal worlds of its 
inhabitants, on the other hand, are constituted by each of the inhabitants’ idiosyncratic 
interpretations of the corporeal world (hence the shift from singular to plural), which 
are manifest in accordance with their beliefs and the ordering and transfigurative 
powers of their imaginations. This interaction between the corporeal and incorporeal 
worlds could also be characterised as the tension drawn between materialism on the 
one hand and idealism on the other. Stevens plays on this opposition in his early long 
poem ‘The Comedian as the Letter C’. In the opening canto the narrator states that ‘man 
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is the intelligence of his soil / The sovereign ghost’ (22), which presupposes that the 
soil, a synecdoche for the corporeal world, is but the product of the sovereign ghost’s 
intelligence, that is to say, the creative mind of ‘man’. By the fourth canto the 
formulation is reversed: ‘his soil is man’s intelligence. / That’s better. That’s worth 
crossing seas to find’ (29). Crispin, the poem’s protagonist, is now better satisfied that 
‘man’s intelligence’, a synecdoche for the collective incorporeal worlds of each corporeal 
inhabitant, is a product of the soil, the corporeal world as above. The oscillations and 
teetering balances between these polarities prove a fecund source of rhetorical 
generativity throughout Stevens’ poetry. Suffice it to say, it is the incorporeal worlds of 
each individual’s imagination, unsurprisingly, that are most amenable to numinous 
perfusion. 
 The ultimate limitation to the description and expression of the mystery at the 
heart of the numinous, on Otto’s account, in fact of the numinous per se, is that it can 
only be recovered via negativa. The most direct means of description and expression of 
the numinous in art in particular, according to Otto, which ‘are in a noteworthy way 
negative’ (68), are ‘darkness’, ‘silence’ and ‘emptiness’ (68-69). It is worth emphasising 
that the numinous thus described is ontologically negative, a metaphysical abstraction 
entirely absented of spirits, souls, ghosts, daemons, angels and gods. The manifestation 
of these entities believed to populate a supramundane realm are, on Otto’s evolutionary 
model, later developed through humankind’s diverse mythologies: it is the intuition of 
this ‘wholly other’ whatever, the numinous experience in its most incipient form, that 
first stirs the primeval consciousness to conceive of the divine. It is of the utmost 
importance, however, to contend that the mysterium for which Otto claims that the 
concepts of the transcendent and the supernatural have become forthwith designations, 
could just as readily be designated immanent and natural. There is nothing inherent to 
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the concept of the mysterious, inexplicable, ‘wholly other’ which could not be 
predicated on mundane experience alone. In point of fact, this latter dyad is the more 
compelling predication. It is epistemologically consistent that this intuition for the 
mysterium is immanent and natural in its provenance as the transcendent and 
supernatural are, by any definition that has been coherently attributed to them, 
necessarily inaccessible to our mundane occupancy. To put it another way, if the 
transcendent and supernatural are concepts whose ontological status could be proven 
null and void, that is, if we could prove (which we can’t) that the transcendent and 
supernatural simply do not exist other than as concepts, it would make no difference at 
all to our intuition of mysterium as Otto defines it. Otto’s argument falls down because it 
is, quite simply, a flagrant non sequitur which can be reduced to the following form: we 
have this feeling, intuition, or sense, of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, therefore 
the transcendent, the supernatural, or God, must exist (the evidence for which is the 
evocation of these feelings—which also begs the question). A sounder, more 
circumspect formulation would run: we have this feeling, intuition, or sense, of the 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans, therefore we are clearly susceptible to forms of 
experience of radical ‘otherness’ we are as yet incapable of understanding (and possibly 
never will). I would oppose to Otto’s numen praesens, as a contrary predication of 
numinous experience, numen abest (the absence of divinity), for the negative experience 
of absence is the utmost formulation of something ‘wholly other’. This absence also 
opens the numinous to being reformulated and thus ‘filled’ by an alternative presence, 
which is precisely what Stevens attempts to poetically hypothesise with prodigious 
rhetorical variation. We could state this revised conception quite pithily: the numinous 
is that which we are ultimately not. 
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Another crucial interjection should be made at this point. Otto is guilty of a sin of 
omission when it comes to his means of direct expression of the numinous in art. 
‘Darkness’, ‘silence’ and ‘emptiness’, if we situate those at the kenotic nadir of an axial 
continuum, would implicate their polar counterpoints at the plerotic zenith of the same 
continuum. I would appoint to the occupancy of these vacant polar coordinates the 
following: ‘illumination’, ‘logos’ and ‘fullness’, all of which are conventional signifiers for 
numinosity, and should not therefore consternate the reader. The rhetorical interplay 
between these kenotic and plerotic polarities, and their openness to perpetual 
analogical revision, delineate the rudimentary limit and extent of Stevens’ 
triangulations of immanent numinosity. 
As I will be using the terms plerosis and kenosis to plot these polarities 
throughout this thesis, I should provide a short description of what I intend them to 
indicate. Kenosis and plerosis are traditionally used to categorize ancient rites and 
rituals observant of seasonal patterns. Theodor Gaster in his Thespis: Ritual, Myth, and 
Drama in the Ancient Near East, summarises the respective rituals as such: ‘In most 
parts of the world, seasonal rituals follow a common pattern. This pattern is based on 
the conception that life is vouchsafed in a series of leases that have annually to be 
renewed. […] They fall into two clear divisions of Kenosis, or Emptying, and Plerosis, or 
Filling, the former representing the evacuation of life, the latter its replenishment’ 
(Gaster, 1977, 17). Stevens’ own observance of seasonal cycles follows a similar logic. As 
Sebastian Gardner cogently argues, winter is for Stevens 
 
…bare, stark reality [regarded] as at once uninhabitable and beautiful on account of its purity, 
freshness and absence of human disorder. We arrive at the world of winter via an operation of 
subtraction on the ordinary world (Stevens calls it abstraction): the world of winter is a 
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contraction of the ordinary world, created through disposing of the clutter of ordinary beliefs, 
habits, and practices, and it exposes the features of the ordinary world that make it humanly 
habitable as illusion, mythology and the residue of projection. […] Stevens’ vision of the world of 
winter may be identified with reality as conceived in any metaphysic that aims to exclude, by 
reduction or elimination, those features of reality which have a human face. (Gardner, 1994, 
326). 
 
In contrast to the kenotic world of winter, the world of summer is plerotic. Gardner 
again:  
 
The world of summer, by contrast, is the world apprehended in the full blaze of what Stevens 
calls imagination, the mental power that pervades everyday human experience but realizes itself 
more fully in poetry and art, where it represents a world as a fulfilment and incarnation of value, 
more than adequate for the purposes of human habitation. […] So, whereas the contracted world 
of winter represents implicitly the everyday world of winter represents implicitly the everyday 
world as illusory, as containing appearances of things to which no reality corresponds, the 
transfigured world of summer represents it as incomplete, as failing to display the full, abundant, 
valuable features of reality. (Ibid, 327). 
 
Accordingly, spring and autumn represent transitional phases between these two 
worlds; the former a renewal of the ritual cycle of filling toward summer’s plerosis, the 
latter a declination toward winter’s kenosis. This is the basic narrative of Stevens’ 
poetry, which ‘consists in movements between the different seasonal worlds, this 
temporal movement symbolizing changes in the subject’s sense of reality’ (Ibid, 325). I 
will not be rehearsing Stevens’ seasonal narrative in this thesis as that work has already 
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been prodigiously addressed elsewhere.33 I am interested in abstracting the concepts of 
plerosis and kenosis together with their aforementioned correlates as I think they are 
fundamentally at the basis of all contemplation, poetic or otherwise, of numinous 
experience. 
It would be relevant at this juncture to review Eric Gould’s insightful summary 
concerning the problematic situation of maintaining the usefulness of the numinous: 
 
From the point of view of defining the numinous, we can say that it is nothing if not the paradox 
of exteriority demanding interiority. For the numinous to remain a useful term, it must remain 
problematic. To define it, then, from the perspective that Rudolf Otto has taken, is to use 
repetitively analogous terms for the “full” and “empty”: “mighty” and “fearful” mysterium 
tremendum, and the “empty distances” of “silence,” “darkness,” and “void.” But that is evasive, 
turning merely to function to account for the numinous. We are reminded also that what Otto 
describes as the elusiveness of numena is no stranger, of course, to the nonreligious poet. 
[…] 
We are not, it is clear, any nearer to knowing what the numinous is, even when we can offer 
interminable analogues for the “full” and “empty,” or show that its expression is fraught with 
ambiguity and doomed to inaccuracy. Instead, perhaps all we can say about the numinous 
consciousness is that it leads to a persistent set of opposites, to a dismantling of its own terms to 
show its hermeneutic structure, a fondness for a dualistic and allegorical explanation of 
experience, a necessary mediation between the transparent and the opaque, the interior and the 
exterior, as reasonable extremes which force us to seek a hypothetical synthesis. (Gould, 1981, 
260-61). 
 
                                                          
33 I have in mind George S. Lensing’s Wallace Stevens and the Seasons. As I will be quoting from this work later 
in this thesis, I would refer the interested reader to the Works Cited list at the end of this document for 
publication details. 
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This reads rather like a series of nails being hammered into the lid of numinosity’s 
coffin, the glaring implication being that tracing the path of the numinous is an exercise 
in aporetic futility. Perhaps Gould is right, and has accurately predicted what all 
attempts at numinous recovery will eventually discover. He is certainly correct in 
asserting that we are no nearer to knowing what the numinous is—such knowledge 
would necessarily negate its object. Whatever the case, it is an attempt perennially 
made, and it is one that Stevens makes over and again. The schematic I have outlined 
above is simply a rhetorical geometry, as it were, for establishing a way into Stevens’ 
‘intricate evasions of as, / In things seen and unseen, created from nothingness, / The 
heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for lands’ (415). What Gould’s summation 
elides are the peculiarities and priorities of each attempt at recovering the numinous in 
the specific probe of a particular poem. The risk, of course, is that any particular attempt 
at recovering the numinous becomes mired in a generic swamp of unknowing. As such, 
a case has to be made for how the mysterium of the wholly other is implicated in and 
across a series of exemplary poems in order to discern what implications are being 
made and to what ends. 
 Such as it is, Kenneth Burke argues in The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in 
Logology that: ‘“Words” in the first sense have wholly naturalistic, empirical reference. 
But they may be used analogically, to designate a further dimension, the “supernatural.” 
Whether or not there is a realm of the “supernatural,” there are words for it’ (Burke, 
1970, 7, original italics). He proceeds to demonstrate how a series of words—‘grace’, 
‘create’, ‘spirit’, specifically—had their etymological roots in words with secular, natural 
meanings, which were then borrowed and translated (analogised) into referents for the 
supernatural realm, and then eventually borrowed back for secular usage, only now 
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altered by the connotations ascribed to them in their supernatural application (Ibid, 7-
8). In this sense, language is already functionally transcendent: 
 
The quickest and simplest way to realize that words “transcend” non-verbal nature is to think of 
the notable difference between the kind of operations we might perform with a tree and the kind 
of operations we might perform with the word “tree.” Verbally, we can make “one tree” into “five 
thousand trees” by merely revising our text, whereas a wholly different set of procedures would 
be required to get the corresponding result in nature. Verbally, we can say, “To keep warm, cut 
down the tree and burn it” and we can say this even if there is no tree. Or whether we call the 
tree generically a tree or refer to it as some particular species of tree, the fact remains that our 
term for it has “transcended” its unique individuality. And if we put an apostrophe after the word 
“tree,” thereby getting the possessive form, “tree’s,” we’d have something quite different from the 
way a tree “owns” its bark, branches, etc. Finally, since the word “tree” rhymes with the words 
“knee,” “be,” and “see,” we have here an order of associations wholly different from entities with 
which a tree is physically connected. (Ibid, 8-9) 
 
Significantly, this means that ‘[t]here is a sense in which language is not just “natural,” 
but really does add a “new dimension” to the things of nature (an observation that 
would be the logological equivalent of the theological statement that grace perfects 
nature)’ (Ibid, 8). The addition of new dimensions to nature and the endless play of 
analogies that language enables therefore makes possible the postulation and 
population of a supernatural realm, irrespective of whether one exists or not. The same 
can be said for the postulation and representation of the mysterium numinosum. Short of 
making a Kierkegaardian leap of faith or undergoing divine revelation, the most that can 
be said is that the numinous designates the hypothesis of a metaphysical entity or 
ontological gap to which we have no means of epistemological access. Furthermore, we 
would not even be able to posit the possibility of its being, or non-being, as the case may 
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be, other than through our symbol-making practices, which, in respect of poetry, 
implicates language specifically. Gould thus concurs: ‘The sense of the numinous and the 
sacred—any apostrophic term to convey the idea of the holy on which religion 
depends—is both inside and outside the text at once. The experience of the holy outside 
the text, which may infiltrate writing, can only be mediated in discourse. It resists 
writing and speech, yet it is only in writing and speech that the definition of the 
boundaries of the holy and the uniqueness of the experience can take place’ (Gould, 
1981, 260). 
 The ‘apostrophic terms’ used to convey the numinous are, of course, legion. The 
names and identities of deities and the various functions they serve in their respective 
mythologies are in and of themselves complex networks of analogous forms, 
metonymically borrowing aspects of their individual natures, physical constitutions and 
attendant symbols from our physical world. The Supreme Being, ‘God’, is the most 
abstracted manifestation, and thus least apprehensible, of all deities. Nevertheless, God, 
too, bears his anthropomorphic taint: ‘The fault lies with an over-human god’ (278).34 
Regardless, all of these apostrophic referents—the named and conceptualised deities 
that populate humanity’s diverse mythologies—serve to undermine the truly radical 
postulation of the numinous: that of a mysterious alterity which remains interminably 
elusive to fixed nomination and human knowing, but of which we are still capable of at 
least hypothesising, or, as Stevens would almost certainly prefer, imagining. 
The task ahead, then, is one of ‘hermeneutically dismantling’, to borrow Gould’s 
terms, what is already an interpretation of a postulated mystery using the 
kenotic/plerotic apparatus previously formulated. Fortunately, the primary difficulty—
                                                          
34 Stevens goes as far as to say, in a letter to Hi Simons, March 29, 1943, that ‘God is the centre of the pathetic 
fallacy’ (L, 444). 
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the initial interpretation of the numinous hitherto described—has been done in each of 
the poems that will be examined. The secondary difficulty, the burden of this thesis, will 
be in establishing a cogent argument that these interpretations can be read as strategic 
‘turns’ from a merely disenchanted world to a world that is both empirically actual as 
well as numinously potent. This argument will ground itself by tracing a pair of 
underpinning though differentiating topoi, which I will designate as the 
commonplaces35 wherefrom Stevens embarks on his poetic explorations of immanent 
numinosity. The structure of these topoi are indicated by the titles of the first and 
second chapters in which they will be respectively dealt with: ‘Emptying the Heavens, 
Filling the World’ (chapter one) and ‘Decreating the World, Figuring the Blank’ (chapter 
two). The two topoi I have designated for Stevens are suitably ad hoc, though not 
without rich precedent. These topoi can be placed, as it were, in ‘the world as our true 
spiritual home’ (Stevens himself asserted in his notebooks: ‘Reality is the spirit’s true 
center’ (913).) and ‘embodied mind in the world as place of mysterious though 
generative blanks’ respectively. The first of these topoi will situate what I refer to as 
Stevens’ religious naturalism. In brief, Stevens’ religious naturalism entails the 
naturalization of ritualised behaviours such as devotion, veneration, celebration and 
                                                          
35 I am using ‘commonplace’ here in its specific sense derived from ‘topoi koinoi’ (Greek, literally, ‘common 
places’). The term comes down to us from classical rhetoric where it was used to signify modes of argument, 
notably ‘Aristotle’s four common or universal arguments…arguments by degree, by possible and impossible, 
by past and future, by amplification and depreciation’ (Cook, 1988, 44 n. 30). Postclassical topoi, such as those 
we find collated in medieval florilegia and Renaissance commonplace books, include numerous exemplary 
treatments of recurrent themes, formulas and figurations plucked from diverse texts, which serve as didactic, 
ethical and, latterly, aesthetic models for imitation. For an extended treatment of topoi in the sense of a 
standard topic in literature, and its various manifestations thereof, see: Ernst Robert Curtius, (2013), European 
Literature in the Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 79-105, 
(first published in 1948 under its original German title Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter). See 
also: Roland Greene et al., ed., (2012), The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 4th edition, Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, s.v. ‘Commonplace’ (285-86), s.v. ‘Topos’ (1442-43). Topos, in modern 
literary discourse, has been largely supplanted by the discussion of motif; see: M. H. Abrams and Geoffrey Galt 
Harpham ed., (2012), A Glossary of Literary Terms, 10th edition, Boston: Wadsworth, s.v. ‘Motif and Theme’ 
(229). 
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exaltation, ordinarily directed toward a supernatural or transcendent order, and will be 
developed further in the following chapter. The second of these topoi will situate 
Stevens’ formulations and meditations upon the myterium numinosum as I have hitherto 
described it, and align the focus of the second chapter. 
I would like to finish this lengthy introduction by quoting Allen Curnow. Curnow 
writes of Stevens’ knack for being ‘Capable to detect where reality was not / And 
scrupulous what to put in place of it’ (Curnow, 1997, 202) in his tribute to the elder poet 
‘Mementos of an Occasion’. Curnow’s lines will serve as something of a guiding principle 
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CHAPTER ONE: EMPTYING THE HEAVENS, FILLING THE 
WORLD 
 
Stevens, in his 1948 lecture ‘Imagination as Value’, writes: ‘And I say the world is lost to 
[the poet], certainly, because, for one thing, the great poems of heaven and hell have 
been written and the great poem of the earth remains to be written’ (730). We might 
wonder whether we should take this to imply that Stevens fancies himself the very poet 
who would write the great poem of the earth. I believe that we should, at least in the 
importantly qualified sense of it being a poem to which Stevens aspires to contribute 
toward; this is to say, it is not a finite and singular, but rather a collective and 
accumulative, poem he has in mind. Stevens, intimate with the work of Shelley, would 
have been doubtless impressed by the latter’s vision in A Defense of Poetry that 
individual poems are but ‘episodes to that great poem, which all poets, like the co-
operating thoughts of one great mind, have built up since the beginning of the world’ 
(Shelley, 2007, 354). This is an idea that finds its culminant expression in Stevens’ late 
poem ‘A Primitive Like an Orb’, particularly in the three-stanza long sentence of its 
seventh through ninth sections, of which I present the seventh: 
 
 The central poem is the poem of the whole, 
 The poem of the composition of the whole, 
 The composition of blue sea and of green, 
Of blue light and of green, as lesser poems, 
 And the miraculous multiplex of lesser poems, 
Not merely into a whole, but a poem of 
The whole, the essential compact of the parts, 
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The roundness that pulls tight the final ring 
   (379) 
 
Stevens had recommended to his publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, that his first collection be 
published under the title ‘The Grand Poem: Preliminary Minutiae’ (L, 237)—or, so we 
could say, in words chosen out of the clarity of hindsight, notes toward the ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’. Three decades later, when he and Knopf were putting 
together what would eventually become The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens, Stevens 
had proposed naming the collection ‘The Whole of Harmonium: Collected Poems of W. 
S.’ (L, 831). Knopf discouraged him from using these alternative titles on both 
occasions.36 Nonetheless, as Richardson remarks, ‘the “grand” intention was never 
abandoned’ (Richardson, 1986, 528), neither at the beginning nor, it must be said, at the 
end of his career. It is readily apparent throughout his poetry that Stevens’ grand 
intention to contribute to the great pluralistic collective poem of the earth impels him to 
empty the heavens and relocate the old nobilities,37 rapturous experiences, and ascetic 
                                                          
36 See: Richardson, 1986, 527-28; Richardson, 1988, 412-13. 
37 Nobility is a word Stevens commonly used to refer to a force of qualitative heightening, whether it be in 
poetry or in life, and one that he says ‘is the peculiarity of the imagination’ (664). This quote is taken from ‘The 
Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’, wherein the notion receives its most sustained treatment. Stevens takes 
the figure of the soul as a pair of winged horses and a charioteer from Plato’s Phaedrus his starting point. He 
construes it as an example, following Coleridge, of Plato’s ‘dear gorgeous nonsense’ (643). He says that after 
‘we have identified ourselves with the charioteer’ (643) driving the winged horses through heaven, ‘suddenly 
we remember, it may be, that the soul no longer exists and we droop in our flight and at last settle on the solid 
ground’ (643). Nonetheless, he later identifies this nobility fallen from the heavens as the marker ‘of our 
spiritual height and depth’ (664). Stevens, it should be acknowledged, in keeping with his logic that the gods 
are anthropomorphic projections, writes in a letter to Ronald Lane Latimer, November 21, 1935: ‘It is an old 
story that we derive our ideas of nobility, say, from noble objects of nature. But then, it is an equally old story 
that we derive them from ourselves. For convenience, and in view of the simplicity of the large mass of people, 
we give our good qualities to God, or to various gods, but they come from ourselves’ (L, 295). Another of his 
Adagia reads: ‘Only a noble people evolve a noble God’ (912). It is worth bearing in mind how precisely this 
line of thought follows Burke’s logological pattern of religious language outlined in the introduction: nobility is 
transposed from the world to the heavens and then back to the world again, yet this reabsorption, whether we 
like it or not, bears the traces of its transcendent detour. This re-secularisation of the term allows Stevens to 
endow imagination with the power of nobility-giving: ‘…the imagination gives to everything it touches a 
peculiarity, and it seems to me that the peculiarity of the imagination is nobility’ (663-64). 
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meditations, which had been formerly predicated upon a transcendent order, to an 
immanent domain. 
Doggett, and I think correctly, discerns in Stevens’ poetry a ‘preference for 
naturalistic thought and for ideas that lean on the imagery of organism’ (Ibid, ix). 
Moreover: ‘In general, throughout Stevens’ poetry, the only continuous strand of 
thought is a fundamental naturalism that is immediately apparent in the poems of 
Harmonium. This naturalism is as much a sentiment, as much an expression of an 
allegiance—a piety and an affection—as it is an expression of thought. The allegiance is 
to earth, and the sentiment is expressed in many celebrations of the reality that is the 
substance and support of his existence’ (Ibid, ix). This last quotation leads me to the 
unenviable decision that any expository critic of a poet as challenging as Stevens must 
make, which is to arrive at a certain commitment as to how to address one’s subject, 
recognising in advance that one must bracket out other potentially fruitful means. To 
this end, the current chapter is intent on exploring the tensions between agnosticism 
and religious naturalism which arise in Stevens’ poetry. But first I must say a few words 
on what religious naturalism is in order to account for why I think it is fitting to include 
Stevens under this conceptual banner. 
Religious naturalism broadly refers to a heterogeneous belief system espoused 
by a diverse group of people who ‘find religious meaning, value, and importance solely 
in nature or in some aspect of the natural order’ (Crosby, 2007, 672), and who seek ‘to 
explore and encourage religious ways of responding to the world on a completely 
naturalistic basis without a supreme being or ground of being’ (Stone, 2008, xi). Jerome 
A. Stone claims that the historical roots of religious naturalism ‘go back at least to 
Spinoza’ (Ibid), but begins his study ‘in the early twentieth century with George 
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Santayana and Samuel Alexander’ (Ibid).38 Interestingly, Stevens was familiar with both 
of these thinkers. As Helen Vendler reminds us, Santayana was one of Stevens’ early 
mentors and confidantes: ‘At Harvard, Stevens abandoned the Protestantism of his 
parents for the Lucretian naturalism of his acquaintance George Santayana’ (Vendler, 
Winter 2003, 102). Not only does Stevens refer to Santayana several times in his letters 
and prose, he evidently held the philosopher in high enough regard to compose a poetic 
tribute for his old mentor: ‘To an Old Philosopher in Rome’ (432-34). Regarding the 
latter, Stevens quotes from Alexander’s Time, Space and Deity concerning the 
philosopher’s theory of ‘compresence’ in ‘A Collect of Philosophy’ (859-60). 
The problem for the proponents of religious naturalism, as Mikael Stenmark 
points out, is to provide a philosophically satisfying explanation for what distinguishes 
them from non-religious naturalists, that is to say, to account for why they see fit to 
append the qualifier ‘religious’. Stenmark cites the example of Richard Dawkins, whom 
he identifies as a non-religious naturalist who believes that ‘[r]eal science does not 
diminish the enchantment of nature, but rather enhances the poetry of experience by 
revealing the workings of the natural world in their full wonder. [Dawkins] says that, 
when it comes to feeling awe about living things, he has more in common with the 
Reverend William Paley than with atheists such as Ayer and Hume. […] If religious 
naturalists are to be known for their reverence and awe of nature, Dawkins seems to 
qualify as one’ (Stenmark, 2013, 542-43). Stenmark proceeds to refer to Thomas Nagel, 
                                                          
38 Stone, in his comprehensive study Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative, 
identifies and discusses a wide array of thinkers under the banner of religious naturalism: ‘Former religious 
naturalists included George Santayana, Samuel Alexander, John Dewey, Roy Wood Sellars, John Herman 
Randall, Mordecai Kaplan, Ralph Burhoe, founder of Zygon, and such Chicago theologians as Henry Nelson 
Wieman, Bernard Meland, and the later Bernard Loomer. Recent religious naturalists include William Dean, 
Willem Drees, Ursula Goodenough,  Charley  Hardwick,  Henry  Levinson,  Karl  Peters,  myself, and perhaps 
Gordon Kaufman’ (Stone, 2008, xi). 
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whom he suggests ‘might offer religious naturalists some help here’ (Stenmark, 2013, 
543). 
Nagel (of whom it should be pointed out does not use the phrase religious 
naturalism) wants to explore naturalistic alternatives to what he calls the ‘default or 
zero-position [of] affectless atheism, or hardheaded atheism’ (Nagel, 2010, 8). He 
recognises that there are people, including himself, who are dissatisfied with scientific 
naturalism as an all-encompassing worldview, but who nevertheless do not ascribe to a 
theistic alternative. The distinction that he wants to draw between the scientific 
naturalist and the dissatisfied naturalist is one of religious temperament. Those 
susceptible to a religious temperament, Nagel suggests, are inclined to ask the following 
cosmic question: ‘How can one bring into one’s individual life a recognition of one’s 
relation to the universe as a whole, whatever that relation is?’ (Ibid, 5). He is adamant 
that this question be distinguished ‘from the pure desire for understanding the universe 
and one’s place in it’ (Ibid). He continues: 
 
It is not an expression of curiosity, however large. And it is not the general intellectual problem of 
how to combine an objective conception of the universe with the local perspective of one 
creature within it. It is rather a question of attitude: Is there a way to live in harmony with the 
universe, and not just in it? 
Without God, it is unclear what we should aspire to harmony with. But still, the 
aspiration can remain, to live not merely the life of the creature one is, but in some sense to 
participate through it in the life of the universe as a whole. To be gripped by this desire is what I 
mean by the religious temperament. (Ibid, 5-6). 
 
Nagel believes the hardheaded atheist simply rejects the validity of the question. He 
characterises the view of the hardheaded atheist thus: 
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The universe exists and meets a certain description; one of the things it has generated is us; end 
of story. Of course, a new story begins with our existence, since we find our own lives 
extraordinarily interesting. But this is a local phenomenon of perfectly understandable self-
absorption, unconnected to the big picture. The big picture is of purely theoretical interest. (Ibid, 
8). 
 
Stenmark aligns Nagel’s pronouncements on hard-headed atheism with the position of 
the non-religious naturalist vis-à-vis the religious naturalist whose worldview is 
oriented by the temperament Nagel proposes. Stevens, in his aspirations to realise 
through his poetry harmonious relations with the world, the earth, the cosmos, nature 
in toto, belongs to this latter camp.39 I will endeavour in this chapter to qualify this claim 
by first investigating Stevens’ improvisations on the idea of God, before moving onto his 




Although it has been widely denounced as apocryphal, there is a well-known anecdote 
recounting an exchange between the French mathematician and astronomer Pierre-
Simon Laplace and Napoleon Bonaparte concerning the former’s magnum opus 
Mécanique Céleste. Napoleon, upon learning that this work contained no mention of God, 
                                                          
39 Gyorgi Voros goes as far as to endorse Stevens as a proto-deep ecologist: ‘Like Emerson, Stevens addressed 
and praised the larger context that gives rise to human categories of thought and action, namely, the dynamic 
relation between the physical world and individual human beings or, on the larger scale, between Nature and 
culture. However, Stevens deliberately effected a figure / ground shift in focus and in doing so not only 
rewrote romanticism but proleptically—and prophetically—forecast a vision evolved by "deep ecologists" 
today. Deep ecology, like traditional environmentalism, is a response to the environmental crisis. Unlike 
traditional environmentalism, which is anthropocentric and utilitarian in pursuing wise use of natural 
resources for human benefit, deep ecology bases itself on philosophical, religious, and ethical reconsiderations 
of Nature's intrinsic value and "right" to self-realization’ (Voros, 1997, 82). 
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conveyed his surprise to Laplace that his system of the universe did not once refer to its 
creator. Laplace declared in response: ‘Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là’.40 We 
might imagine a similar apocryphal exchange taking place between Stevens and the 
Romantics and Transcendentalists to whom his preeminent literary inheritance is 
commonly attributed.41 It is from these poetic forebears that Stevens inherits the topos 
of the world as our true spiritual home. What distinguishes Stevens from these same 
forebears is his insistence that he can make-do in his poetic-spiritual engagement with 
the world without the hypothesis of the universe’s divine origins, much less of an 
appellate judge ruling over an empyreal court. God does make frequent appearances 
throughout Stevens’ poetry though, both in the upper and lower case, in singular and 
plural manifestations, as well as under entirely different designations than ‘god/God’ 
altogether. Stevens often stages both supernatural and worldly religious figures and 
their attendant beliefs and traditions in order to perform rhetorical enactments of their 
negation, expiry, or obsolescence, or to trivialise them through parody, mockery and 
satire.42 However, it would be improper to imply that Stevens spurns all of what 
                                                          
40 ‘I had no need of that hypothesis’. A version of this fabricated encounter is recounted in W. W. Rouse-Ball, 
(1960), A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 343. 
41 The literature on Stevens’ situation in the genealogy of Romanticism is immense. A very good and concise 
account of Stevens’ late Romanticism is ‘The New Romanticism of Wallace Stevens’, in George Bornstein, 
(1976), The Transformations of Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens, Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 163-230. The literature on Stevens’ indebtedness to his 19th-century compatriots is similarly 
extensive. Practically everything Harold Bloom has written on Stevens propounds the Transcendentalists’ 
myriad influence, especially that of Emerson and Whitman (if we may be allowed to label Whitman thus), on 
Stevens’ thought and work. As Bloom’s work is so widely known, and that I am quoting from a number of items 
of it throughout this thesis, I need not detail their particulars here. 
42 Examples of poems performing various rhetorical enactments of the negation, expiry, or obsolescence of 
supernatural and worldly religious figures and/or their attendant beliefs and traditions include the following: 
‘Of Heaven Considered as a Tomb’ (45), ‘Sunday Morning’ (53-56), ‘Negation’ (82), ‘Lunar Paraphrase’ (89-90), 
‘Waving Adieu, Adieu, Adieu’ (104), ‘Evening Without Angels’ (111-12), ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ (135-
51), ‘A Thought Revolved’ (171-73), ‘The Men That Are Falling’ (173-74), ‘The Sense of the Sleight-of-Hand 
Man’ (205), ‘Esthétique du Mal’ (277-87), ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (329-352), ‘St Armorer’s Church 
from the Outside’ (448-49). Examples of poems parodying, mocking or satirising the same include the 
following: ‘Ploughing on Sunday’ (16); ‘Cy Est Pourtraicte, Madame Ste Ursule, et Les Unze Mille Vierges’ (17), 
‘The Doctor of Geneva’ (19), ‘The Worms at Heaven’s Gate’ (40), ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’ (47), 
‘Cortege for Rosenbloom’ (63-64). 
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traditional religious observance and ritual has to offer. George S. Lensing points out, for 
instance, that Stevens exhibits a ‘lingering admiration for the pageantry of religious 
gestures and dress in poems like “Winter Bells,” “Gray Stones and Gray Pigeons,” “The 
Old Lutheran Bells at Home,” and “St. Armorers Church from the Outside.”’ (Lensing, 
2001, 41). 
Most importantly, though, are Stevens’ frequent improvisations43 upon the ‘idea 
of God’, which run the entire course of his poetry. Perhaps Stevens reasons, as Morris 
does, that ‘the creation of a new god is the automatic supersession of the old’ (Morris, 
1974, 92). Lensing claims ‘[t]hat most frequently he promotes a new religion to replace 
the old one that will have at its center the human self and the natural world’ (Lensing, 
2001, 41). Lensing also acknowledges Stevens’ ‘disenchantment with humanism’ (Ibid, 
40) and his counter-proposals of ‘the possibility of a modern redeemer, a poet, a hero, a 
giant, who would be fully human but a human-epitome, a figure who can be imagined 
now but whose impossibilities enticed him in poem after poem’ (Ibid). All the same, God 
for Stevens is by no means an inadmissible idea requiring permanent erasure, but 
rather, as I have been arguing, renovation. I will now survey, for reasons that will 
become readily apparent, three of Stevens’ improvisations upon the ‘idea of God’. 
The first and most salient example of Stevens’ improvisations is Ananke, the 
Greek Protogenos personifying inevitability, compulsion, and, most importantly, 
necessity. Although a feminine personification in Greek mythology, Stevens genders 
Ananke male. Stevens’ version of Ananke appears most prominently in ‘The Greenest 
Continent’ from Owl’s Clover, wherein he invokes this deity with what is for him an 
                                                          
43 I could have just as well used the term ‘variations’. Many critics have pointed out the influence on Stevens’ 
work of the musical form of variation. Angus Fletcher, for instance, argues that ‘[t]he governing rhetorical 
figure in Stevens is a figure equivalent to musical variations’ (Fletcher qtd. in Eeckhout, 2002, 54). See also: 
Northrop Frye, (1976), ‘Wallace Stevens and the Variation Form’, Spiritus Mundi: Essays on Literature, Myth, 
and Society, Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 275-94.  
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uncommon forthrightness: ‘Fatal Ananke is the common god.’ (580); ‘Fateful Ananke is 
the final god.’ (581).44 The starkly declarative syntax in these two isolated lines 
comprising predicate nominatives stripped of qualification, compounded appositives, 
and figural subterfuge, is uncharacteristic of Stevens’ wider style. Moreover, that they 
should pertain to something as momentous as a common and final god is especially 
atypical in Stevens, who generally prefers to pose his major figures as hypothetical 
inventions embedded in networks of evasive syntax and figural complexity.45 An earlier 
appearance of Ananke occurs in section XII of ‘Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery’: 
‘The sense of the serpent in you, Ananke, / And your averted stride / Add nothing to the 
horror of the frost / That glistens on your face and hair.’ (122). This short piece alludes 
to the Ananke we find in the Orphic theogonies described by the 5th-6th CE Neoplatonist 
scholarch Damascius. According to Damascius, Ananke was thought to have self-
emerged at the beginning of time entwined with the winged serpent Chronos. She is 
represented, paradoxically, as an incorporeal serpent whose arms extend the expanse of 
the universe, thus signifying her reach of influence, which is to say, everywhere and 
through all time.46 Reading ahead to the fourth canto of ‘The Greenest Continent’ we 
                                                          
44 Stevens reflects in a letter to Hi Simons, August 28, 1940, that ‘Ananke may have been an improvisation, or 
an importation from Italy’ (L, 370). Whether the geographical misattribution evidenced in Stevens’ latter 
clause is willed so as to cavalierly distance himself from the poetic sequence Owl’s Clover in which Ananke 
features, or from the ‘improvisation’ itself as he has moved on artistically, or that it is simply a casual 
oversight, is finally indeterminable. We do know that Stevens’ substantially revised and heavily cut the 1936 
version of Owl’s Clover (which he had Alcestis Press publish as a stand-alone volume) for inclusion in The Man 
With the Blue Guitar the following year. Furthermore, we know that he chose to omit Owl’s Clover, in either of 
its version, from his 1954 Collected Poems, on the grounds that it was, according to Samuel Morse, ‘rhetorical’ 
(OP, xxiii). Stevens’ familiarity with Greek and Latin diction, etymology, and mythology, would call into doubt 
his misattribution as a casual oversight. Nonetheless, these cavils will persist as the stuff of irresolvable 
conjecture. 
45 For further reading on these structural aspects of Stevens’ poetry, see footnotes 70, 71, and 72, below. 
46 For an analysis of the Damascian-Orphic account of Ananke, see: M. L. West, (1983), The Orphic Poems, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, esp. 70, 178, 194-98. As to where Stevens discovered the the serpent-Ananke 
connection is unclear. He would have been familiar with Plato’s description of Necessity in Book X of The 
Republic, wherein she is depicted as seated at the centre of the universe with a spindle in her lap, thus 
accounting for the maternal lineage of the three Fates; see: Plato, (1991), The Republic, 2nd edition, ed. & 
trans. Alan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 300. A. Walton Litz accounts for Stevens’ introduction to the deity in 
his correspondence with the Italian scholar Mario Rossi, who calls her ‘imperscrutable Ananke’. Stevens 
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learn that ‘the serpent might become a god’ (577) and that ‘Death, only, sits upon the 
serpent throne’ (577). By the eighth canto, in which the ‘unmerciful pontifex’ (581) 
Ananke appears, we can assume that the serpent from the fourth canto has become a 
god, in the light of the serpent-Ananke association Stevens has previously drawn our 
attention to. Ananke’s ‘voice / In the jungle is a voice in Fontainebleau’ (581), is a 
metonymy for the god’s universal influence as it resounds through time and space from 
the primordial African jungle to modern European civilisation. This fatal serpent god, 
emerging from the African jungle, is an example of Stevens’ primitivism—a widely 
recognised and exotically distorted appropriation made by countless modernist artists 
and writers.47 It is an improvisation that looks ahead to a later jungle-god vision, 
possibly a Mayan-inflected revision of the Yucatan jungle scene in ‘The Comedian as the 
Letter C’ (25-26), in the third canto of the ‘It Must Give Pleasure’ section of ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’: 
 
A lasting visage in a lasting bush, 
A face of stone in an unending red, 
Red-emerald, red-slitted-blue, a face of slate, 
  
An ancient forehead hung with heavy hair, 
The channel slots of rain, the red-rose-red 
And weathered and the ruby-water-worn, 
  
The vines around the throat, the shapeless lips, 
                                                          
considers this a ‘magnificent word’, and copied part of Rossi’s letter into his commonplace book, latterly 
published under his ascription Sur Plusieurs Beaux Sujects (Rossi and Stevens qtd. in Litz, 1977, 121). Stevens 
also quotes the passage on Necessity from Horace’s Odes, Book I.35, which, nonetheless, bears no mention of 
Necessity figured as a serpent. 
47 For an extended discussion of Stevens’ primitivism, see: Jeffrey Westover, (Fall 2009), ‘Wallace Stevens’ 
Savage Commonplace’, The Wallace Stevens Journal, 33:2. 217-37. 
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The frown like serpents basking on the brow, 
The spent feeling leaving nothing of itself, 
  
Red-in-red repetitions never going 
Away, a little rusty, a little rouged, 
A little roughened and ruder, a crown 
  
The eye could not escape, a red renown 
Blowing itself upon the tedious ear. 
An effulgence faded, dull cornelian 
  
Too venerably used. That might have been. 
It might and might have been. 
   (346) 
 
Whether or not it might have been, this vision of ‘a lasting visage’ has ossified into a 
statuesque entity, thus fixing it in a state segregated from life. Although this statuesque 
visage is replete with asteriated spectral effects emphasising its otherworldliness, it is 
nonetheless in a state of ruination. As such, it is subject to reclamation by the natural 
region its mythology had presumably once reflected.48 It is ultimately a vision of deical 
extinction. This is, of course, later Stevens. Ananke is allowed to live in Owl’s Clover 
before ‘the gods are annihilated’ (Vendler, 1969, 120) in that suite’s later companion 
piece, ‘Man With the Blue Guitar’.49 It is in this latter poetic sequence, composed shortly 
                                                          
48 I am improvising here on Stevens’ construction from the first line of his late untitled poem beginning: ‘A 
mythology reflects its region.’ (476). 
49 Ananke is never mentioned by name again after the Man With the Blue Guitar’s annihilation of the gods, 
save for in a rejected stanza of ‘Examination of the Hero in a Time of War’: ‘The self-same rhythm / Moves in 
lamenting and the fatal, / The bold, obedience to Ananke.’ (1002). The serpent figure, however, reappears in 
‘The Bagatelles the Madrigals’. The serpent in this poem, as with the serpent-Ananke in ‘Like Decorations of a 
Nigger Cemetery’, is associated with a foreboding winter vision: 
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after the publication of Owl’s Clover during the winter of 1936-37, that poetry is called 
upon ‘to take the place / Of empty heaven and its hymns’ (137). This sequence also 
announces ‘A substitute for all the gods’ (144): 
 
 This self, not that gold self aloft, 
 
 Alone, one’s shadow magnified, 
 Lord of the body, looking down, 
 
 As now and called most high, 
 The shadow of Chocorua 
 
 In an immenser heaven, aloft, 
 Alone, lord of the land and lord 
 
 Of the men that live in the land, high lord. 
 One’s self and the mountains of one’s land, 
 
 Without shadows, without magnificence, 
 The flesh, the bone, the dirt, the stone. 
    (144) 
                                                          
Where do you think, serpent, 
Where do you lie, beneath snow, 
And with eyes closed 
Breathe in a crevice of earth? 
 
In what camera do you taste 
Poison, in what darkness set 
Glittering scales and point 
The tipping tongue? 
  (193) 
The serpent’s most significant reappearance is in ‘Auroras of Autumn’, where it is has been transformed into 
the terrific lights of the aurora borealis: ‘This is form gulping after formlessness, / Skin flashing to wished-for 
disappearances / And the serpent body flashing without the skin.’ (355). Note here the serpent’s 
indeterminate corporeality compared with Damscius’ description of Ananke as an incorporeal serpent outlined 
above. 
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Here is the human brought nobly low, where ‘the mind alone confronts the world alone, 
without any sacred parental influences’ (Vendler, 1969, 120), to seek out ‘A poem like a 
missal / Found in the mud,’ (145)—which brings us to the second of Stevens’ 
improvisations, the ‘Mud Master’: 
 
 The muddy rivers of spring 
 Are snarling 
 Under muddy skies. 
 The mind is muddy. 
  
 As yet, for the mind, new banks 
 Of bulging green 
 Are not; 
 Sky-sides of gold 
 Are not. 
 The mind snarls. 
 
 Blackest of pickanines, 
 There is a master of mud. 
 The shaft of light 
 Falling, far off, from sky to land, 
 That is he— 
 
 The peach-bud maker, 
 The mud master, 
 The master of the mind. 
   (119) 
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This poem is from Ideas of Order, and thus precedes Ananke and the annihilative 
interventions of ‘Man With a Blue Guitar’. This poem could be read with Jarraway, 
mistakenly I believe, as an indicative example of ‘the transcendent perspective of ascent 
[that] is unmistakably the metaphorical radical’ (Jarraway, 2007, 195) in Ideas of Order: 
 
“Mud Master,” for instance, moves much beyond the dilemma of determining the superiority of 
intelligence over soil or soil over intelligence in “The Comedian as the Letter C” back in 
Harmonium. By scaling a falling shaft of light, the Mud Master transcends reality and lays claim to 
a metaphysically superior realm both soil and self. (Ibid). 
 
Precisely the opposite trajectory is taking place. The Mud Master is not at all a quasi-
Adamic being emerging from the mud to scale a falling shaft of light and thus assume a 
metaphysically superior realm. The Mud Master, as the poem unequivocally states, is 
the falling shaft of light itself, which is to say, a metonymy for the sun. The Mud Master 
is, quite simply, the sun. The world is muddy so the mind is muddy, an equation that is 
perfectly in keeping with the second of the propositions from ‘The Comedian as the 
Letter C’ to which Jarraway is alluding, namely, ‘his soil is man’s intelligence’ (29). It is 
the intervention of the sun, personified in the appositive epithets ‘The peach-bud 
maker, / The mud master, / The master of the mind’, which is responsible for realising 
the ‘new banks / Of bulging green’ and the ‘Sky-sides of gold’. This apposition reveals 
the dual function Stevens’ frequently attributes to the sun: that of life-giver and 
illuminator of marvels. The sun, as animator in this double sense, mastering the mud 
into producing new life and the sky into providing spectacle, is by metaleptic extension 
the master of the mind, as the mind too is emergent from the sun-animated mud. What’s 
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more, the trajectory follows the immanent perspective of descent, the sunlight come 
down to earth not from heaven, but simply the heavens. 
What we have then is a covert naturalist rewriting of the creation myth of 
Genesis. The fundamental elements are cognate: mud for dust, mind for soul, animating 
light for inspiriting breath, and thus sun for God, taking place on Earth, which 
substitutes as an unfallen yet muddily imperfect Eden.50 Stevens would later write in 
‘The Poems of Our Climate’: ‘The imperfect is our paradise.’ (179), which is no less than 
an aphoristic summary of his recurrent naturalist argument in favour of a temporally-
bound state of incompletion as our right and proper good.  
What frequently emerges from Stevens’ poetry, and is arguably the preeminent 
‘theology’ to which it bears witness, is a pseudo-heliotheism. It is ‘pseudo’ in that we 
must constantly remind ourselves of the shibboleth ‘this most heliocentric of poets’ 
(Eeckhout, 2002, 168) imparts to us at the beginning of his poetic career. I am referring 
to the neo-pagan opening of the penultimate canto of ‘Sunday Morning’: 
 
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men 
Shall chant in orgy on a summer morn 
Their boisterous devotion to the sun, 
Not as a god, but as a god might be, 
Naked among them, a savage source. 
   (55-56) 
 
                                                          
50 As with a lot of Stevens poetry preceding ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, ‘Mud Master’ also looks 
forward to that major poem, specifically in the overhaul of the Edenic narrative performed in the fourth canto 
of ‘It Must Be Abstract’: ‘There was a muddy centre before we breathed. / There was a myth before the myth 
began, / Venerable, articulate and complete.’ (331). 
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The sun should be perceived with and when reading Stevens: ‘Not as a god, but as a god 
might be’. This is no less than an indispensable crux for any satisfactory apprehension 
of Stevens’ poetry. It should also be noted that the sun is a pars pro toto for nature, and 
that Stevens’ religious naturalism variously treats all of nature ‘Not as a god, but as a 
god might be’. This important example of one of Stevens’ many ‘intricate evasions of as’ 
(415), denotes a significant emphasis of his spiritual perspective. Stevens’ abandonment 
of belief in a supernatural God does not entail his abandonment of exercising devotion. 
Instead, as we have come to see, Stevens exercises his devotion toward what is 
immanent in the natural world. One of the obvious ways in which Stevens accomplishes 
this is by reorienting religious vocabulary to secular ends. This follows the logological 
procedure that we have seen outlined by Burke: the application of secular terms to a 
transcendent, supernatural realm that have been latterly taken back and reapplied to an 
immanent, natural realm.51 Stevens’ purpose in doing this is neither to propound a faux 
mysticism nor is it to espouse pantheism. Stevens rejects mysticism52 and nowhere 
ascribes to the notion that nature is in itself a total and immanent god. Stevens’ purpose, 
rather, is to emphasise that nature is, or at least should be, a sufficient substitute for 
God as an object of devotion. 
This said, there is a rare instance of Stevens’ entertaining the notion of a god 
immanent in nature. This god occurs in the third and last of Stevens’ improvisations 
presently under review—in his poem ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’. The 
                                                          
51 For a discussion of Stevens’ employment of traditional Christian language and biblical forms see Morris’ 
chapter ‘Lineage and Language’ (Morris, 1974, 9-44). Morris points out that ‘Stevens’ poetry, like his prose, 
consciously incorporates biblical wording and echo’ (Ibid, 41). ‘The major biblical forms that Stevens uses in his 
poetry are the parable, the proverb, the prayer, the hymn, and the psalm’ (Ibid, 18). 
52 In his essay ‘The Irrational Element in Poetry’, Stevens is assiduous in assuring his reader that: ‘I do not for a 
moment mean to indulge in mystical rhetoric, since for my part, I have no patience with that sort of thing’ 
(791). It must be said, of course, that Stevens’ reservations are by no means a prophylactic against mystical 
interpretations of his work. Stevens’ awareness of being misconstrued as a mystic evinced in this statement 
could itself be interpreted as a self-realisation that he has a tendency to sail close to the mystical wind. 
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speaker of this poem prescriptively accedes to a god, if, for some unbeknownst 
compulsion, there must be a god in the house: 
 
 If there must be a god in the house, must be, 
 Saying things in the rooms or on the stair, 
 
 Let him move as the sunlight moves on the floor, 
 Or moonlight, silently, as Plato’s ghost 
  
 Or Aristotle’s skeleton. Let him hang out 
 His stars on the wall. He must dwell quietly. 
 
 He must be incapable of speaking, closed, 
 As those are: as light, for all its motion, is; 
 
 As color, even the closest to us, is; 
 As shapes, though they portend us, are. 
 
 It is the human that is the alien, 
 The human that has no cousin in the moon. 
  
 It is the human that demands his speech 
 From the beasts or from the incommunicable mass. 
 
 If there must be a god in the house, let him be one 
 That will not hear us when we speak: a coolness, 
 
 A vermilioned nothingness, any stick of the mass 
 Of which we are too distantly a part. 
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    (288) 
 
Milton J. Bates suggests that this poem expresses the same idea, only ‘more obliquely’ 
(Bates, 1985, 254), as that which we encounter in the third canto of ‘Esthétique du 
Mal’.53 An ‘over-human god’ is reimagined in this poem, though not pejoratively, as 
something less and less human. It is a god stripped of logocentricity, in that it can 
neither hear nor speak. Its demanded silence is transumed into the imperceptibility of 
Plato’s ghostly Form(s) and the physical laws of Aristotelean materialism—the skeleton 
of motion concealed in the flesh of matter. Gyorgi Voros identifies the god’s positive 
attributes ‘as physical phenomena perceivable to the senses…sunlight, moonlight, color, 
and shape’ (Voros, 1997, 75), while neglecting to include the most arresting of these 
occurring in the poem, namely temperature. Voros introduces the simile that this god ‘is 
like a force of Nature’ (Ibid). However, it is difficult to comprehend how colour, for 
instance, could be conceived of as a force rather than as a property of nature. 
Alternatively, it is tempting to identify this household god with the inscrutability of 
nature—light, colour, shape, although perceptible to us are nonetheless ‘closed’. The 
                                                          
53 The passage Bates presents, and which I have earlier quoted from, reads as follows: 
 
The fault lies with an over-human god, 
Who by sympathy has made himself a man 
And is not to be distinguished, when we cry 
 
Because we suffer, our oldest parent, peer 
Of the populace of the heart, the reddest lord, 
Who has gone before us in experience. 
 
If only he would not pity us so much, 
Weaken our fate, relieve us of woe both great 
And small, a constant fellow of destiny, 
 
A too, too human god, self-pity’s kin 
And uncourageous genesis . . . It seems 
As if the health of the world might be enough. 
    (315) 
 
Again, note the compensatory gesture of ‘the health of the world might be enough’. 
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masterful pun on ‘incommunicable mass’ is apposite. The pun signifies on the one hand 
that the human is incapable of communicating with the mass of nature ‘Of which we are 
too distantly a part’ (itself a pun: a part/apart). On the other hand it signifies a religious 
communion that cannot be communicated.  Part of the poem’s implicit argument is that 
we alienate nature when we attempt to demand it to speak to us in our own language, 
much less when we try to find anthropotheistic cousins in the heavenly bodies. 
Therefore, we should reconcile ourselves with nature, rather than have nature reconcile 
itself with us. We will find this injunction recurring throughout Stevens’ poetry, and 
often more explicitly than in the present context. The larger rhetorical argument would 
seem to advance an appeal against an anthropomorphic deification of nature drawn 
along the following lines: that if god there must be, and nature there is, then nonhuman 
they simply co-immanently are. 
This reading, however, remains problematic due to the nondisclosure of who or 
what is enjoining the speaker to make these concessions to a god in the house in the 
first place, and with the identification of this god with the personifying pronominal 
‘him’. We might resolve the first of these problems by conjecturing that the speaker has 
wrestled with the ‘idea of God’ for some time, and that the poem soliloquizes his or her 
provisional submission to this idea. The second problem is trickier. Stevens is too 
careful a poet not to have realised that he could have substituted the neutral pronoun 
‘it’ for its masculine counterpart and thus avoid the compromise of personification 
altogether. The kenotic emptying of this numinous ‘it’ from a god ‘Saying things in the 
rooms or on the stair’ to a god that is silent and deaf (thus ‘incommunicable’) would 
already take care of negating the metonymic attributions of homo loquens. But that 
Stevens has made this compromise opens up a disjunction. On one side of this 
disjunction, the argument could be made that Stevens’ attempt to configure a nonhuman 
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god is self-refuted by identifying it as a ‘him’. On the other side of this disjunction, one 
could make the argument that this is not what Stevens’ is attempting to do at all. Rather 
than configuring a nonhuman god, one could argue that Stevens is instead confecting a 
more and more, but not entirely, inhuman god—thus a god in the process of becoming 
inhuman (the clue, as often with Stevens, is in the poem’s title). Stevens posits that we 
are, after all, a part, albeit distantly, of the mass of which this god is a fellow constituent. 
That leaves us then with the sorts of insoluble contradictions in which Stevens revels: 
with a god that is and is not us, alien and a part thereof. 
There still remains of course the troubling image of ‘A vermilioned nothingness’. 
Jarraway suggests, in reference to this image, that ‘we may find a Heideggerian 
discourse helpful…in particular, the “concept” of Ereignis, or experience’ (Jarraway, 
1993, 194). Jarraway quotes Robert Bernasconi’s reading of Heidegger’s concept, from 
which I will do the same: 
 
Mystics have found God in the dark night of the soul and it is now almost commonplace among 
theologians to recognize the experience of the loss of God in a secular society as an experience of 
God. Such experiences do not reestablish presence in the midst of absence. They break with the 
dichotomy of presence and absence, establishing absence as present precisely in its absence. 
(Bernasconi, 1985, 84). 
 
This hearkens back to the numen abest, which I have previously discussed. Nothingness 
is a pure abstraction in the strongest sense, in that it entails the complete absence of 
concretion. ‘A vermilioned nothingness’, on the other hand, is figurally cognate with ‘An 
abstraction blooded’ (333).54 Blood-coloured, this ‘vermilioned nothingness’ could be 
                                                          
54 This quote occurs in the sixth canto of the ‘It Must be Abstract’ section of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. 
~ 80 ~ 
 
read as a capsule ‘variant upon the Incarnation’ (Hoffman, 1966, 264) which Frederick J. 
Hoffman claims ‘is to be found in almost every major modern writer’ (Ibid). Though 
rather than an incarnation of the Word made flesh in the body of Christ, here we have a 
dis-incarnation of the numen praesens in blood-haunted nothingness. It is nothingness 
as though seen through a glass, redly. As a cross-hatching between kenotic nothingness 
and plerotic illumination it too breaks its formative dichotomy. Stevens’ breakage with, 
or what I think is the stronger claimant, synthesis of the kenotic/plerotic dichotomy is 
locally exemplified in the paradoxical figures of ‘A vermilioned nothingness’ and ‘An 
abstraction blooded’. His myriad figural variations issuing from the alternate poles of 
kenosis and plerosis, and especially in their synthetic consummations, locate his 
recoveries of immanent numinosity at their most rhetorically impressive. Extended 
forays into the paradoxical frontiers of the intelligible, however, underwrite the topos of 
the next chapter, and will receive due elaboration there. 
 I have chosen to survey these particular improvisations upon the ‘idea of God’ as 
I believe they represent what I take to be Stevens’ three fundamental modes of 
engagement with immanent numinosity. The first mode involves the treatment of 
received mythologies, which tends to find Stevens at his most dismissive. It is the most 
easily recognizable mode and will be addressed wherever pertinent. The second mode 
entails Stevens’ religious naturalism. This mode treats nature—which entails human 
beings, non-human animal and plant life, Earth as such and the greater cosmos—‘Not as 
a god, but as a god might be’, in all of the rich complexity this qualification connotes. It is 
this mode that will lead the continued focus of the current chapter. The third mode is 
that of the mysterium numinosum proper, which, broadly speaking, tropes on the 
negations of absence and its correlates (e.g. silence, darkness, emptiness, nothingness). 
As I have previously indicated, this mode will receive a full hearing in the following 
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chapter. I must also emphasise that these modes are not mutually exclusive. They often 
inform or converge upon each other, as we have already seen, in peculiar states of 




The American poet and critic J. V. Cunningham, a former student of Yvor Winters,55 
furnishes us with a pertinent summary of the relationship between Stevens’ poetry and 
his spiritual disposition: 
 
The central concern of Stevens’ poetry…is a concern to be at peace with his surroundings, with 
this world, and with himself. He requires for this an experience of the togetherness of himself and 
Nature, an interpenetration of himself and his environment, along with some intuition of 
permanence in the experience of absoluteness, though this be illusory and transitory, something 
to satisfy the deeply engrained longings of his religious feeling. (Cunningham, 1960, 122). 
 
I would like to recite, in this connection, Gould’s aforementioned definition of the 
numinous: ‘that it is nothing if not the paradox of exteriority demanding interiority’ 
(Gould, 1981, 260). One of Stevens’ late personae, Professor Eucalyptus from ‘An 
Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, declares: ‘“The search / For reality is as momentous as 
/ The search for god.”’ (410). The speaker of the poem proceeds from the Professor’s 
declaration with the following: ‘It is the philosopher’s search / For an interior made 
                                                          
55 Winters was among the earliest of Stevens’ critics to most influentially disseminate the hotly contested view 
that his poetry ‘gives us…the most perfect laboratory of hedonism to be found in literature’ (Winters, 1947, 
458). He would later revise his opinion in a 1959 postscript to his original essay, included in a reprint of the 3rd 
edition of his Anatomy of Nonsense. Winters now took Stevens to believe ‘that we live in a nominalistic 
universe made up of unrelated and inscrutable particulars, and that the only order possible in such a universe 
is that created by poetic imagination’ (Ibid, 459). 
~ 82 ~ 
 
exterior / And the poet’s search for the same exterior made / Interior’ (410). The 
speaker tells us, then, that whereas the philosopher wants to project her mental 
constructs onto the world, the poet wants instead to introject the world into himself. 
This introjection of the world into the self is the inverse of anthropomorphism, and has 
a name: physiomorphism.56 The poet’s introjection of the world into himself is an 
expression of the desire for plerotic fulfilment, which would necessarily collapse the 
dualisms between self/world, subject/object, mind/matter, interior/exterior, and so on, 
into a dynamic monistic unity. The obverse of this coin, exteriority demanding 
interiority, would involve the world projecting itself into the poet. Were this latter 
transference to eventuate, the circuit of interpenetration would be complete and 
plerotic fulfilment achieved. The problem with this dynamic, of course, particularly once 
you have done away with God, is that it presupposes at the very least ascribing some 
form of intentionality to the material world. The best candidate to account for this 
                                                          
56 Physiomorphism is a term Claude Lévi-Strauss employs in A Savage Mind to refer to the inverse of 
anthropomorphism. Lévi-Strauss introduces the term in a discussion comparing magic and religion, in which he 
argues that ‘although it can, in a sense, be said that religion consists in a humanization of natural laws and 
magic in a naturalization of human actions - the treatment of certain human actions as if they were an integral 
part of physical determinism - these are not alternatives or stages in an evolution. The anthropomorphism of 
nature (of which religion consists) and the physiomorphism of man (by which we have defined magic) 
constitute two components which are always given, and vary only in proportion. As we noticed earlier, each 
implies the other’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, 221, original italics). Graham Richards defines physiomorphism thus: 
‘The psychological assimilation of, identification with, or introjection of, properties found in the external world. 
Thus external phenomena such as coldness, hardness and slipperiness enable us to identify ourselves and 
others as cold, hard or slippery in a psychological sense’ (Richards, 2009, 173). More recently, the ecocritic 
Ashton Nichols argues for an analogous concept which he calls ‘ecomorphism’: ‘Ecomorphism is the antithesis 
of anthropomorphism. Instead of seeing myself at the center of my world, I can now help both myself, and the 
world around me, if I come to see my own activity—indeed, all human activity—in terms of its connectedness 
to nonhuman life. For centuries the poets have said, “that bird’s song is sad in the same way that I am sad” or 
“that flower looks happy, just as I am happy.” But the time has come to reconsider the tenor and the vehicle of 
such anthropomorphic metaphors. The vehicle is the personal subject—humans—from which the metaphor’s 
characteristic (sadness or happiness) is taken. The tenor is the natural subject (bird or flower) to which the 
human characteristic is given. Poets, and other metaphor-makers, should now consider reversing this 
metaphoric order as often as possible in the interest of ecocentrism. No longer should ants be imagined to 
resemble humans: “The ant colony is just like the corporation for which I work; every ant is trying to work for 
the good of the whole, but individuals can often seem frustrated in their efforts to help others.” The time has 
come to reverse this claim and point out that humans often act like ants, or birds, or even flowers, not vice 
versa’ (Nichols, 2011, 77). 
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world-intention would be panpsychism, which, I will maintain, is a philosophical 
position Stevens’ frequently entertains.57 Nonetheless, the poet, allowing himself to 
entertain the notion of world-intention, has no determination over if and when the 
world does project itself into him. The dissolution of self in the world has often been 
described in the Western tradition as an effect of sublime ekstasis—the experience of 
feeling transported outside of oneself.58 This experience is analogous to plerotic 
interpenetration insofar as the self is seized and assimilated by the object of its 
contemplation. If the poet is fortunate enough to experience this ekstasis his powers of 
cognition are momentarily suspended, rendering him dumb to articulation. 
Nonetheless, the memory of the experience, although inexplicable, leaves its indelible 
trace. The poet, disappointed with the transitory nature of his experience, seeks its 
restitution. That he is a poet, his method of restitution is to try and write himself into it. 
And thus the rhetoric of plerotic desire is born. 
Plerosis thus described as self-fulfilment by way of interpenetration with the 
‘otherness’ of the exterior world, is not by any means the motivation of every poet, but it 
is almost certainly the motivation of every Romantic poet, of which Stevens is a late and 
                                                          
57 To entertain is not the same as to believe. I am not making a claim for Stevens’ belief in panpsychism per se, 
but instead suggesting that there is evidence in many of Stevens’ poems which proffer a panpsychic 
perspective of the universe—his invocation of a ‘central mind’ in both ‘Chocorua to Its Neighbour’ (265) and 
‘Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour’ (444), later rephrased in ‘A Child Asleep in Its Own Life’ as ‘that single 
mind’ (468), provide the most obvious examples (which bear some resemblance to Anaxagoras’ theory of 
nous). Nowhere in Stevens’ letters or essays does he explicitly refer to panpsychism. As is well known, 
however, Stevens does convey an interest in and familiarity with the work of William James and A. N. 
Whitehead, both of whom present arguments for particular forms of panpsychism—see, for instance, the 
following: William James, (2008), A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present 
Situation in Philosophy, Rockville: Arc Manor, esp. 126-28; William James, (1916), ‘Novelty and Causation—The 
Perceptual View (Chapter XIII)’, Some Problems of Philosophy, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 208-19; A. 
N. Whitehead, (1978), Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, New York: The Free Press; A. N. Whitehead, 
(1933), Adventures in Ideas, New York: Macmillan. Any parallels between James and Whitehead’s respective 
panpsychic arguments and Stevens’ thought would remain highly speculative, and beyond the scope of the 
present thesis. Suffice it to say, Stevens’ poetry is rich with examples that gesture toward some form of mental 
or experiential aspect intrinsic to the material world at various levels of aggregate complexity. 
58 What I have explicitly in mind here is the Longinian account of the sublime. See: Longinus, (1965), ‘On the 
Sublime’, Classical Literary Criticism, ed. & trans. T. S Dorsch, London: Penguin, 97-158 
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exemplary case. Another is Whitman, as epitomised in his ‘Song of Myself’: ‘My tongue, 
every atom of my blood, form’d from this soil, this air,’ (Whitman, 1997, 25). This 
apposition steers us toward one of Stevens’ earliest plerotic personae—the eponymous 
protagonist of ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’: 
 
Not less because in purple I descended 
The western day through what you called 
 The loneliest air, not less was I myself. 
 
 What was the ointment sprinkled on my beard? 
 What were the hymns that buzzed beside my ears? 
 What was the sea whose tide swept through me there? 
 
 Out of my mind the golden ointment rained, 
 And my ears made the blowing hymns they heard. 
 I was myself the compass of that sea: 
 
 I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw 
 Or heard or felt came not but from myself; 
 And there I found myself more truly and more strange. 
   (51) 
 
Bloom interprets Hoon as ‘a composite of Stevens and Whitman’ (Bloom, 197, 63), citing 
the start of section 25 of ‘Song of Myself’ in support of this claim.59 We might imagine 
                                                          
59 The Whitman passage Bloom cites runs as follows: 
 
 Dazzling and tremendous how quick the sun-rise would kill me, 
 If I could not now and always send sun-rise out of me. 
 
 We also ascend dazzling and tremendous as the sun, 
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Hoon rewriting Whitman’s great poem of self, beginning thus: ‘I celebrate myself, and 
sing myself, / And what I assume all shall assume, / For every atom belonging to all as 
good becomes from me.’60 This rewriting implicates the solipsism that so many of Hoon’s 
detractors have accused him of typifying.61 My reading of Hoon, as we will see, rejects 
this charge. 
In the context of this poem, Hoon is recollecting a past experience, presumably to 
an unrepresented conversant with whom he is speaking over tea. We are prompted to 
construe Hoon as an aristocratic figure due to his account that ‘in purple I descended / 
The western day’. In Hoon’s recollection, the old rituals of anointment and their 
attendant hymns are transposed to his sublime communion with nature. The golden 
ointment that had rained from his mind and the blowing hymns that his ears had made 
do not prove him a solipsist. They signify instead that Hoon, if we take him at his word, 
had temporarily accomplished plerosis, a man who had succeeded in orienting the 
sweep of the sea because he and the world had interpenetratively fulfilled each other; 
                                                          
 We found our own O my soul in the calm and cool of daybreak. 
 
 My voice goes after what my eyes cannot reach, 
With the twirl of my tongue I encompass worlds and volumes of worlds. 
 
Speech is the twin of my vision, it is unequal to measure itself, 
It provokes me forever, it says sarcastically, 
Walt you contain enough, why don’t you let it out then? 
 
Come now I will not be tantalized, you conceive too much of articulation, 
Do you know O speech how the buds beneath you are folded? 
Waiting in the gloom, protected by the frost, 
The dirt receding before my prophetical screams, 
I underlying causes to balance them at last, 
My knowledge my live parts, it keeping tally with the meaning of all things, 
   (Whitman, 1977, 50). 
60 The original text reads: ‘I celebrate myself, and sing myself, / And what I assume you shall assume, / For 
every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.’ (Whitman, 1977, 25). 
61 I often wonder what goes through the minds of those people who continue to reiterate the critical 
commonplace of Hoon as solipsist when they read the phrase ‘through what you called / The loneliest air, not 
less was I myself’. 
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thus his will had been consistent with the will of the sea.62 Simply put, the night, the air, 
the sea, had become Hoon and Hoon had become them; Hoon had been embodied by the 
world and the world had been embodied by Hoon.63 Solipsism, in this light, is a faulty 
gauntlet to throw at Hoon’s feet. I would suggest that we better read Hoon as a 
panpsychic advocate recollecting his experience from the perspective of a manifold 
world-mind, of which Hoon’s assertive self was but a representative part. We do not, of 
course, have to assent to the veracity of Hoon’s account. We might write him off as 
delusional, as I suspect many of us do. I am of the opinion that Stevens is himself 
sceptical of Hoon’s hyperbolic reflection, the evidence for which, as I will argue 
presently, is underwritten in the ambiguity of the poem’s concluding line. Furthermore, 
it is of no small significance that Whitman wrote his majestic song of self in the present 
infinitive, whereas Hoon’s testimony is relegated to the past tense.  
 We learn from ‘Sunday Morning’, one of the earliest and most intertextually 
informative compositions in Stevens’ first collection, that the world of Harmonium is an 
‘island solitude, unsponsored, free’ (56). As such, the devotional object of Hoon’s 
anointment and hymnal praise was not an absent God, but was the immanent world 
with which we are told he had become plerotically integrated. This is to say that Hoon, 
                                                          
62 Richard P. Adams speculates that ‘a knowledge of Schopenhauers’s ideas may help us to understand 
Stevens’ poems’ (Adams, 1972, 135). Stevens’ only sustained reference to Schopenhauer, as Adams 
acknowledges, occurs in ‘A Collect of Philosophy’. Stevens’  journal entry of February 21, 1906, wherein he 
refers to ‘Schopenhauer’s psychological observations’ (L, 88), indicates that he was at least partially familiar 
with the philosopher’s work some forty-five years before writing the aforementioned essay. I am drawing 
upon Adams’ inference of a Schopenhauerian influence on Stevens’ thought regarding Hoon’s will’s 
consistency with that of the sea. Adams refers to ‘the contrast made by Schopenhauer between the “the thing 
itself”, which for him was the world as will, and “ideas about the thing,” which of course belonged to the world 
as idea’ (Adams, 1972, 136). I am suggesting that Hoon’s claimed plerotic interpenetration with the sea itself 
would, following Schopenhauer’s arguments, conflate the world as will with the will of Hoon himself. 
63 Another common interpretation of Hoon is as a figure of apotheosis. Curiously, part of Stevens’ own gloss on 
Leibniz’s Monadology in ‘A Collect of Philosophy’ is written in language that reads quite pertinently to such an 
interpretation of Hoon: ‘…in a system of monads, we come, in the end, to a man who is not only a man but sea 
and mountain, too, and to a God who is not only all these: man and sea and mountain but a God as well’ (853). 
It should also not go by unnoticed that Leibniz’s concept of the monad is a panpsychic theory.   
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in anointing himself, was simultaneously anointing the world with which he had 
become one. The absence of God also informs the ambiguity of the poem’s concluding 
line, of which I am yet to read a compelling interpretation. To stay with Bloom, he reads 
the line thus: ‘as his triumphant line makes clear, he is not a solipsist, because the 
“there” of his world is an arena in which he is at work finding himself, more truly the 
more he expands, and more strange, probably because Pater, one of his high priests, had 
defined the Romantic imagination as adding strangeness to beauty’ (Bloom, 1977, 65). I 
am not sure this is what the line makes clear at all, and at least Bloom is honest enough 
to admit to his speculation concerning Pater’s influence on it. I accept Bloom’s point that 
the world is where Hoon is at work finding himself, but he does not sufficiently account 
for the proper implications of what Hoon had found, not least of all because he makes 
the rather novice error of interpreting the line in the present continuous. What the 
poem does make clear is that Hoon perceives the experience he recounts as having 
occurred in Harmonium’s unsponsored world. The ointment and hymns that had issued 
not from God’s church, but from Hoon’s plerotic interpenetration with nature, attest to 
this. I contend that the last line should be read as Stevens’ authorial intervention into 
Hoon’s brief narrative: the ‘I’ of the hyperbolic persona brought down to size by the 
authorial ‘I’ who feels dwarfed by the oversized mask he has just adorned. As such, I 
maintain that as Hoon’s atonement was with the natural unsponsored world and not 
with God, accounts for Stevens-as-Hoon having found Hoon more truly therein. 
Margaret Peterson argues, not in connection with this poem, but nonetheless 
applicably, that ‘[t]he nobility of man is a continuous theme and one concomitant with 
[Steven’s] original rejection of Christian belief. Moreover the conception of Stevens as a 
hedonist turned humanist overlooks the fact that his supposed humanism is based, from 
Harmonium on, upon the naturalistic evolution of man from nature’ (Peterson, 1983, 
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94). Hoon, as a rhetorical projection of an aspect of Stevens’ own plerotic desire, is a 
figure coherent with the poet’s apperception of reality, which, as Peterson correctly 
argues, entails a naturalist belief system predicated upon the theory of evolution.64 
Stevens’ frequently literalizes evolutionary emergence as an identity between the 
emergent subject and that from which it has emerged. We have already seen this in 
‘Mud Master’—the world is muddy so the mind is muddy.65  Thus Hoon’s evolutionary 
continuity with nature is also inscribed in how Stevens-as-Hoon found Hoon more truly. 
Once we understand this, we begin to see how Stevens has pulled Hoon away from his 
plerotic interpenetration with nature and into finding himself ‘more strange’. To begin 
with, Hoon’s pseudo-apotheosis was a castle he had built in the air with the hands of 
Emersonian self-reliance. Without something like a doctrinally established 
formalisation of dispensation to support him, Hoon would have found himself at odds 
with the foundations upon which his sacred expropriations were substantiated. We 
recall Stevens’ aforementioned argument that after the gods had come to nothing, ‘It left 
us feeling dispossessed and alone in a solitude, like children without parents, in a home 
that seemed deserted, in which the amical rooms and halls had taken on a look of 
hardness and emptiness’ (842). This confession’s psychological perspective 
underwrites Hoon’s estrangement: as a descendant of God-absented nature, he is made 
strange in a cosmos that has no superordinate personality with which to identify. 
                                                          
64 A rhetorical antagonist, to provide but one counter-example to a poetic figure made to compensate a 
personal desire, would maintain a belief system that did not accord with the poet’s apperception of reality so 
as to provide a foil with whom to argue. 
65 Another early example of this literalization of the identity of emergent subject with that from which it has 
emerged can be found in ‘Anatomy of Monotony’: 
If from the earth we came, it was an earth 
That bore us as a part of all things 
It breeds and that was lewder than it is. 
Our nature is her nature. Hence it comes, 
Since by our nature we grow old, earth grows 
The same. We parallel the mother's death. 
   (90). 
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Although Hoon claims to have had achieved natural plerosis, this would have receded 
commensurate with his finding himself more strange: continuity is not identity, and so a 
difference perceived between self and a world that preceded selfhood in toto would 
have emerged. This emergent difference would have been quickened in that to find 
oneself strange in a world that is oneself is to become self-estranged. It is with this last 
line that Stevens deflates Hoon’s plerosis by drawing his ‘I was the world in which I 
walked’ into an ambivalence between truth and estrangement, which in this context is 
an ambivalence equivalent to that between identity and difference, between the world-
self and its simultaneously distancing ‘there’, wherein Stevens-as-Hoon had found 
himself more strange. 
Bloom collocates ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’, ‘The Man Whose Pharynx was Bad’ 
and ‘The Snow Man’ ‘as though they formed one larger, dialectical lyric when run 
together’ (Bloom, 1977, 50). He is adamant that ‘[t]he reader who masters the 
interrelationships of these three brief texts…has reached the center of Stevens’ poetic 
and human anxieties and of his resources for meeting those anxieties’ (Ibid). Bloom 
continues: ‘The Pharynx poem states the crisis of poetic vision; The Snow Man meets the 
crisis by a reduction to the First Idea; exuberantly, the great hymn of Hoon, so 
invariably misread as irony, reimagines the First Idea and restitutes, momentarily yet 
transumptively, the contraction of meaning provoked by the crisis’ (Ibid). Read 
intertextually, these three poems do indeed yield useful insights into Stevens’ praxis in 
the main. However, I would reinterpret Bloom’s reading of the ‘The Snow Man’ as ‘a 
reduction to the First Idea’ as a figure of fully achieved kenosis. I have already 
reinterpreted Bloom’s reading of Hoon as a figure of ‘expansion’ (Ibid, 51, 160) in terms 
of plerotic fulfilment. Hoon’s plerotic assertiveness, I would argue, is deflated by the 
poet’s epistemological doubt concerning his powers of expression in ‘The Man Whose 
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Pharynx Was Bad’. The title of this latter poem is in itself a naturalized, anatomical trope 
for a poet whose powers of expression have been compromised—rather than the 
disappearance of the muses or the absence of divine afflatus, it is simply that his own 
throat is at fault.  The poem reads: 
 
The time of year has grown indifferent. 
Mildew of summer and the deepening snow 
Are both alike in the routine I know: 
I am too dumbly in my being pent. 
 
The wind attendant on the solstices 
Blows on the shutters of the metropoles, 
Stirring no poet in his sleep, and tolls 
The grand ideas of the villages. 
 
The malady of the quotidian. . . .  
Perhaps, if winter once could penetrate 
Through all its purples to the final slate, 
Persisting bleakly in an icy haze; 
 
One might in turn become less diffident, 
Out of such mildew plucking neater mould 
And spouting new orations of the cold. 
One might. One might. But time will not relent. 
   (81)  
 
The indifference of the time of year forecloses the poet’s capacity to differentiate the 
world’s particulars. The seasonal variations have dissolved into an indistinguishable 
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routine, thus relegating him to a mute confinement. Not even the wind66 blowing at the 
plerotic zenith of summer’s solstice, nor at the kenotic nadir of winter’s, can stir the 
poet from his sleep. Moreover, in a marvellous metalepsis, the wind tolls the grand ideas 
of the villages. This metalepsis operates in a typically Stevensian double sense by 
punning on the verb. The ‘grand ideas of the villages’ is in itself a complex figure, no less 
than a metonymy of a synecdoche. The synecdoche is the village church, whose bells the 
wind is tolling, which stands pars pro toto for institutionalised religion. The grand ideas, 
then, are a metonymy for the creeds of the church. The wind tolling these grand ideas at 
once signifies their stale routineness metaphorised as measured time, while ironizing 
their very designation as grand. For Stevens, inert routine stands next to death, hence 
the wind tolls these grand ideas in the second sense as an announcement of their 
demise in the disenchanted ‘malady of the quotidian’. This metalepsis also serves as an 
instance of Stevens’ overthrowing the old transcendent order with the immanent world. 
The natural power of the wind has overturned the divine power of God—it has in fact 
delivered it of its death-knell. 
 The ellipsis marks an anacoluthic break as the mood changes from the present 
indicative to an optative conditional. The poet hopes that if the winter will clarify the 
muddle of its purple periphrases into a ‘final slate’,67 a finality that in fact instantiates a 
new beginning,68 then he might be able to regain confidence in his ability to differentiate 
the world’s particulars again into a workable poesis. This ‘might’ is charged with an 
                                                          
66 Wind serves as Stevens’ commonplace metonymy for natural utterance, a favourite trope of the English 
Romantics. See, for instance, Stevens’ short apostrophe: ‘To the Roaring Wind’ (77). 
67 The ‘final slate’ is thematically cognate with ‘The air is not a mirror but bare board,’ (332) in the fourth canto 
of ‘Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction: It Must Be Abstract’. The speaker, revising Eve’s making air the mirror of 
herself, asserts that the air is a bare board, that is to say, a tabula rasa free of any pre-imposed identity. 
68 Again, this is thematically cognate with the figure of ‘Omega refreshed at every end.’ (400) concluding the 
sixth canto of ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’. T. S. Eliot, in many respects Stevens’ bête noire, finishes 
‘East Coker’ with an uncannily similar trope: ‘In my end is my beginning.’ (Eliot, 1974, 191). Of course Eliot 
begins ‘East Coker’ this lines inverse: ‘In my beginning is my end.’ (Ibid, 184).   
~ 92 ~ 
 
acute urgency, however, as the future realisation of his hope is suppressed by the 
relentlessness of the ongoing present. 
 ‘The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad’ is a symptomatic figure of Stevens’ 
epistemological doubt. Stevens’ uncertainty as to whether the poet can say anything 
about the world as it is, of things as they are, of mere being, is the tempering cap with 
which he intermittently stops the lens of his refractive imagination. It takes many forms 
in his poetry, whether it be through dramatizing an expressive crisis as in the poem just 
read; through the defensive use of impersonal voice or distancing personae;69 through 
self-conscious interrogation of and within a poem; through his frequent use of evasive 
syntax, hypotheses, contradictions, and qualified assertions;70 through complex figural 
deviations;71 or by composing and arranging poems in sets that establish intertextual 
networks of contrary or differential variations on a guiding theme, trope or idea.72 It 
would perhaps be supererogatory to add that doubt is a deep pool of renewed creativity 
for Stevens, as this poem exemplifies. ‘The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad’, after all, is a 
poem generated by the doubtfulness of being able to poetize, of being able to spout new 
orations of the cold.  
We might suppose that the speaker of ‘The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad’ could 
attempt to pursue Hoon’s path of plerotic interpenetration, which, as we have seen, 
collapses back into an ambivalence between identity and difference. This eventual 
                                                          
69 Stevens’ frequent predication of his syntax on the objective pronoun ‘one’ is telling in this regard.  
70 See: Helen Vendler, (1965), ‘The Qualified Assertions of Wallace Stevens’, The Act of the Mind: Essays on the 
Poetry of Wallace Stevens, ed. Roy Harvey Pearce and J. Hillis Miller, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 163-
178; Helen Vendler, (Winter 2003), ‘Wallace Stevens: Hypotheses and Contradictions’, Representations, 81:1, 
99-117. 
71 See: Frank Doggett, (1980), Wallace Stevens: The Making of a Poem, Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 150-54; Laury Magnus, (Spring 1987), ‘”And Things Beyond Resemblances”: On 
Stevens’ Embedded Similes’, Wallace Stevens Journal, 11:1, 12-20. 
72 ‘Stevens made a habit of publishing poems in carefully organized sets, particularly in pairs in which one 
poem questions, undercuts, and cycles into the other’ (Schulze qtd. in Eeckhout, 2002, 96). 
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collapse into an ambivalence between identity and difference could in fact be one 
remedy to the speaker’s indifferentism. Yet the speaker of the poem would appear to 
desire realising what the kenotic ‘final slate’ of winter might entail. This latter path 
would involve going the way of ‘The Snow Man’. 
As I will be giving a fuller reading of ‘The Snow Man’ in the next chapter, I will 
only make some perfunctory remarks on it here. Elements we are by now familiar with 
from our reading of Hoon also appear in ‘The Snow Man’, only in sharper focus, which is 
eminently befitting of the poem’s starkness. I am of course referring to the 
panpsychic/physiomorphic amalgam. The titular snow man, whatever else ‘he’ might 
be, possesses a ‘mind of winter’, performs perceptual and cognitive acts (regarding, 
beholding, thinking, listening), and is perplexingly embedded within a triply 
compounded nothing: ‘And, nothing himself, beholds / Nothing that is not there and the 
nothing that is.’ (8). Whereas Hoon was fulfilled with the world-self, the snow man is a 
figure of profound emptiness—but it is an emptiness which surpasses in magnificent 
quietude anything of which Hoon in all of his enraptured grandiloquence is capable. 
This distinction points to a marked difference in the tone and style of the two poems. 
‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’ is written in a sublime, lofty register, importing its purple 
diction and hieratic phrasing from the Victorian aesthetes, all perfectly suitable to its 
ecstatic subject. ‘The Snow Man’, by comparison, is lexically spare, as per the credos of 
Imagism with which Stevens’ briefly flirted. It is, however, syntactically sinuous,73 
hypotactic in its phrasing, and, if a forebear it must have, the most viable contender 
would be Emily Dickinson at her most non-exclamatory. It is a poem in the meditative 
tradition, and would provide the model for all of Stevens’ superb late pensive lyrics. But 
                                                          
73 William W. Bevis refers to ‘The Snow Man’ as ‘a periphrastic striptease’ (Bevis, 1988, 24).  
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we must further explore the Hoonian impulse for immanent plerosis, as it is such an 




Hoon reappears (or is recast), Bloom correctly points out, as Walt Whitman in the first 
section of ‘Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery’:74 
 
 In the far South the sun of autumn is passing 
 Like Walt Whitman walking along a ruddy shore. 
 He is singing and chanting the things that are a part of him, 
 The worlds that were and will be, death and day. 
 Nothing is final, he chants. No man shall see the end. 
 His beard is of fire and his staff is a leaping flame. 
    (121) 
 
The simile in this passage should give us pause. Is it the sun who is walking along the 
shore, or is it Walt Whitman? The appositive gerunds confuse the sense. Bloom’s 
solution, which this confusion enables, is ‘that Whitman is both the sun and the world in 
which he walks’ (Bloom, 1977, 66), and thus accounts for his alignment with Hoon. The 
same problem, of course, that beset Hoon—that of the ambivalence between identity 
and difference—occurs here. The ambivalence is in fact more pointed in this example, as 
the connection hinges on a simile as opposed to Hoon’s metaphorical pronouncement. 
                                                          
74 ‘I would judge that [Hoon] appears again in 1935 as the Walt Whitman in section I of Like Decorations, and in 
his own name and right again, later in 1935, in Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz, and finally as the insouciant Well 
Dressed Man With a Beard in 1941’ (Bloom, 1977, 65). I agree with Bloom on the first, the second is beyond 
dispute, whereas the third I consider somewhat idiosyncratic. 
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Likeness and unlikeness, as every poetry reader knows, are simultaneously implied in 
the very grammatical structure of A is like B. Stevens revises Hoon’s self-world 
integration a perspectival step further in ‘A Rabbit as King of the Ghosts’: 
 
 And to feel that the light is a rabbit-light, 
 In which everything is meant for you 
 And nothing need be explained; 
 
 Then there is nothing to think of. It comes of itself; 
 And east rushes west and west rushes down, 
 No matter. The grass is full 
 
 And full of yourself. The trees around are for you, 
 The whole of the wideness of night is for you, 
 A self that touches all edges, 
  
You become a self that fills the four corners of night. 
   (190) 
 
Here we see Stevens extending the self-world integration to include non-human 
animals. ‘A self that touches all edges’ is a wonderful synaesthetic stroke, especially 
when we consider our taken for granted conflation of feeling and tactility. When a 
person says ‘I feel moved’, they do not feel it with the eye, ear, tongue or nose, but in 
that most plerotic and least defined of bodily senses, touch. Our sense of touch covers 
the surface of our skin and goes all the way down, as it were, from head to toe, heart to 
gut. It is cooperative in all of our other senses, and is the primary recipient of pleasure 
and the exclusive recipient of pain. It is the only sense coextensive with our entire body, 
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and is therefore foremost in our contact with the phenomenal world; one need only 
imagine navigating an unfamiliar pitch-black room to bear home the point. It is for these 
reasons that it is synaesthetically bound up with our emotional being and imparts to our 
understanding the complex sense embedded in the verb phrase ‘to feel’. As such, it is 
arguably the sense most intimately linked with our intuition of being an embodied self 
in the world. Thus, ‘A self that touches all edges’, is to absorb the Hoonian figure of 
expansion and amplify it to the fullest degree. It takes the pronouncement ‘I was the 
world in which I walked’—a claim which appeals solely to the ego—and physicalizes it 
with and through the emotional colouring we have seen embedded in the sense of 
touch, and thus renders Hoon’s boast rather paltry in comparison. 
We can enumerate Stevens’ non-human extension of subjects in various states of 
plerotic achievement or desirousness even further: the bantam chastising the ‘Damned 
universal cock’ in ‘Bantams in Pine-Woods’: ‘Your world is you. I am my world.’ (60); 
‘the parakeet of parakeets’ in ‘The Bird with the Coppery Keen Claws’ (65), which 
operates as a satire upon a modern idealist conception of God (see: Peterson, 1983, 97-
100); the ‘green vine angering for life’ in ‘Nomad Exquisite’ (77); ‘the eminent thunder 
from the mouse’, a universal, heroic mouse who survives and outstrips all 
contemporaneous human endeavour, and predominates as ‘one of the not-numerable 
mice’ in ‘The Blue Buildings in the Summer Air’ (196-97); the bird who ‘kept saying that 
birds had once been men,’ and ‘In the little of his voice…proclaimed himself, was 
proclaimed’, in ‘On an Old Horn’ (210-11); ‘The dry eucalyptus’ who ‘seeks god in the 
rainy cloud’ in ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ (405), which illustrates in miniature 
Mutter’s thesis concerning Stevens’ strategy of substitution, in that it ‘shifts the 
attention from the content of the religious idea to the needs and desires that generated 
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it’ (Mutter, Fall 2011, 744); and the titular mountain-monologist in ‘Chocorua to Its 
Neighbour’, who declares from afar: 
 
To speak quietly at such a distance, to speak 
And to be heard is to be large in space, 
That, like your own, is large, hence, to be part 
Of sky, of sea, large earth, large air. It is 
To perceive men without reference to their form. 
   (263). 
 
We can discern in this by no means exhaustive gathering Stevens’ gestures toward the 
natural world in its nonhuman otherness. This is significant, because it intimates a 
fundamental aspect of the shortcomings Stevens’ perceived in humanism. In a letter to 
Henry Church, May 18, 1943, he writes: ‘The chief defect of humanism is that it concerns 
human beings. Between humanism and something else, it might be possible to create an 
acceptable fiction’ (L, 449). Leon Surette suggests that ‘in Stevens’ view humanism is 
characterized by a denial of the inhuman, of that which exceeds, or, to use a Derridean 
term, “supplements” the human’ (Surette, Spring 2005, 147). Derrida’s ‘supplement’ is 
an interesting term to invoke in this connection. Derrida describes the supplement as 
having a double signification. In the first signification it is additive: ‘The supplement 
adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
presence’ (Derrida, 1997, 144, original italics), The second signification is 
compensatory: ‘But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes 
or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void’ (Ibid, 145, original 
italics). In the first instance the supplement adds itself to a thing already whole in itself; 
in the second it replaces something lacking in the thing that it supplements, thus 
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subverting the integrity of the lacking thing as a self-contained whole and thus replacing 
it with a supplemented thing. I agree with Voros that the ‘something else’ Stevens 
alludes to in his letter to Henry Church is ‘the physical universe, which exists prior to 
and beyond the human and for which Stevens’s primary word was “reality.”’ (Voros, 
1997, 6). Voros describes Stevens’ reality as ‘a demythified, nontranscendental 
naturalistic Nature’ (Ibid, 5); he also qualifies it as both ‘nonteleological’ and 
‘nonanthropocentric’ (Ibid, 6). I would argue that Stevens’ conception of a nonhuman 
nature denuded of God and ultimate purpose is the necessary supplement to the 
humanism he found wanting. Stevens’ ‘reality’ accords with humanism insofar as it does 
not seek a reality beyond the natural, but goes further than humanism in asserting that 
the human is not a sufficient end in and of itself. The human, for Stevens, is 
supplemented by nature in that attending to it extends human concern to a veneration 
of something beyond itself. Thus nature also supplements, in a compensatory sense, the 
humanist’s lack of God.  With this in mind, I think we can and should read Stevens as an 
eloquent critic of anthropocentrism. 
 The foregoing, however, should not be taken to imply that the human is excluded 
from this expanded ambit of veneration. Stevens is not, by any means, an anti-humanist. 
His gloss on his poem ‘A Fading of the Sun’ (112-13) in a letter to Ronald Lane Latimer, 
November 21, 1935, is about as direct a humanist statement as you will find: 
 
It is an old story that we derive our ideas of nobility, say, from noble objects of nature. But then, it 
is an equally old story that we derive them from ourselves. For convenience, and in view of the 
simplicity of the large mass of people, we give our good qualities to God, or to various gods, but 
they come from ourselves. In A FADING OF THE SUN the point is that, instead of crying for help to God 
or to one of the gods, we should look to ourselves for help. The exaltation of human nature should 
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take the place of its abasement. Perhaps I ought to say, the sense of its exaltation should take the 




I have already argued that Stevens departs from his Romantic and Transcendentalist 
forebears by dispensing with their predication of communing with nature as a means to 
find God. For Stevens, communing with nature is a sufficient good in and of itself, and it 
is through his poetry that he bears witness to this good. Whereas a conventionally 
religious poet such as Gerard Manly Hopkins would say: ‘The world is charged with the 
grandeur of God’ (Hopkins, 1953, 27), the religious naturalist Stevens would say: ‘The 
most beautiful (the only beautiful) (beautiful is an inadequate and temporizing 
improvisation) thing in the world is, of course, the world itself. This is so not only 
logically but categorically’ (907).75 Mutter describes Stevens’ tautological thinking 
regarding the sufficiency of the natural world as follows: 
 
Stevens’s ambition to make language tautological with the experience of the world in its 
immanence is an ambition to overturn this prejudice against the world, to experience it as 
                                                          
75 Stevens’ transcendence downward, to reprise Scott Jr.’s phrase, is emphasised in another fragmentary 
journal entry: ‘Feed my lambs (on the bread of the living) . . . The glory of god is the glory of the world . . . To 
find the spiritual in reality . . . To be concerned with reality’ (914). The trajectory is typical of Stevens: rather 
than feed the Christian flock on heavenly manna, Stevens insists on feeding a worldly flock on worldly 
sustenance. On the face of it, the second phrase would seem to bear a close affinity to Hopkins’ previously 
quoted line, but this would be a specious comparison. Hopkins’ is making a dualistic assertion between spirit 
and matter: that the world is charged with a divine force, but a force nonetheless issuing from something 
beyond the material world. Stevens’ is a monistic tautology, he is equating the glory of god with the glory of 
the world, which is to say that they are one and the same. It is as close as Stevens gets to a pantheistic attitude 
and bears no repetition elsewhere in his poetry or prose, other than, so far as I can determine, in section XIV 
of ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’. In this section, Professor Eucalyptus is depicted seeking ‘God in the 
object itself, without much choice.’ (405). Stevens in imparting this pantheistic search to one of his personae 
removes himself from the commitment, but nevertheless allows it in as another ‘celestial possible’ (433). 
Stevens’ expressed desire to find the spiritual in reality, which is quite obviously of an immanent persuasion, is 
arguably analogous to Professor Eucalyptus’ search to find God in the object itself. 
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something “complete,” “sufficient,” “adequate,” or “enough.” These sorts of words appear in 
Stevens’s poetry again and again. To experience the world as sufficient, even as a plenitude, is to 
repudiate the intuition he, following William James, thought the beginning of religious 
consciousness; namely, that there is something wrong with the world, and that our difficulty here 
means we must refer our discontented desire to something “beyond” in order to render it 
intelligible and relieve our misery. (Mutter, Fall 2011, 749). 
 
As we have already seen, Stevens does not repudiate the intuition toward religious 
consciousness outright, only what he perceives to be, as Mutter points out, its 
pernicious tendency to transcend the natural. Mutter proceeds to argue that Stevens 
prioritises sensory experience: ‘Stevens looks to the sensory because it ends with itself, 
is satisfied with itself, asks nothing beyond itself. It makes no sense to say of a color, a 
shape, or a landscape, “Is it enough?” The visual imperative in Stevens can therefore be 
understood as an attempt to overcome the uneasiness toward the visual in monotheistic 
religions, with their proscriptions of idolatry and their preference for the interior or the 
inward’ (Mutter, Fall 2011, 749). As I have already demonstrated, for Stevens the 
outward or exterior is often proposed to be a manifestation of the inward or interior. A 
striking example of this is the early ‘Anecdote of Men by the Thousand’: 
 
The soul, he said, is composed 
 Of the external world. 
 
There are men of the East, he said, 
Who are the East. 
There are men of a province 
Who are that province. 
There are men of a valley 
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Who are that valley. 
 
There are men whose words 
Are as natural sounds 
Of their places 
As the cackle of toucans 
In the place of toucans. 
 
The mandoline is the instrument 
Of a place. 
 
Are there mandolines of western mountains? 
Are there mandolines of northern moonlight? 
 
The dress of a woman of Lhassa, 
In its place, 
Is an invisible element of that place 
Made visible. 
   (41) 
 
The emphasis here is again on outward manifestations of numinous interior qualities 
peculiar to specific places. The supposition, presumably, is that the inward is to be 
inferred from its outward manifestations. ‘I am what is around me’ (70) declares the 
speaker of ‘Theory’. Stevens’ pseudo-heliotheism resituates this equivalence between 
inward and outward from the specificity of worldly loci to their solar source. In his early 
suite of epigrams ‘New England Verses’ it is stated bluntly: ‘All things in the sun are sun.’ 
(87), and in section VI of ‘Esthétique du Mal’: ‘The sun is the country wherever he is.’ 
(281). In ‘Waving Adieu, Adieu, Adieu’, a poem dismissive of Christian notions of an 
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afterlife and asserting the poignancy of death’s finality, concludes with a conciliatory 
resignation: ‘Ever-jubilant, / What is there here but weather, what spirit / Have I except 
it comes from the sun?’ (104). Not only is place and spirit formed from the sun, but so 
too the products of human making: ‘Of what is this house composed if not of the sun,’ 
(397) asks the speaker of ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’. And finally, in the 
magnificent late retrospect ‘The Planet on the Table’, Stevens announces that his poems 
are also ‘makings of the sun’: 
 
Ariel was glad he had written his poems. 
They were of a remembered time 
Or of something seen that he liked. 
 
Other makings of the sun 
Were waste and welter 
And the ripe shrub writhed. 
 
His self and the sun were one 
And his poems, although makings of his self, 
Were no less makings of the sun. 
 
It was not important that they survive. 
What mattered was that they should bear 
Some lineament or character, 
 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words, 
Of the planet of which they were part. 
   (450) 
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These notions of environmental determinism would recur throughout Stevens’ poetry 
to the end. His late posthumously published poem, ‘A mythology reflects its region’, 
which Samuel Morse speculates ‘may very well be the last poem Stevens wrote’ (OP, 
xxiii), bears this out: 
 
 A mythology reflects its region. Here 
 In Connecticut, we never lived in a time 
 When mythology was possible—But if we had— 
 That raises the question of the image’s truth. 
 The image must be of the nature of its creator. 
 It is the nature of its creator increased, 
 Heightened. It is he, anew, in a freshened youth 
 And it is he in the substance of his region 
 Wood of his forests and stone out of his fields 
 Or from under his mountains. 
    (476) 
 
The ‘true’ image must be of the nature of its creator, but the creator ‘in a freshened 
youth’, is nonetheless embedded in the substance of his region. This is to say that the 
‘truth’ of the mythological image, were it possible, must be derived from the substance 
of its region. Stevens’ essay ‘The Figure of Youth as a Virile Poet’ is a crucial intertext to 
an understanding of this poem. In this essay the youthful, virile poet is a figure of 
‘intelligence that endures’ (675) the ‘antique imagination of the father’ (Ibid). He is an 
emergent figure ‘stepping forward in the company of a muse of its own, still half-beast 
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and somehow more than human, a kind of sister of the Minotaur’ (675)76 to discover ‘a 
pleasure of agreement with the radiant and productive world in which he lives’ (678). 
This figure of the emergent poetic imagination is concerned, according to Stevens, with 
poetic truth. Whatever poetic truth involves, and Stevens himself admits this, is 
ambiguous. It is said to involve ‘the belief of credible people in credible things’ (675). 
This is tied to Stevens’ notion of the youthful, virile poet who must overcome ‘the 
burden of the obscurities of the intelligence of the old’ (675) to discover a credible truth 
for his contemporaries. It is also concerned with fact, but not, as Stevens’ insists, with 
the absolute fact of reality, but with poetic ideas that satisfy the imagination (668).  
These poetic ideas and their truth, however, are said to be congruent with reality: ‘…the 
truth that we experience when we are in agreement with reality is the truth to fact’ 
(680). Poetic truth, Stevens argues, arises from the world as it is in our process of 
perceiving it. Whereas the philosopher limits him or herself ‘to the gaunt world of 
reason’ (678), the poet lives in a ‘mundo of the imagination...[whose] pleasure is the 
pleasure of powers that create a truth that cannot be arrived at by the reason alone, a 
truth that the poet recognizes by sensation’ (679). Sensory experience as it is 
experienced, then, is the basis of poetic truth. But the figure of the youthful, virile poet 
transfigures this raw data of experience through his imagination. His imagination is in 
conversation with his half-beast though more than human muse (a chimerical hybrid of 
the primordial real with a metaphysical being), which compels him to make the 
following address:  
                                                          
76 For a lively disputation as to who or what the sister of the Minotaur might be, see: Stanley Cavell’s 
‘Reflections on Wallace Stevens at Mount Holyoke’; Jeffrey Mehlman’s response to Cavell ‘Thoughts on 
Wallace Stevens’s Contribution at Pontigny-en-Amérique’; and Cavell’s counter-response to Mehlman 
‘Postscript: Response to Mehlman’; collected in Christopher Benfey and Karen Remmler, eds., (2006), Artists, 
Intellectuals, and World War II: The Pontigny Encounters at Mount Holyoke College, 1942-1944, Boston and 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 61-88. 
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Inexplicable sister of the Minotaur, enigma and mask, although I am part of what is real, hear me 
and recognise me as part of the unreal. I am the truth but the truth of that imagination of life in 
which with unfamiliar motion and manner you guide me in those exchanges of speech in which 
your words are mine, mine yours. (685) 
 
This amounts to an admission that the poet and his imagination aspire to mythopoeic 
truth—but one that must be rooted in its time and place, as the foregoing poem 
suggests, in order to be credible. The pollination of the real with the unreal will be the 
source of this mythology. The indefinite historical period the speaker refers to in 
Connecticut was evidently not germane to a credible mythology. But the speaker has left 
another note toward a supreme fiction, as it were, a fragmentary blueprint for some 
future poet in a freshened youth to realise a possible mythology which adequately 
reflects its region. 
 This rhetorical manoeuvre is typical of Stevens. He is continuously positing 
possibilities that remain unrealised. The realisation of a mythology, a supreme fiction, is 
something that he only composes notes toward. This effectively places the onus on the 
reader to contemplate what a supreme fiction might entail in his or her own historical 
context. For Stevens, the finality of a fully realised supreme fiction or mythology would 
be anathema to his pluralistic restlessness. ‘July Mountain’, another short, late poem 
emphasises this point: 
 
We live in a constellation 
Of patches and pitches, 
Not in a single world, 
In things well said in music, 
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On the piano, and in speech, 
As in a page of poetry— 
Thinkers without final thoughts 
In an always incipient cosmos, 
The way, when we climb a mountain, 
Vermont throws itself together.  
    (476) 
 
The plurality of worlds made up of patches and pitches for each thinker without final 
thoughts suggests that the mind (interior) will never find a wholly congruent 
satisfaction with the world (exterior). Section VI of ‘Extracts From Addresses to the 
Academy of Fine Ideas’ tells of a thinker who 
 
…wanted to think his way to life, 
Sure that the ultimate poem was the mind, 
Or of the mind, or of the mind in these 
Elysia, these days, half earth, half mind; 
Half sun, half thinking of the sun; half sky, 
Half desire for indifference about the sky. 
 
He, that one, wanted to think his way to life, 
To be happy because people were thinking to be. 
They had to think it to be. He wanted that, 
To face the weather and be unable to tell 
How much of it was light and how much thought, 
In these Elysia, these origins, 
This single place in which we are and stay, 
Except for the images we make of it, 
And for it, and by which we think the way, 
~ 107 ~ 
 
And, being unhappy, talk of happiness 
And, talking of happiness, know that it means 
That the mind is the end and must be satisfied. 
 
It cannot be half earth, half mind; half sun, 
Half thinking; until the mind has been satisfied, 
Until, for him, his mind is satisfied. 
Time troubles to produce the redeeming thought. 
Sometimes at sleepy mid-days it succeeds, 
Too vaguely that it be written in character. 
   (231-32) 
 
The satisfactions of the mind are achieved, so the poem tells us, in a somnolent realm of 
unintelligibility, yet only ‘sometimes’. These satisfactions are still subject to the 
sovereign law of necessity, which, as Bloom has it in reference to the serpent in ‘Auroras 
of Autumn’, is the law of ‘time and mutability’ (Bloom, Winter 1966, 40). To put it in 
Spinozan terms, Stevens is more interested in natura naturans than in natura naturata, 
in process rather than completion, an incipient rather than an already developed 
cosmos. I would argue that this is why Stevens is so emphatically discursive. David 
Ayers presents an argument not dissimilar to the one I have been making: ‘Stevens sees 
poetry as basically discursive. He does not, however, think of writing as something that 
can transcend and fix experience, but as immanent to experience, permanently 
circulating within it, indeed constituting it. So language, though it is a discourse, is not a 
discourse of finality, but of openness’ (Ayers, 2004, 41). Where I would differ from 
Ayers, however, is that I would argue that Stevens’ poetry in its very discursiveness 
does indeed mimic the experience of thinking itself: its misgivings and equivocations, its 
occasional bursts of aphoristic certainty, its constant revisions and revolutions of ideas, 
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formulations, theories, beliefs. Stevens, we could argue, achieves a paradoxical 
resolution of mimesis in transcending and fixing the experience of non-fixedness. And 
this, I would further argue, is fundamentally reflective of Stevens’ attitude towards mind 
and nature—that they parallel one another inasmuch as they are always in a state of 
mutable becoming and never resolved. A contrary thrust in Stevens, which we will 
explore further in the following chapter, is that the mind or the sense of selfhood is 
often so resistant to assimilation that it perceives of itself as alienated from the world. 
As we have seen, however, Stevens also constantly reiterates their unification: 
 
I am a native in this world 
And think like a native thinks, 
 
Gesu, not native of a mind 
Thinking the thoughts I call my own, 
 
Native, a native in the world 
And like a native think in it. 
   (147-48) 
 
The thoughts are not the thinker’s own, but are immanent to the world in which the 
thinker indigenously belongs. More than just his thinking, his imagination is determined 
by the world around him: 
 
 The world imagines for the beholder. 
 He is born the blank mechanic of the mountains 
 
 The blank frere of fields, their matin laborer. 
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 He is the possessed of sense not the possessor. 
    (420) 
 
So to his very self: 
 
If he will be heaven after death, 
If, while he lives, he hears himself 
Sounded in music, if the sun, 
Stormer, is the color of a self 
As certainly as night is the color 
Of a self, if, without sentiment, 
He is what he hears and sees and if, 
Without pathos, he feels what he hears 
And sees, being nothing otherwise, 
Having nothing otherwise, he has not 
To go to the Louvre to behold himself. 
   (179) 
 
Music, the sun, the night, are all externalities which sound out and colour a self, or a 
mutability of selves, changing in coextension with the changing external conditions. This 
is, I would maintain, a fundamentally plerotic attitude. Whereas Hoon’s plerosis is 
characterised by an assertive boastfulness approaching the apotheosis of self, the 
plerosis Stevens appears to find more satisfying is characterised by a passive openness 
to the experiential unity of self and world.  
 It is of no small significance that in this passage Stevens executes something of a 
performative contradiction. The Louvre stands as a synecdoche for the institution of art. 
Stevens’ means of articulating the sufficiency of experiential being in the world is via the 
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art of poetry. By extension, we can take this to imply that poetry, as with the art 
collected in the Louvre, is not required to behold oneself. This can be done, so Stevens 
seems to tell us, by merely being assiduously cognizant of one’s own experience in the 
world. His way out of this contradiction that would begin to dominate his thinking on 
poetry from the 40’s onwards is to synonymise poetry with life itself. We recall his 
insistence from ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ that the theory of poetry is the 
theory of life. This notion was seeded as early as the famous ‘Memorandum’ letter that 
he wrote to Henry Church, October 15, 1940:  
 
What is intended is to study the theory of poetry in relation to what poetry has been and in 
relation to what it ought to be. Its literature is a part of it, and only a part of it. For this purpose, 
poetry means not the language of poetry but the thing itself, wherever it may be found. It does 
not mean verse any more than philosophy means prose. The subject-matter of poetry is the thing 
to be ascertained. […] It is the aspects of the world and of men and women that have been added 
to them by poetry. These aspects are difficult to recognize and to measure. (L, 377). 
 
Here poetry is not merely its literature, nor its form (verse), but more importantly, its 
subject matter. Its subject matter, in a typically vague formulation, is said to be poetry’s 
aspectual additions to the world of men and women. If we were to make a type/token 
distinction, then, Stevens would appear to be saying that poetry’s literature and form, 
that is to say actual poems, are its tokens. Poetry’s type would appear to be a mode of 
perception—a way of viewing the world that recognises aspects of it that, presumably, 
had not been previously ascertained. Stevens writes in ‘The Man With the Blue Guitar’, 
some few years before composing this letter: 
 
Poetry is the subject of the poem, 
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From this the poem issues and 
 
To this returns. Between the two, 
Between issue and return, there is 
 
An absence in reality, 
Things as they are. Or so we say. 
 
But are these separate? Is it 
An absence for the poem, which acquires 
 
Its true appearances there, sun’s green, 
Cloud’s red, earth feeling, sky that thinks? 
 
From these it takes. Perhaps it gives, 
In the universal intercourse. 
   (144-45). 
 
This canto would seem to lend credence to critics who want to suggest that the primary 
subject matter of Stevens’ poetry is poetry itself. However, although the poem issues 
from and returns to itself, it does so by way of an ‘absence in reality, / Things as they 
are’. The apposition of an absence in reality with things as they are suggests that poetry 
is that which presences things as they are. Without the Orphic intervention of poetry, 
things as they are remain absent or, as it were, unissued. But it is as much the things as 
they are interfusing the presencing power of poetry that imparts to poetry, upon its 
return, its own presence, its ‘true appearances’. Poetry here seems to assume a 
metaphysical numinous agency of its own, as though it is the agency responsible for 
reality coming into awareness of itself. The green of the sun and the red of the clouds 
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are defamiliarising modifiers, but no less a part of the phenomenal aspects that both the 
sun and the clouds are capable of exhibiting. A feeling earth and thinking sky are 
primary contributors to the universal intercourse of which poetry is the articulating 
power. What is giving or taking at any given time in this intercourse remains 
indeterminate. Or so Stevens might be saying. Many years later he would write in ‘An 
Ordinary Evening in New Haven’: ‘The poem is the cry of its occasion, / Part of the res 
itself and not about it.’ (404). Poetry is here also postulated as being part of the ‘res’, the 
Latin for ‘thing’. Poetry, the cry, is occasioned by the thing; the thing is cried through 
poetry. This circular interrelationship between poetry and thing, or its functional 
cognates in Stevens’ theoretical terminology, namely imagination and reality, is the 
arch-substitute for the idea of God. In this sense his theory of poetry, which his actual 
poetry frequently seeks to articulate in practice, could be described as meta-poetry. A 
meta-poetry in that it declares itself to be both realising agent and signifier of the 
ground of reality, or we might say, being, to which it is immanent. I would argue that 
poetry, then, as Stevens declares as early as ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’ (47), 
is his supreme fiction. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, Stevens envisions 
poetry as the vehicle for articulating a supreme fiction that is, paradoxically, 
inarticulable. Stevens’ poetry so frequently returns to rhetoricising an ultimate 
expression that is actually impossible to contain in expression: 
 
High poetry and low: 
Experience in perihelion 
Or in the penumbra of summer night— 
 
The solemn sentences, 
Like interior intonations, 
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The speech of truth in its true solitude, 
A nature that is created in what it says, 
The peace of the last intelligence; 
   (418) 
 
Does this passage tell us what high poetry and low experience in perihelion or in the 
penumbra of summer night? Or should the colon indicate an anacoluthic break, and that 
what follows is an imperative command to high poetry and low? Irrespective of which 
grammatical path one chooses to read this passage, they both invariably lead to the 
postulation of an experiential truth in the solitude and the peace of the last intelligence. 
Troublingly, the nature of this experiential truth is said to be created in what it says, but 
it is not in the premise that this saying is communicable in human language. Such an 
experience, were it possible, cannot be said. This demonstrates a rhetorical collision 
between the plerosis of the absolute—an experience of finality in perihelion—and the 
kenosis of silence absenting this experience’s expressibility. Language, alas, can only 
gesture towards the encircling silence against which it conspires to elicit veneration for 
its absenting delimiter. 
 Another demonstration of the venerable relationship between poetry and 
immanent being is given by one of Stevens’ numerous personae, ‘A Pastoral Nun’: 
 
Finally, in the last year of her age, 
Having attained a present blessedness, 
She said poetry and apotheosis are one. 
 
This is the illustration she used: 
If I live according to this law I live 
In an immense activity, in which 
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Everything becomes morning, summer, the hero, 
The enraptures woman, the sequestered night, 
The man that suffered, lying there at ease, 
 
Without his envious pain in body, in mind, 
The favorable transformations of the wind 
As of a general being or human universe. 
 
There was another illustration, in which 
The two things compared their tight resemblances: 
Each matters only in that which it conceives. 
   (327) 
 
Poetry here assumes a spiritually therapeutic function. The nun, approaching death, 
illustrates her thesis that poetry and apotheosis are one. Significantly, the plerotic 
enlargements of an immense activity that living by this law give her access to have 
nothing to do with death or what comes after. It helps her, as we have seen Stevens 
elsewhere claim of poetry, to live her life. Living by this law enables her to conceive of 
life and her part in it as belonging to something immense in which everything, in 
principle, becomes. Stevens elusively foreshortens the nun’s second illustration to an 
ambiguous aphoristic fragment. Whatever the case, the tight resemblances between 
poetry and apotheosis have something to do with the significance of which each 
conceives. The self-reflexivity of this statement opens the matter, as it were, to 
whatever the comparatist finds resemblant among the conceptions of poetry and 
apotheosis. Again, this displaces the onus of contemplating these resemblances onto the 
reader. It is a rhetorical tactic that compels the reader to think about how poetry and 
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apotheosis are one in that which they conceive, and in so doing, elevates the reader into 
a contemplation that partakes of the immense activity such a comparison requires. 
 Stevens’ rhetorical persuasions to these elusive ends deflect the culpability of 
commitment to any final pronouncements on what poetry as the supreme fiction makes 
manifest. This is certainly the case for poetry qua poetry conceived of as the supreme 
fiction, or, as I have said, its vehicle. However, within the ‘supreme fiction’ that Stevens 
actually writes, that is to say his body of poems, we find him concocting an array of 
fictive beings—his heroes, giants, major and central men (the ‘human-epitome’ figures 
Lensing refers to),77—to populate his not so disenchanted world. Some of these figures 
will receive attention in the following chapter, so I will not expand upon their 
appearances in Stevens’ poetry here. To finish this chapter, I will return to the natural 




I have previously alluded to Stevens’ frequent invocations of the adequacy, sufficiency, 
even the completeness, to reiterate Mutter, of ‘the experience of the world in its 
immanence’ (Mutter, Fall 2011, 749). Adequacy and sufficiency betoken a somewhat 
muted plerosis of immanent experience; completeness an increase in degree rather than 
a difference in kind. They are all, nonetheless, forms of fulfilment. 
The earliest and best known example of the sufficiency of the experience of the 
immanent world is of course Stevens’ ‘Sunday Morning’, which Nancy N. Frankenberry 
judges ‘very probably the finest expression of religious naturalism in American poetry’ 
                                                          
77 Of which the previously discussed figure of the poet as a virile youth is an example originating outside of the 
poetry. 
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(Frankenberry, 2007, 292). The eight-stanzaed sequence takes the form of a dialogical 
indirect discourse between a woman who is not in attendance at church at the titularly 
appointed time and the poem’s expository commentator. Over the course of the poem’s 
eight stanzas, the woman, dressed in her peignoir and enjoying a late breakfast of coffee 
and oranges, contemplates the ‘that old catastrophe, / […] silent Palestine, / Dominion 
of the blood and sepulchre.’ (53). This reverie induces her to question her ambivalence 
toward her religious commitments, or lack thereof, in comparison with the 
psychological and physical satisfactions derived from the immanent world. Throughout 
this inquiry, the commentator reaffirms the sufficiency of the immanent world to meet 
the satisfactions she desires. We are told along the way that  
  
Divinity must live within herself: 
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow; 
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued 
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty 
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights; 
All pleasures and all pains, remembering 
The bough of summer and the winter branch. 
These are the measures destined for her soul. 
   (53). 
 
She wonders whether these measures destined for her soul ‘shall… / Seem all of 
paradise that we shall know’ (54). Her indirect interlocutor grants on the one hand that 
if we accept the doctrine of incarnation ‘The sky will be much friendlier then than now,’ 
(54), but on the other hand assures that  
 
There is not any haunt of prophecy, 
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Nor any old chimera of the grave, 
Neither the golden underground, nor isle 
Melodious, where spirits gat them home, 
Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm 
Remote on heaven's hill, that has endured 
As April's green endures; or will endure 
Like her remembrance of awakened birds, 
Or her desire for June and evening, tipped 
By the consummation of the swallow's wings. 
   (54) 
 
Nonetheless, ‘She says, “But in contentment I still feel / The need of some imperishable 
bliss.”’ (55), to which the speaker declares that ‘Death is the mother of beauty; hence 
from her, / Alone, shall come fulfilment to our dreams / And our desires.’ (55). Death, so 
it is implied, is what sharpens our acuity of bliss and beauty in the here-and-now of 
lived experience. She is the author of change, without which, in an eternal paradise, we 
would experience only stasis. Presumably, without the transiency that charges beauty 
and bliss with temporal allurement—which seems to be one of both of their 
distinguishing, albeit contingent, properties—our desire for these experiences would be 
nullified, which, in consequence, would eliminate the very experiences themselves. The 
following and penultimate stanza returns us from a meditation on Edenic stagnation to 
the world at dawn in which a neo-pagan ritual is improvised:  
 
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men 
Shall chant in orgy on a summer morn 
Their boisterous devotion to the sun, 
Not as a god, but as a god might be, 
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Naked among them, like a savage source. 
Their chant shall be a chant of paradise, 
Out of their blood, returning to the sky; 
And in their chant shall enter, voice by voice, 
The windy lake wherein their lord delights, 
The trees, like serafin, and echoing hills, 
That choir among themselves long afterward. 
They shall know well the heavenly fellowship 
Of men that perish and of summer morn. 
And whence they came and whither they shall go 
The dew upon their feet shall manifest. 
   (55-56) 
 
The chant of paradise will be a chant of earthly paradise, as it will be ‘out’ of the men’s 
own human blood commingled with the voices of the windy lake, the trees, and the 
echoing hills—each of which are appointed their naturalised roles in this terrestrial 
congregation: the windy lake as speculum of their lord the sun’s delight; the trees as 
singing angels; and the hills that resound in a reverberant choir. The heavenly 
fellowship that these chanters shall know is the immanent cycle of death and renewal, 
which is thematically cognate with the ‘old dependency of day and night’ in the final 
stanza. The final stanza comes full circle wherein the woman’s reverie on the dominion 
of blood and sepulchre is encroached upon by ‘A voice that cries, “The tomb in Palestine 
/ Is not the porch of spirits lingering. / It is the grave of Jesus, where he lay.”’ (56). The 
incarnation is refuted: Jesus is merely a man who died and remained dead. The poem 
then closes with a Virgilian pastoral scene, which I will unabashedly join the choir of 
Stevens’ enthusiasts in affirming that what we have here are some of the finest lines of 
blank verse to have been written in the twentieth-century: 
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Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail 
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries; 
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness; 
And, in the isolation of the sky, 
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make 
Ambiguous undulations as they sink, 
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. 
   (56) 
 
This closing pastoral implicates the expansion of the woman’s coexistence in a world of 
life comprising vastly more than her fellow human species. She has already admitted in 
the fourth stanza that ‘I am content when wakened birds, / Before they fly, test the 
reality / Of misty fields with their sweet questionings;’ (54). Her misgiving with this 
form of contentment, though, is marked by an eschatological wariness: ‘But when the 
birds are gone, and their warm fields / Return no more, where, then, is paradise?’ (54). 
The speaker’s recurrence to illustrations of the natural world as being not only 
sufficient in and of themselves, but actually preferable to an inert paradise, together 
with an appreciation of immanent experience in all of its sensuous detail, admonishes 
the woman that here and now is salve enough—it requires no supplementation from 
beyond. One is put in mind of Mr Overton’s remark in Samuel Butler’s The Way of All 
Flesh: ‘All animals, except man, know that the principal business of life is to enjoy it’ 
(Butler, 1987, 95). ‘Life is Motion’, another brief poem collected in Harmonium, is 
persuasive of this principal: 
 
In Oklahoma, 
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Bonnie and Josie, 
Dressed in calico, 
Danced around a stump. 
They cried, 
“Ohoyaho, 
Ohoo” . . . 
Celebrating the marriage 
of flesh and air. 
   (65) 
 
This poem reprises the neo-pagan ritual from the seventh stanza of ‘Sunday Morning’. 
Only this time, the revellers are two women in a sort of mock-May Day celebration, 
ironised by the vestigial presence of a stumped maypole. The phallus thus truncated, 
Bonnie and Josie celebrate an immanent, naturalised, not to mention desexualised, 
hieros-gamos of flesh and air, replete with a Whitmanian barbaric yawp. The circular 
form of these rituals Stevens would later transmute into a whimsical pleasure, as in ‘The 
Pleasures of Merely Circulating’: ‘The garden flew round with the angel, / The angel flew 
round with the clouds, / And the clouds flew round and the clouds flew round / And the 
clouds flew round with the clouds.’ (120). In a later revision of the motif, from ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’, the pleasure of circulation is declared as a good: 
 
One of the vast repetitions final in 
Themselves and, therefore, good, the going round 
 
And round and round, the merely going round, 
Until merely going round is a final good, 
The way wine comes at a table in a wood. 
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   (350)  
 
This canto concludes: ‘Perhaps, / The man-hero is not the exceptional monster, / But he 
that of repetition is most master.’ (350).78 The repetition of circulation is congruent 
with both the repetition of ritual and routine. Eleanor Cook points out, by way of 
Northrop Frye, that Kierkegaard conceived of repetition in a religious context (Cook, 
2007, 234): ‘By it he apparently means, not the simple repeating of an experience, but 
the recreating of it which redeems or awakens it to life, the end of the process, he says, 
being the apocalyptic promise: “Behold, I make all things new.”’ (Frye, 1971, 345). 
Frye’s account of Kierkegaard’s concept is entirely appropriate to the ritual 
underpinnings of Stevens’ apocalyptic rhetoric—which is not a rhetoric of terminal 
destruction, but of renewal. We may recall the Alpha and Omega canto from an 
‘Ordinary Evening in New Haven’: ‘Alpha continues to begin. / Omega is refreshed at 
every end.’ (400). To the last, Stevens was ensconced in the ritual celebration of new 
beginnings. ‘A Discovery of Thought’, a late, uncollected poem first published in 1950, 
attests to the persistence of this leitmotiv in his work. This poem imagines, from ‘the 
antipodes of poetry, dark winter’ (459), a kenotic reduction to the real, ‘an infancy of 
blue snow’ (459) wherein ‘One is a child again’ (459), the future arrival of ‘the 
susceptible being’ who will disclose ‘The true tone of the metal of winter in what it says: 
                                                          
78 The ‘exceptional monster’ hearkens back to section XIX of ‘The Man With the Blue Guitar’. The exceptional 
monster is effectively a composite of two monsters: ‘Being the lion in the lute / Before the lion locked in 
stone.’ (143). The lion in the lute is an emblem of the imagination, the lion in stone an emblem of life/reality. 
In conflating ‘the two together as one’ (143), the poet hopes to ‘play of the monster and of myself, // Or better 
not myself at all, / But of that as its intelligence,’ (143). This is to say that the poet hopes to accomplish a 
synthesis of the monster of life/reality with the monster of his own intelligence in order to become a form of 
supra-intelligence of both. Stevens’ own gloss of this section in a letter to Hi Simons, August 8, 1940, is 
revealing of the connection between his later figuration of the exceptional monster and mastery: ‘The monster 
is what one faces: the lion locked in stone (life) which one wishes to match in intelligence and force, speaking 
(as a poet) with a voice matching its own. One thing about life is that the mind of one man, if strong enough, 
can become the master of all the life in the world. To some extent, this is an everyday phenomenon. Any really 
great poet, musician, etc. does this’ (L, 360). 
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// The accent of deviation in the living thing / That is its life preserved, the effort to be 
born / Surviving being born, the event of life.’ (459). What is remarkable about this 
poem is how Stevens achieves, by way of a telescoped prolepsis, the gestation of the 
inevitable event of life in the barrenness of winter, deftly captured in the image of ‘The 
cricket of summer forming itself out of ice.’ (459). Yet all of this is merely an elaborate 
conceit for the poem’s true subject, which is a renewal of the ‘first word’ (459) of the 
discovery of thought, which promises a rejuvenation of the earth and with it the poet’s 
powers.  
As is so often the case with Stevens, it comes down to a matter of perspective. 
The overriding perspective in Stevens’ poetry is comic—not in the sense that we are to 
expect a happy ending, but rather in the sense that there are these constant assurances 
of renewals of happiness, of joy, of life, to come. At his bleakest, Stevens is rarely tragic, 
but rather faces the existential void with a cool equanimity (we will have more to say on 
this in the following chapter). His short poem ‘Gubbinal’, for example, is an ironic 
exercise in demonstrating his comic perspective by way of parodying its opposite: ‘Have 
it your way. // The world is ugly, / And the people are sad’ (69). Irrespective of 
whatever misery or pain may occur in the world, Stevens is forever counterposing  the 
potential for joy, pleasure, or diversity of perspective in worldly experience. Even in 
‘Esthétique du Mal’, his long meditation on ‘the relation between poetry and…pain’ (L, 
468),79 the speaker muses:  
 
It seems 
                                                          
79 Stevens was prompted to compose ‘Esthétique du Mal’ after reading a letter sent to John Crowe Ransom 
published in The Kenyon Review, in which the correspondent, ‘a soldier in foreign service’ (Ransom, Spring 
1944, 276), complains: ‘I find the poetry in Kenyon Review lamentable in many ways because it is cut off from 
pain. It is intellectual and it is fine, but it never reveals muscle and nerve’ (Ibid). 
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As if the health of the world might be enough. 
 
It seems as if the honey of common summer 
Might be enough, as if the golden combs 
Were part of a sustenance itself enough, 
 
As if hell, so modified, had disappeared, 
As if pain, no longer satanic mimicry, 
Could be borne, as if we were sure to find our way. 
(278). 
 
This long poetic sequence concludes with the famous canto beginning: ‘The greatest 
poverty is not to live / In a physical world, to feel that one’s desire / Is too difficult to 
tell from despair.’ (286). Here again is a critique of an otherworldly paradise that lacks 
the necessary physicality required of differentiation and discernment. The speaker 
imagines: ‘After death, the non-physical people, in paradise, / Itself non-physical, may, 
by chance, observe / The green corn gleaming and experience / The minor of what we 
feel.’ (286).80  Although the speaker concedes that ‘The adventurer / In humanity has 
                                                          
80 This theme of posthumous beings desirous of physical experience in the immanent world is later revisited in 
‘Large Red Man Reading’: 
 
They were those that would have wept to step barefoot into reality, 
 
That would have wept and been happy, have shivered in the frost 
And cried out to feel it again, have run fingers over leaves 
And against the most coiled thorn, have seized on what was ugly 
 
And laughed, as he sat there reading, from out of the purple tabulae, 
The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its law: 
Poesis, poesis, the literal characters, the vatic lines, 
 
Which in those ears and in those thin, those spended hearts, 
Took on color, took on shape and the size of things as they are 
And spoke the feeling for them, which was what they had lacked. 
   (365) 
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not conceived of a race / Completely physical in a physical world’ (286), he nonetheless 
affirms that for the revenant dead the physical is the truly plerotic state of affairs: ‘The 
green corn gleams and the metaphysicals / Lie sprawling in majors of the August heat, / 
The rotund emotions, paradise unknown.’ (286). This conflation of the metaphysical 
and the physical induces the speaker to utter one of the most unblushingly liturgical 
exclamations found in Stevens’ poetry: ‘This is the thesis scrivened in delight, / The 
reverberating psalm, the right chorale.’ (286). 81 
 A physical, and more disarmingly, impersonal world, is what Stevens calls his 
‘ultimate inamorata’ (915). In Sur Plusieurs Beaux Sujects, the commonplace book 
Stevens kept in the 30s, he quotes the American clergyman R. S. Storrs thus: ‘The 
philosopher could not love the indefinite and the impersonal principle of order 
pervading the universe, any more than he could love atmospheres or oceans’ (OP, xxxii). 
Stevens’ response is, unsurprisingly, entirely to the contrary: ‘For myself, the indefinite, 
the impersonal, atmospheres and oceans and, above all, the principle of order are 
precisely what I love; and I don’t see why, for a philosopher, they should not be the 
ultimate inamorata. The premise to Storrs is that the universe is explicable only in 
terms of humanity’ (915). Stevens himself, however, vacillates between personification 
and objectification of the world. For example, in seeing the earth specifically ‘as 
                                                          
81 One also detects in the minors and majors of feeling in this canto, Stevens’ recurrent synonymy of music and 
feeling. We first encounter this in ‘Peter Quince at the Clavier’: ‘Just as my fingers on these keys / Make music, 
so the self-same sounds / On my spirit make a music, too. // Music is feeling, then, not sound;’ (72). It is also 
interesting to note that the crescendo of this later poem’s closing canto (‘This is the thesis scrivened in delight, 
/ The reverberating psalm, the right chorale’) echoes the conjugation of music and liturgy concluding the 
earlier ‘Peter Quince at the Clavier’: 
 
Susanna’s music touched the bawdy strings 
Of those white elders; but, escaping, 
Left only Death’s ironic scraping. 
Now, in its immortality, it plays 
On the clear viol of her memory, 
And makes constant sacrament of praise. 
(74)   
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inamorata’ (413), as we find in ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, is to feminise it, to 
cast it in the role of lover, companion, or muse. Stevens does this again and again: in 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, the earth is addressed as ‘Fat girl, terrestrial, my 
summer, my night, / […] my green, my fluent mundo.’ (351); the ocean is a feminine 
genius loci in the early ‘Infanta Marina’ (6), as is the venereal soil in ‘O, Florida, Venereal 
Soil’ (38-39); ‘The moon is the mother of pathos and pity’ (89), in ‘Lunar Paraphrase’, in 
comparison to the masculinised sun ‘That brave man’ (112) in ‘The Brave Man’; even 
the light produced by the sun and moon are respectively gendered in ‘Of Hartford in a 
Purple Light’: ‘But, Master, there are / Lights masculine and lights feminine.’ (208), (the 
‘Master’ being addressed, again, is the masculinised, and inexplicably Francophone, sun 
‘Master Soleil’ (208)). An extensive cento of further examples could be enumerated. 
Suffice it to say, Stevens does not shy away from the use of prosopopoeia, and is 
therefore being somewhat disingenuous in criticising Storrs for perceiving the 
explicability of the universe in human terms. If we recall Gardner’s previously quoted 
analysis, we could align Stevens’ figurations of the universe with a human face with his 
summer mode, which is ostensibly one of transfigurative addition to the material base 
of the universe. The contraposition is of course Stevens’ winter mode, which is an 
ostensibly subtractive procedure to arrive at the contracted world of stark physical 
reality entirely absented of anthropocentric cultural additives. In ‘An Evening Without 
Angels’, the speaker asserts ‘Bare night is best. Bare earth is best.’ (112). It is precisely 
this barrenness that is celebrated in ‘How To Live. What To Do’:82  
  
Last evening the moon rose above this rock 
                                                          
82 Stevens remarks in a letter to Ronald Lane Latimer, November 15, 1935, that of all the poems in Ideas of 
Order ‘How to Live. What to Do’ is the poem he ‘preferred to all the others. […] I like it most, I suppose, 
because it so definitely represents my way of thinking’ (L, 293). 
~ 126 ~ 
 
Impure upon a world unpurged. 
The man and his companion stopped 
To rest before the heroic height. 
 
Coldly the wind fell upon them 
In many majesties of sound: 
They that had left the flame-freaked sun 
To seek a sun of fuller fire. 
 
Instead there was this tufted rock 
Massively rising high and bare 
Beyond all trees, the ridges thrown 
Like giant arms among the clouds. 
 
There was neither voice nor crested image, 
No chorister, nor priest. There was 
Only the great height of the rock 
And the two of them standing still to rest. 
 
There was the cold wind and the sound 
It made, away from the muck of the land 
That they had left, heroic sound 
Joyous and jubilant and sure. 
   (102-03) 
 
However, as these foregoing examples illustrate, Stevens is yet encumbered by making 
human value judgements on the numinous otherness of the nonhuman world: bare 
night and earth are ‘best’; the cold wind and the sound it made is a ‘heroic sound / 
Joyous and jubilant and sure’. It is a bind that Stevens knew he could not undo. Even at 
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its most objectively descriptive, the act of the mind that becomes a poem is exactly that: 
a verbal representation produced by a perceiving subject. The representation of a view 
from nowhere remains impossible. ‘The Plain Sense of Things’, to run the risk of an 
excruciating pun, makes this impossibility quite plain. The speaker, beholding a winter 
scene, proposes that ‘It is as if / We had come to an end of the imagination, / Inanimate 
in an inert savoir.’ (428), struggling ‘even to choose the adjective / For this blank cold, 
this sadness without cause’ (428). (Tellingly, the adjective that is settled for is the 
resoundingly kenotic ‘blank’. Moreover, the perceived sadness is without cause, as 
though to suggest it is concurrently intrinsic to the perceiver and the thing perceived.) 
But then the speaker alights upon a crucial realisation: ‘Yet the absence of imagination 
had / Itself to be imagined.’ (428).  
Stevens’ manifold response to this bind is at least tripartite. One layer of this 
manifold is phenomenological in its bearing: to accept the world as it is as it appears to 
us. This is why throughout the poetry such emphasis is placed on the act of sensory 
perception, on the mere appearances, sounds, smells, and feel of things, and their 
susceptibility to change in accordance with environmental conditions. Arguably, the 
deepest mine of Stevens’ raw materia poetica is indeed the act of perception itself, and 
with it, as I have previously alluded to, perspectivism. One of his anthology pieces, 
‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ from Harmonium, is a famous instance of the 
latter. Another is ‘Two Illustrations That the World Is What You Make of It’ from his last 
published collection The Rock. The later poem, a diptych, starkly juxtaposes two 
illustrations: the first, a version of Stevens’ kenotic vision of winter: ‘The sky seemed so 
small that winter day, / A dirty light on a lifeless world, / Contracted like a withered 
stick.’ (435); the second, a version of his plerotic vision of summer: ‘He discovered the 
colors of the moon // In a single spruce, when, suddenly, / The tree stood dazzling in 
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the air // And blue broke from the sun, / A bullioned blue, a blue abulge, / Like daylight, 
with time’s bellishings, / And sensuous summer stood full-height.’ (437). This poem, 
then, exhibits a microcosm of Stevens’ ritual cycle of kenosis and plerosis, emptying and 
filling.  
Another layer is to make explicit that the bare earth, night, what have you, is the 
foundation of human percipience. The human reduced to merest perceiver of bare 
reality approaches in Stevens’ poetry the essential unity of being: ‘It was in earth only / 
That he was at the bottom of things / And of himself. […] // The odor / Of earth 
penetrates more deeply than any word. / There he touches his being. There as he is / He 
is.’ (216). This is an example, not uncommon in Stevens, of language being used against 
itself to assert the primacy of non-linguistic experience. It is as though the language is 
compelling the reader away from itself and into the inimitable experience of odour-
induced unity to which it is at both an anterior and posterior remove. Stevens points 
quite pronouncedly to the image of the ‘rock’, his most contracted figure for bare 
physical reality. In its namesake poem—‘The Rock’—we are told that it is ‘the gray 
particular of man’s life, / The stone from which he rises, up—and—ho, / The step to the 
bleaker depths of his descents…’ (447). Here, then, we see the rock as the nonhuman 
ground for both the plerotic rise and the kenotic descent of the human. The rock is ‘The 
starting point of the human and its end’ (447), which seems to ape the pronouncements 
of Genesis 3:19: ‘for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return’ (KJV). However, the 
gaze of the other half of Stevens’ Janus-faced phenomenology perceives the 
enhancements of reality that language can imbue to perception: ‘Words add to the 
senses. The words for dazzle / Of mica, the dithering of grass, / The Arachne integument 
of dead trees, / Are the eye grown larger, more intense.’ (214). And of metaphor: 
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The bouquet stands in a jar, as metaphor, 
As lightning itself is, likewise, metaphor 
Crowded with apparitions suddenly gone 
 
And no less suddenly here again, a growth 
Of the reality of the eye, an artifice, 
Nothing much, a flitter that reflects itself. 
   (384) 
 
In ‘On the Road Home’, the poem’s interlocutor recollects his pronouncement that ‘The 
world must be measured by the eye’ (186). Mutter argues that ‘for Stevens experience 
at its most authentic is spatial rather than hermeneutic […] Sight is tautological: it 
discloses the intensity of the unmediated, non-linguistically-altered being of the world’ 
(Mutter, Fall 2011, 750). The importance of sight for Stevens and its non-pejorative 
superficial proclivity to ‘Make gay the hallucinations in surfaces.’ (403) is difficult to 
overstate. It is a rich variety in Stevens’ poetry of the plenitude of immanent experience. 
In a short early poem, ‘Tattoo’, Stevens’ assimilates and physicalizes the filaments of 
Whitman’s ‘A Noiseless Patient Spider’. In Whitman’s poem, the speaker is watching a 
spider launch forth ‘filament, filament, filament, out of itself.’ (Whitman, 1977, 399). 
Whitman then transposes the spider’s filaments into a metonymy of the speaker’s 
searching soul: 
 
 And you O my soul where you stand, 
 Surrounded, detached, in measureless oceans of space, 
 Ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing, seeking the spheres to connect them. 
 Till the bridge you will need be form’d, till the ductile anchor hold, 
 Till the gossamer thread you fling catch somewhere, O my soul. 
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    (Ibid) 
 
Stevens’ poem begins with a simile: ‘The light is like a spider.’ (64), which he then 
literalizes: 
 
It crawls over the water. 
It crawls over the edges of the snow. 
It crawls under your eyelids 
And spreads its webs there— 
Its two webs. 
 
The webs of your eyes 
Are fastened 
To the flesh and bones of you 
As to rafters or grass. 
There are filaments of your eyes 
On the surface of the water 
And in the edges of the snow. 
    (64) 
 
Thus Stevens’ tropes on the interconnection between light, eye and object, in such a way 
as to incarnate vision as a palpably material conjunction between inner and outer. The 
poem is manifestly about the act of visual perception, quite apart from Whitman’s 
hermeneutic allegory. The illuminant entanglement of eyesight and snow produces, in 
my opinion, one of the single most beautiful images in all of Stevens’ poetry. It occurs in 
‘No Possum, No Sop, No Taters’: ‘Snow sparkles like eyesight falling to earth, // Like 
seeing fallen brightly away.’ (261). The cinematic shift in perspective from a ground’s-
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eye-view of the falling snow, to that of a bird's or god's-eye-view looking down from the 
snow-clouds, is a quiet masterstroke. 
The third layer is in Stevens’ many gestures towards the ineffability of the 
nonhuman world, toward its resistance to the human propensity for interpretation. This 
layer takes the form of abstraction and via negativa, and, I would argue, comprises 
Stevens’ strongest observance of the world’s numinous bearing upon us. The world is 
there and we perceive it, classify it, look for patterns, for ways of reading it. 
Nonetheless, the pigeons ‘make / Ambiguous undulations as they sink / Downward to 
darkness, on extended wings’ (56).83 The undulations the pigeons make defy our 
augury. We are left only with ambiguity, with the mystification of uncertainty. That they 
are sinking downward to darkness only focuses their numinous trajectory toward the 
unknown. The blankness of the world underlying our interpretive cognition, and how 





                                                          
83 It is interesting to note, in passing, that the penumbra overshadowing the ambiguity of the pigeons’ 
undulations has a lucent, though still extra-linguistic, counterpoint in the ‘bright, discursive wings’ (221) of the 
little (is it too much to assume Minervan?) owl in ‘On the Adequacy of Landscape’. 
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Decreation is a concept that Stevens adapts from the mystical writings of Simone Weil. 
He refers to Weil only once throughout the entirety of his work in the lecture he gave at 
the Museum of Modern Art in 1951: ‘The Relations Between Poetry and Painting’. Here 
is the relevant quotation: 
 
Simone Well in La Pesanteur et La Grâce has a chapter on what she calls decreation. She says that 
decreation is making pass from the created to the uncreated, but that destruction is making pass 
from the created to nothingness. Modern reality is a reality of decreation, in which our 
revelations are not the revelations of belief, but the precious portents of our own powers. The 
greatest truth we could hope to discover, in whatever field we discovered it, is that man's truth is 
the final resolution of everything. (748). 
 
There is no way of knowing for how long Stevens had been familiar with Weil’s work. 
His encounter with Weil’s concept of decreation could not have occurred any earlier 
than 1947 when La Pesanteur et la grâce (Gravity and Grace) was first published, four 
years after Weil’s death.84 Nonetheless, this has not prevented some of Stevens’ critics 
from reading this concept retroactively into his earlier poetry. Eleanor Cook, for 
example, uses the concept to analyse the first and last cantos of ‘Notes Toward a 
                                                          
8484 It should also be noted that Weil had never intended the material in La Pesanteur et la grâce to be 
published. In point of fact, the book is comprised of a collection of excerpts from her notebooks, selected, 
edited, and organised under subject headings by Weil’s friend Gustave Thibon. 
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Supreme Fiction’ (Cook, Fall 1980, 46-57, passim), and James Lindroth reads it as a 
subtext of the more chronologically plausible ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ 
(Lindroth, Spring 1987, 43-62, passim).85 In fairness, Cook uses the concept as per 
Stevens’ adaptation of it. She correctly acknowledges that ‘Stevens, following Weil, is 
using the word in another sense. He is turning her term to his own uses’ (Cook, Fall 
1980, 46). She does not, however, account for why she is using a concept that Stevens 
would have only called by this name several years after writing ‘Notes Toward a 
Supreme Fiction’. As I will be drawing upon the concept to orient the current chapter, I 
suppose I will have to justify it myself. This can be simply enough done: ‘decreation’, as 
Stevens uses the term, is a procedure, as I intend to demonstrate, that he had been 
following from the beginning of his poetic career. Weil’s term, I would argue, is simply a 
serendipitous find on Stevens’ part signifying what to an integral component of his 
poetic praxis. That leaves us then to explain how Weil and Stevens differ in their usage 
of the term, and to argue for why it is a relevant notion to read into Stevens, both 
forward and back. 
 For Weil, ‘to make something created pass into the uncreated’ (Weil, 2002, 32) 
means to divest the self of its createdness, that is to say, of its recognition as being a 
creature created by God, but distinct from God. God, in Weil’s theology, is the creator of 
the universe, but has hidden himself from his creation: ‘God could create only by hiding 
himself. Otherwise there would be nothing but himself’ (Ibid, 38). God is uncreated in 
the sense that he ‘renounces being everything’ (Ibid, 33), and ‘emptied himself of his 
divinity’ (Ibid, 34) by way of the incarnation: Christ’s kenosis was also God’s. What 
remains is the uncreated, hidden God, and the process of decreation of the creature will, 
                                                          
85 We know from his letters that Stevens had been working on ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ from at 
least March 1949. See his letters to Sister M. Bernetta Quinn, April 22, 1949 (L, 634-35), and to Bernard 
Heringman, May 3, 1949 (L, 635-37). See also: Richardson, 1988, 350-54. 
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according to Weil, pass through the created into the uncreated, that is to say, the 
creature’s decreation will reunite him or her with God. This process of decreation 
entails, however, an understanding that ‘we are nothing, the object of all our efforts is to 
become nothing. […] May God grant me to become nothing. In so far as I become 
nothing, God loves himself through me’ (Ibid). Weil enjoins us then to undergo our own 
kenosis, to ‘empty ourselves of the false divinity with which we were born’ (Ibid), in 
order to be consummated in the true divinity which is God’s love. 
 Stevens’ usage of the term, unsurprisingly, is far removed from Weil’s. If I read 
Stevens’ right, his ‘reality of decreation’ is simply the passage from a universe created 
by God to one that is not created by God, that is to say, uncreated. That is why 
decreation, in his usage, passes us through to the revelation of ‘the precious portents of 
our own powers’, rather than to a reunification with God. For Stevens, decreation does 
pass through to nothingness, that is to say, at the base of an uncreated universe is 
nothingness. There is a numen abest inasmuch as the gods themselves have been 
decreated and have come to nothing. Weil, and other radical theologians, would say that 
this coming to nothing of God, his absence, is our experience of God. We experience God 
in absentia. Stevens does not go this far—nothingness suffices. This nothingness at the 
core of mysterium numinosum, however, is something that intrigued Stevens throughout 
his poetic career. He had other designations and designs for this elusive gap—the 
‘center’, ‘first idea’, and a host of superlatives such as ‘utmost’, ‘final’, ‘supreme’. 
Whereas in the last chapter we were focused on Stevens’ devotions to the natural, 
physical world, this chapter will focus on Stevens’ metaphysical fictions. These, so far as 
we can know, properly belong to the abstractions of a mind, and thus pertain to the 
metaphysics of absence in its most basic sense: as being that which is not present in the 
physical, empirically observable world. It is inside the playhouse of Stevens’ 
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imagination resisting the given world wherein this meditation on nonphysical being, or, 
as we will also see, that which is not-yet-become, is confected. However, there is 
another side to this dualistic story. This side of the story involves the panpsychic-
physiomorphic axis that I had outlined in the previous chapter. If we approach Stevens 
from this perspective then I believe we can read a good deal of his metaphysical fictions 
as figurations of states of nonhuman or extra-human consciousness. This, however, does 
not shed an explanatory light on and therefore eliminate the numinosity of these 
nonhuman or extra-human conscious states, it merely gives speculative form to their 
otherness. What this approach does do, though, is dissolve the dualism of mind and 
matter into a fundamental and universal unification of the two. The mysterium 
numinosum nonetheless persists in the seclusion of the nonhuman or extra-human 
other’s subjectivity. To follow this trace through Stevens’ poetry we must begin with 




‘The Snow Man’ first appeared in the October 1921 issue of Poetry Magazine in a series 
of twelve poems gathered under the title ‘Sur Ma Guzzla Gracile’.86 In this series ‘The 
Snow Man’ appears immediately before ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’. The original 
placement of these two poems together (they were later separated in the published 
order of Harmonium) indicates that they are companion pieces. We have seen from our 
reading of ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’, that Hoon is a figure who boasts to have had 
achieved a sublime plerotic integration with the world and had thus become, or at least 
                                                          
86 ‘[A] “buffo title,” as Schulze calls it, meaning “From Out of My Slender Gullet” and “mark[ing] the cycle as an 
exercise in ventriloquism.”’ (Eeckhout, 2002, 96). 
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for a time, a man-world. Hoon is the self-asserting human counterpart to the mind of 
winter kenotically divested of self that is the snow man. Whereas Hoon claims to have 
had achieved an identity of self and world, the snow man simply is the thing itself—a 
very specific, though seemingly counterintuitive, form of nothing. The poem: 
 
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow; 
 
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter 
 
Of the January sun; and not to think 
Of any misery in the sound of the wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves, 
 
Which is the sound of the land 
Full of the same wind 
That is blowing in the same bare place 
 
For the listener, who listens in the snow, 
And, nothing himself, beholds 
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is. 
   (8) 
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One approaches this poem with a certain degree of trepidation. The countless variety of 
interpretations that this short piece has given rise to are foreboding in their 
disputatiousness. I will limit myself to merely two. 
Hesla goes to painstaking lengths to demonstrate that the poem should be read, 
grammatically speaking, as an inferential sentence (Hesla, May 1985, 249-50), of the 
form: ‘If he did X, then he must be—I draw the inference that he is—Y’ (Ibid, 250). He 
likens the poem to a statement such as: ‘You must be crazy to think a thing like that’ 
(Ibid). He continues: ‘The ordinary meaning of this sentence is not, “If you want to 
believe . . . then you must go insane.” It is rather, “From the fact that you believe . . . I 
infer that you do not have all your wits about you.”’ (Ibid). Thus, he draws the 
conclusion that the poem ‘does not tell us what one must do or be in order not to think 
of any misery. It says, rather, that from the fact that someone does not or cannot think of 
any misery in the sound of the wind it can be inferred that the person has a mind of 
winter’ (Ibid). This leads Hesla to offer the following reading of the poem: 
 
Once the inferential nature of the poem is recognized the perplexities of the last tercet disappear. 
The “Nothing that is not there” is of course the something that is—the junipers and spruces, the 
sun, the ice, the leaves and the sound they make when they blow in the wind. As for the “nothing 
that is,” it is just what Stevens says it is—misery. Misery is nothing, not thing, not a thing, in the 
sense that the trees and sun and leaves are things, available to seeing, and that the sounds of the 
winds and leaves are things, available to hearing. But misery is there, and real, as the emotional 
meaning of the experience of this bleak winter landscape. 
[…] What is the case, rather, is that, like misery, the listener himself is "nothing," no 
thing, not a thing. He is not a thing, not a man of snow, has not a mind of winter, because he is 
able to behold both the nothing that is not there and the nothing-the misery-that is. The tone of 
the poem is not that of a steely-eyed positivist calling upon us to distinguish facts from feelings; 
nor is it that of a dialectical ontologist courageously facing the abyss of nothingness.  It is, rather, 
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the tone of a person bemused, even appalled, by the fact that there can be people who have so far 
forgotten their humanity as to be unmoved by a winter landscape. (Ibid, 250-51). 
 
The crucial problem, as I see it, with Hesla’s interpretation is in what he infers from his 
inferential reading.  If you do not perceive misery in the sound of the windblown leaves 
then I think you have a mind of winter, logically speaking, implies its inverse: namely, if 
you do perceive misery in the sound of the windblown leaves then I think you do not 
have a mind of winter, i.e. you have a mind of humanity. Ergo, the listener is the snow 
man, who, as Hesla correctly infers, has a mind of winter. The snow man is not, as Hesla 
otherwise has it, a non-object subjective perceiver who has their humanity to think 
about misery in the sound of the windblown leaves still intact. In order for Hesla’s 
reading to hold he has to write the snow man off as a person whom the speaker of the 
poem assumes to be a bit daft in the head for not thinking about the misery in the sound 
of the windblown leaves, and force the role of ‘the listener’, who is ‘nothing himself’, 
onto the shoulders of a properly humane person who, presumably, is himself (we might 
otherwise infer that this person is crazy to think that he himself is nothing). If we accept 
Hesla’s inference that the person who does not think about the misery in the sound of 
the windblown leaves must have a mind of winter, then this only accounts for the 
subject of the ‘and not to think / Of any misery’ verb phrase. There is, as I read the 
poem, a transitional distinction between the person who does not think about misery in 
the sound of the windblown leaves and the ‘listener’. The extent of Hesla’s inferential 
reading effectively ends at the second line of the third tercet, as per his grammatical 
precis: ‘One must have a mind of winter . . . to regard . . . to behold . . . and not to think of 
any misery’ (Ibid 250). But this is not where the poem ends, and why Hesla’s 
interpretation of the listener seems so remarkably out of place. One could, however, 
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expand upon Hesla’s inference thus: I infer that if you have been cold a long time 
regarding the frost and beholding the ice-shagged junipers and do not think of any 
misery in the sound of the windblown leaves that you must have a mind of winter; but if 
you literally have a mind of winter and regard and behold all of these things without 
thinking of the misery in the sound of the windblown leaves then I infer that you must 
be a snow man, which, as we will shortly see, is not a man at all.  The transitional 
distinction I am referring to occurs between the first and second lines of the fourth 
tercet: ‘Which is the sound of the land / Full of the same wind’. The sound is the same 
for the listener and the person who does not think about the misery in the sound of the 
windblown leaves, but the listener and the thinker are not the same entity.  The listener, 
the titular snow man, who has an actual mind of winter, as opposed to an inferred one, 
is neither thinking nor not thinking about the sound of the windblown leaves. This is 
because the listener is listening and beholding, but not thinking. More on this shortly. 
Bevis, whose thorough book-length study of ‘the meditative state of 
consciousness recorded by especially Buddhist testimonies and the scientific results of 
neurophysiological and experimental states-of-consciousness research’ (Eeckhout, 
2002, 78-79) is entirely beyond my competence to summarise here. Suffice it to say, 
Bevis, taking ‘The Snow Man’ as his point of departure, seeks to elucidate the ascetic 
meditative streak that runs through Stevens’ poetry, using the aforementioned Buddhist 
and scientific testimony as a means to demonstrate this propensity.87 Bevis emphasises 
                                                          
87 Bevis’ summary of the meditative state of consciousness reads thus: 
 
A meditative state of consciousness is a naturally occurring physiological phenomenon, possible for 
any person in any culture and probably experienced by everyone to some degree. There are several 
characteristics common to its various stages: (1) transience, (2) ineffability, (3) sensations of time and 
space changed or transcended, (4) sensations of self-loss—that is, absence of thought or feeling 
according to later reports, and minimal cortical activity as measured by machines during meditation. 
Such a state of consciousness differs in report and measurable characteristics from other states such 
as waking, dreaming, day-dreaming, and hypnotic trance, and such calm self-loss differs also from the 
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that ‘[c]ontrary to common Western opinion, meditative experience can include vivid 
sensory perception, as well as reports of nothingness’ (Bevis, 1988, 12). This last 
collocation—that of sensory perception together with reports of nothingness—appear 
especially pertinent to ‘The Snow Man’. Bevis ‘begin[s] with the proposition that 
Western experiences, as described in Wallace Stevens’ “The Snow Man,” who is “nothing 
himself,” or in Emerson’s statement in “Nature,” “I am nothing,” may have something to 
with the claim of Yung-Chia (a seventh-century Chinese Buddhist) that in meditation 
“the roots of mental activity are itself cut out.”’ (Ibid, 20). Maybe so, but my issue with 
Bevis’ work, as informative and fascinating as it is, is that he seems eager to correlate 
the experience of the listener, the snow man, with a meditative state of consciousness 
that experiences nothing. My issue is that although I would agree that the poem is 
stylistically meditative, I would disagree with reading the experience of the snow man 
as a human experience. This is because I take Stevens’ poem at its word, and how I read 
these words is that they are not about a human subject at all. 
A satisfactory reading to me would involve the physiomorphic-panpsychic axis I 
have already addressed. I must lead off with a very simple premise that is almost 
universally ignored by critics of the poem. It is quite simply this: that the snow man of 
the title is exactly that—a snow man that any number of people may have made out of 
rolling balls of snow together and piling them on top of each other in the vaguest 
semblance of human form. One may choose to imagine this snow man with a carrot 
nose, coals for eyes, and twigs for arms if it helps to fulfil the image, but such 
embellishments are fancifully beside the point. That is because the snow man is simply a 
                                                          
other mystical categories of the occult, vision, and ecstasy (excited self-loss). (Bevis, 1988, 12; also 
qtd. in Eeckhout, 2002, 79). 
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synecdochic placeholder for the possession of a mind of winter.88 A mind of winter, 
which the snow man possesses, is exactly that—winter’s mind. The objection could be 
raised that a mind of winter is merely an anthropomorphism. But this objection can be 
obviated if we allow the premise of panspychism to stand, in the sense that 
consciousness is a fundamental and universal aspect of everything that is. We needn’t 
detain ourselves with the philosophical arguments for or against panpsychism, as we 
are talking about a poem that simply asserts that this is the case. The problem of the 
snow man ‘himself’ being another anthropomorphic projection—if we are reluctant to 
settle for the ordinary sense in which we refer to a stack of snowballs as a snow man 
without actually thinking that it is literally a man—can be dissolved if we invert the 
projection. The physiomorphic inversion would hold that the idea of personhood has 
been naturalised into snow. The man with a mind of winter is the actual snow man, not 
a metaphor for an actual man. Again, we needn’t quibble over why it should be that the 
snow man possesses a mind of winter and not, say, a frozen lake, or the ice shagging the 
junipers. Very possibly these particulars also possess a mind of winter. In fact, we might 
presume that all things that are winter possess a mind of winter, but the poem 
attributes this possession specifically to the snow man. Now we must address why the 
snow man, the listener, is ‘nothing himself’. I infer that there are two parts to why the 
snow man is ‘nothing himself’. The first part is that the snow man is not a self at all, 
much less a man, ‘he’ is simply snow. The statement ‘nothing himself’ is quite obviously 
                                                          
88 David Perkins argues that Stevens’ ‘poem does not describe but merely invokes "The Snow Man" by 
mentioning him in the title; thereafter the snowman is involved in the poem only as a metaphor of a 
metaphor. He is a metaphor of a "mind of winter," and this, in turn, is a metaphor of something even more 
abstract: a mind that entertains nothingness’ (Perkins, 1976, 542). My reading of the poem, as should be quite 
apparent, does not share in this figurative chicanery. I take the snow man to be literally a snow man, not a 
metaphor of a metaphor. Neither do I accept that ‘a mind of winter’ is itself a metaphor, except insofar as it 
applies to what a human subject is inferred to possess were he or she to regard and behold winter and not to 
think of any misery in the sound of the windblown leaves. The snow man, I contend, literally possesses a mind 
of winter. 
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a self-negation in the most literal sense—a negation of self, the ultimate kenosis. The 
second part is that a mind of winter is itself nothing. Winter is an extrinsically applied 
human concept to an observable natural state of affairs. To say that winter has a mind, 
is, in effect, to say that the human concept of winter applied to an observable state of 
natural affairs has a mind. Moreover, ‘nothing’ is an abstraction, a pure concept. The 
snow man, and this the poem tells us explicitly, does not think in terms of ‘winter’ or 
‘nothing’ because the snow man does not think at all, much less think of itself as winter. 
It does not think of itself as winter because it neither thinks nor has a self. The snow 
man’s mind of winter only performs acts of perception: namely listening and beholding. 
It is non-cognitive in the sense that it does not possess the sort of mind, such as a human 
mind, that transforms percept into concept. The regarding, beholding, and not thinking 
of misery in the sound of the windblown leaves from the first three tercets have been 
dispensed with by our inferential reading from above. The snow man, possessing a 
mind of winter, cancels itself out by not only being ‘nothing himself’, but also by 
beholding ‘Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is’. The ‘nothing that is not 
there’ is simply that which is there, the material world manifesting a state of affairs we 
humans call winter, and the ‘nothing that is’ is the the snow man’s self-cancelling mind 
of winter. 
What the poem is inviting the reader to do is to imagine being the snow man. The 
poem then advances what imagining being a snow man could entail. It suggests that if 
we panpsychically grant to the snow man a mind of winter, this mind will do no more 
than behold that it is nothing, which is at once only what there is and the nothing that it 
is. This reading may appear paradoxically vexatious, but it is what the poem, so far as I 
can determine, actually says. The paradox is insoluble, but it is unavoidably there in the 
poem. What it tells us is that the snow man possesses a mind that listens and beholds 
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but does not think, and what it hears and beholds is the nothing of is, or the is of 
nothing—the barest nouns signifying existence and of that which is not are become one. 
Bevis’ analysis may be allowed a point of entry here insofar as this sort of conscious 
experience may well be achievable through meditative practice. Be that as it may, the 
poem is not telling us about a human percipient. ‘The Snow Man’ retains its numinous 
charge because it soundly remains ineffably other. I would argue that it is impossible for 
human consciousness to perceive nothing for the entire duration of its existence, and 
that is why we are so confounded by this poem, because we are presented with a cipher 
that does exactly that. As the Canon Aspirin learns in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’: 
‘The nothingness was a nakedness, a point / Beyond which thought could not progress 
as thought.’ (348). The Buddhist who claims to have experienced nothing nevertheless 
only does so for a limited duration.89 
Listening and beholding, the snow man’s twin perceptions, comprise for Stevens, 
commonly enough, the two basic building blocks of his poetry. Listening is correlate 
with the ear, sound, and verbal communication; beholding is correlate with the eye, 
sight, vision, imagination, and written or symbolic communication. The first branch of 
correlates culminates in the fictive human-epitome figure we encounter in ‘The 
Creations of Sound’: ‘a different poet, / An accretion from ourselves, intelligent / 
Beyond intelligence, an artificial man / At a distance, secondary expositor, / A being of 
sound, whom one does not approach / Through any exaggeration. From him, we collect.’ 
(275). This formulation is typical of Stevens’ figural procedure in the concoction of his 
fictive beings, which we will take up presently. The second branch of correlates in 
                                                          
89 Were one in a less charitable mood, one could refer to Cioran’s sketch of a Hindu monk in his aphorism on 
‘The Language of Irony’: ‘And when, dazed, we think of some Hindu monk who, for nine years, stood against a 
wall in paralyzed meditation, irony intervenes once more to inform us that he discovered, at the end of many 
sufferings, the nothingness by which he had begun!’ (Cioran, 1998, 181). 
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Stevens culminates in his notion of the first idea, or original seeing, which will discuss in 
the penultimate section of this chapter. To close, we will return to the scene of ‘The 
Snow Man’, and the challenge that poem bequeaths to Stevens’ later poems to push at 




Stevens’ fictive beings—what we have already seen Lensing refer to as ‘human-
epitomes’—are quasi-mythological figures. Gary Mike Cronin analyses ‘the question that 
is a giant himself’ (397), invoked at the beginning of ‘Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, 
by way of alluding to the following startling line from canto VI of ‘It Must Be Abstract’:  
‘Abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.’ (333). Cronin says that ‘Stevens uses his 
private and cumulative symbology to express the idea that questions, and presumably 
answers, must be blooded; that is, made human-like. […] ‘Blooding an abstraction is for 
Stevens a way of apprehending external reality in the lived world by investing a concept 
with the attributes of a real object. This prosopopeiaic way of making fictions come to 
life allows Stevens to explore and experiment with his perceptions of the lived world’ 
(Cronin, 1994, 8-9). Not dissimilarly, Grosvenor E. Powell, describes what he calls 
Stevens’ ‘persona’ as ‘personifications, in an epistemological sense, of various subject-
object relationships’ (Powell, July 1971, 733). He argues that these persona ‘replace the 
gods and heroes of war-like aristocracy as the larger-than-life figures that give us a 
sense of ourselves and our possible limits. […] Through them, we see, not quite as a god 
sees, but usually from a humanly impossible point of view which is, nevertheless, 
humanly conceivable’ (Ibid). These comments trace some of the essential contours of 
Steven’ fictive beings. Often these fictive beings are personifications of concepts or 
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ideals, but they are often also personifications of sublimated90 psychic states, desires, 
and emotions (and more often than not they are all of these things). They tend to take 
the form physiomorphic entities bearing human attributes or meta-human entities 
composed of physiomorphic ‘bodies’. Many of them are also protean figures—composed 
by way of something akin to a cubist multiplicity of perspective. Some of them are the 
subjects of whole poems or sequences, others make brief cameo appearances in poems 
in which they play an important, albeit walk-on, role. Some of them reappear across a 
number of poems, whether as continuations or variations upon their inaugural 
manifestations. Some of them are given specific names, others are designated common 
nouns. Many of them are aggregated composites unified in a singular ideal of which they 
are representative. Some of them are figured as fictive beings that are accessible to a 
particular way of thinking, others a figured as possible beings that are not-yet-become. 
And finally, some of them are quite traditional personifications of nature (seasons, 
earth, moon, sun, etc.), or are drawn and recalibrated from older mythologies, such as 
Stevens’ angels. 
 One way of thinking about Stevens’ fictive beings, such as the Hero, Major Man, 
the giants, the Green Queen, the Glass Man, the figure of capable imagination, and so 
forth, are as what he proposes to call in ‘The Pure Good of Theory’ ‘A large-sculptured, 
platonic person’ (290). Platonic personages, which I will call for the sake of brevity 
meta-humans, built from the ground up, as it were. Another comment that I think is 
useful in connection with these fictive beings comes from ‘The Noble Rider and the 
Sound of Words’: ‘But as a wave is a force and not the water of which it is composed, so 
                                                          
90 I would like to make it explicit that my use of the term ‘sublimated’ here is not to be misread as the Freudian 
concept of diverting or modifying instinctual, usually sexual, impulses into a more socially acceptable activity 
or expression. I intend it in the sense of an elevation of something to a higher state or plane of existence, 
which also takes under its wing, by catachrestic extension, the chemical process of converting a solid to a gas 
and vice versa. 
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nobility is a force and not the manifestations of which it is composed, which are never 
the same’ (665). This goes a long way to understanding how these figures generally 
work: it is not what they are that matters, but what it is that compels their making. We 
might recall Stevens’ comments from a letter quoted earlier that ‘we give our good 
qualities to God, or to various gods, but they come from ourselves’ (L, 295). Stevens 
gives what qualities he cares for to his fictive beings. I think it is fair to say, as Powell 
does, that these fictive beings are, in their respective measures, ‘god substitutes’ in 
Stevens’ homemade mythology. They are attempts to populate his supreme fiction with 
figures that are meant to impress by way of their extra-human capacities. Stevens’ oft-
cited aphorism is apposite in this regard: ‘The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which 
you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it 
is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly’ (903). The relevance of citing this 
aphorism here I think can be justified by referring to certain remarks Stevens made in a 
letter to José Rodriguez Feo, February 26, 1945: ‘ln the other poem I have defined major 
men for you.91 I realize that the definition is evasive, but in dealing with fictive figures 
evasiveness at least supports the fiction. The long and short of it is that we have to fix 
abstract objectives and then to conceal the abstract figures in actual appearance. A hero 
won't do, but we like him much better when he doesn't look it and, of course, it is only 
when he doesn't look it that we can believe in him’ (L, 489). Understandably, it is well 
beyond the limits of this thesis to address all of these fictive beings, thus I will have to 
limit myself to an exemplary few. 
 ‘Paisant Chronicle’, the poem Stevens refers to in his letter to Feo, provides a 
useful precis of Stevens’ meta-human figurations: 
                                                          
91 The poem Stevens is referring to is ‘Paisant Chronicle’ (293). 
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What are the major men? All men are brave. 
All men endure. The great captain is the choice 
Of chance. Finally, the most solemn burial 
Is a paisant chronicle. 
 
Men live to be 
Admired by men and all men, therefore, live 
To be admired by all men. Nations live 
To be admired by nations. The race is brave. 
The race endures. The funeral pomps of the race 
Are a multitude of individual pomps 
And the chronicle of humanity is the sum 
Of paisant chronicles. 
 
The major men— 
That is different. They are characters beyond 
Reality, composed thereof. They are 
The fictive man created out of men. 
They are men but artificial men. They are 
Nothing in which it is not possible 
To believe, more than the casual hero, more 
Than Tarluffe as myth, the most Moliere, 
The easy projection long prohibited. 
 
The baroque poet may see him as still a man 
As Virgil, abstract. But see him for yourself, 
The fictive man. He may be seated in 
A cafe. There may be a dish of country cheese 
And a pineapple on the table. It must be so. 
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   (294) 
 
Many of the composite parts listed above are apparent here. The major men are a meta-
human composite aggregated out of all men. They are artificial, fictive, beyond reality 
(i.e. imagined) but composed thereof (i.e. sublimated), but are nevertheless said to be 
‘Nothing in which it is not possible / To believe’. The major men are a personified ideal, 
in that they are metaphorical embodiments of the utmost in bravery and endurance, 
qualities, the poem tells us, to be admired. They are more possible to believe in than 
casual heroes (i.e everyday personages given the appellation of hero), or actual 
historical persons who endure in our collective memories as myths or abstractions. It is 
the turn at the conclusion of the poem that catches us off guard, however. After rejecting 
the casual hero and historical persons the speaker tells us to see the fictive man for 
ourselves. He may be seated in a café, or, presumably, waiting at the bus stop, or buying 
a loaf of bread from the local dairy. The scenario is irrelevant. What this turn implies is 
that we can see the major man in each of us, should we so care to look, as it is from us 
that he arises. We recall that it is not the water but the force that is the wave. It is not 
the major men, but the force of bravery and endurance that the major men personify 
that matters, and is presumably there to be found in us all. 
 ‘Examination of the Hero in a Time of War’ explores a meta-human persona not 
dissimilar to the major men of this poem, only with greater figural complexity and 
variation. We are lead to believe that the ‘common man is the common hero. / The 
common hero is the hero.’ (244). But then, in the following canto, he is 
physiomorphised: 
 
Make him of mud, 
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For every day.  In a civiler manner, 
Devise, devise, and make him of winter's 
Iciest core, a north star, central 
In our oblivion, of summer's 
Imagination, the golden rescue: 
The bread and wine of the mind, permitted 
In an ascetic room, its table 
Red as a red table-cloth, its windows 
West Indian, the extremest power 
Living and being about us and being 
Ours, like a familiar companion. 
   (246) 
 
The hero is now no longer common man, but a familiar companion sublimated in the 
mud, the stars, the kenosis of winter and the plerosis of summer, and, ultimately, as the 
extremest power. It is the ideal of the hero made cosmically ubiquitous. In canto VIII we 
are told ‘The hero is not a person.’ (247), but in the following stanza that he is an 
emblem, which  
 
…stand[s] taller than a person stands, has /  
A wider brow, large and less human /  
Eyes and bruted ears: the man-like body /  
Of a primitive. He walks with a defter 
And lither stride. His arms are heavy 
And his breast is greatness. All his speeches 
Are prodigies in longer phrases. 
   (247) 
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In Canto XII we are told  
 
The hero is a feeling, a man seen 
As if the eye was an emotion, 
As if in seeing we saw our feeling 
In the object seen and saved that mystic 
Against the sight, the penetrating, 
Pure eye. Instead of allegory, 
We have and are the man, capable 
Of his brave quickenings, the human 
Accelerations that seem inhuman. 
   (248-49) 
 
The hero as an allegorical figure is rejected, and again, as with the major men in ‘Paisant 
Chronicle’ the hero is returned to its source—within ourselves if we look ‘As if the eye 
was an emotion’. But then in the penultimate canto another elevation takes place. ‘The 
highest man with nothing higher / Than himself’ (250), assumes the various roles of 
‘Man-sun, man-moon, man-earth, man-ocean’ (250), and is finally rejected for the ‘man-
man as he wanted’ (250). The same deflation of the self-aggrandizing Hoon that I argued 
Stevens had performed in that poem, is performed here for the hero. The final stanza 
announces that ‘After the hero, the familiar / Man makes the hero artificial.’ (280), and 
then asks: 
 
But was the summer false? The hero? 
How did we come to think that autumn 
Was the veritable season, that familiar 
Man was the veritable man? So 
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Summer, jangling the savagest diamonds and 
Dressed in its azure-doubled crimsons, 
May truly bear its heroic fortunes 
For the large, the solitary figure. 
   (280) 
 
This poem is, ultimately, an overly long periphrastic exercise to arrive at the following 
basic point: ‘The hero is summer, when the world is largest.’ (Bloom, 1977, 160). 
Although I do not particularly care for the two preceding poems, they are useful 
illustrations of the complexity of Stevens’ figural variation regarding the concoction of 
his fictive beings. I do not think, however, they come anywhere close to achieving his 
stated aims. They are too pompous, sentimental, and too recognisably human to 
accomplish the radical defamiliarisation required of a numinous mythos. I will finish 
this section by tracing a handful of Stevens’ meta-human fictions through a series of 
poems that I think are more convincing, not least of all because the human aspect of 
these fictions ‘resist the intelligence / Almost successfully’ (306). 
 ‘Asides on the Oboe’ opens with a challenge: ‘The prologues are over. It is a 
question, now, / Of final belief.  So, say that final belief / Must be in a fiction. It is time to 
choose.’ (226). The question of belief in a decreated world is front and centre of this 
poem: 
 
If you say on the hautboy man is not enough, 
Can never stand as god, is ever wrong 
In the end, however naked, tall, there is still 
The impossible possible philosophers' man, 
The man who has had the time to think enough, 
The central man, the human globe, responsive 
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As a mirror with a voice, the man of glass, 
Who in a million diamonds sums us up. 
   (226-27) 
 
The glass man is, not unlike the snow man, a physiomorph. The very notion of a man of 
glass is transparently abstract. He is both central and global, centripetally interior and 
centrifugally exterior. That he is responsive ‘As a mirror with a voice’, summing us up in 
a million diamonds, suggests that he is a figure of collective consciousness. One is put in 
mind of the closing tercet of the penultimate canto of ‘Ordinary Evening in New Haven’: 
‘It is not an empty clearness, a bottomless sight. / It is a visibility of thought, / In which 
hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see at once.’ (416). The glass man is a conduit for 
precisely this visibility of thought. 
The figure of the mirror opens a useful ambiguity embedded in the double sense 
of ‘glass’, in that the glass man is both transparent and reflective. He can be seen 
through, but he also reflects back. This is what enables him to both respond and 
summarise: ‘He is the transparence of the place in which / He is and in his poems we 
find peace.’ (227). A kenotic winter figure, the glass man in summer, ‘cold and 
numbered, dewily cries, / “Thou art not August unless I make thee so.”’ (227). A sharp 
pun, it is neither summer nor majestic unless he makes thee so. This is because he is so 
‘perfect a perceiver of his environment that he becomes indistinguishable from it’ 
(Powell, July 1971, 740). As he is thus one with his environment he makes it so, but his 
intrusions do nothing to interfere with the environment because he is indistinguishable 
from it. He is another of Stevens’ brilliant paradoxes. The poem finishes with a ritual for 
the dead, during which the speaker observes that  
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…we and the diamond globe at last were one. 
We had always been partly one. It was as we came 
To see him, that we were wholly one, as we heard 
Him chanting for those buried in their blood, 
In the jasmine haunted forests, that we knew 
The glass man, without external reference. 
   (227). 
 
There is a final unity between the glass man and the mourners of the dead. The glass 
man turned diamond globe has thus become a figure of universal empathy in his 
assimilation of the mourners’ suffering: ‘There was nothing he did not suffer, no; nor 
we.’ (227). As an abstraction of universal empathy he requires no external reference to 
be known. 
 This epitomical figure is revised in ‘Chocorua to Its Neighbour’, who is 
envisioned by the titular mountain (the speaker of the poem), as ‘a shell of dark blue 
glass, or ice, / Or air collected in deep essay, / Or light embodied,’ (264), whose ‘body 
seemed / Both substance and non-substance, luminous flesh / Or shapely fire’ (264). 
The mountain recollects: ‘He was not man yet he was nothing else.’ (264). Chocorua 
reports this figure’s mountaintop speech: 
 
"The moments of enlargement overlook 
The enlarging of the simplest soldier's cry 
In what I am, as he falls. Of what I am, 
 
  XI 
The cry is part. My solitaria 
Are the meditations of a central mind. 
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I hear the motions of the spirit and the sound 
Of what is secret becomes, for me, a voice 
That is my own voice speaking in my ear. 
 
XII 
There lies the misery, the coldest coil 
That grips the centre, the actual bite, that life 
Itself is like a poverty in the space of life, 
So that the flapping of wind around me here 
Is something in tatters that I cannot hold." 
   (265) 
 
As with the glass man we have here another, albeit chameleonic, physiomorph, 
possessed of universal empathy. There is also the panpsychic invocation of a central 
mind, which this figure, in his solitaria, has access to. Stevens revises the ‘fiction’ of a 
central mind in a small group of late, uncollected poems: ‘The Sail of Ulysses’, ‘Presence 
of an External Master of Knowledge’,92 and ‘A Child Asleep in Its Own Life’. The last of 
these begins: ‘Among the old men that you know, / There is one, unnamed, that broods 
/ On all the rest, in heavy thought. // They are nothing, except in the universe / Of that 
single mind.’ (468). This transposes the figure of a central mind to that of a quasi-
transcendent single mind borne by an unnamed thinker, and, were it not for his 
thinking, the rest would be nothing.  In section VI of ‘The Sail of Ulysses’, the titular 
soliloquist dissertates on the notion of an ancestral mind anterior to all descendant 
                                                          
92 It should be noted that ‘The Sail of Ulysses’ and ‘Presence of an External Master of Knowledge’, neither 
published during Stevens’ lifetime, are two versions of what presumably began as a single poem. Both of them 
share identical opening and closing stanzas. ‘The Sail of Ulysses’, a poem of eight sections, exceeds in length by 
some few pages the four sestets of ‘Presence of an External Master of Knowledge’. The two poems share 
certain lines and phrases outside of the opening and closing stanzas. 
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minds, thus invoking the presence of an external master of knowledge, a further 
revision on the ‘bright scienza outside of ourselves’ (225) from ‘Of Bright & Blue Birds & 
the Gala Sun’ (224). The man on top of Chocorua, however, possesses a central mind 
because he is another aggregate meta-human containing multitudes: a ‘collective being 
[who] knew / There were others like him safely under roof.’ (266). These others include 
a captain, cardinal, stone effigy, mother and scholar, which, as Lensing points out, 
signify ‘male and female, figure of action and contemplation, religious and secular, living 
and non-living’ (Lensing, 2001, 158). Thus, in spite of his ventriloquized cry of despair 
in solitude, he grows strong ‘because men wanted him to be.’ (266). 
Chocorua declaims in section XIX what I would argue is this poem’s central 
statement: 
 
To say more than human things with human voice, 
That cannot be; to say human things with more 
Than human voice, that, also, cannot be; 
To speak humanly from the height or from the depth 
Of human things, that is acutest speech. 
   (267) 
 
The height and depth of human speech reads conspicuously like a self-reflexive 
comment on Stevens’ own poetic praxis. There are in a number of Stevens’ poems meta-
human sublimations of the figure of the poet. We have already seen from ‘The Creations 
of Sound’ the ‘other poet’ described as ‘a secondary expositor’ and ‘a being of sound’. 
This figure is a later revision of the ‘metaphysician in the dark’ (219) from ‘Of Modern 
Poetry’, who is the meta-human translator of ‘the speech of the place’ (218). The speech 
of one’s contemporary place that must ‘speak words in the ear, / In the delicatest ear of 
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the mind, repeat, / Exactly, that which it wants to hear, at the sound of which, an 
invisible audience listens, / Not to the play, but to itself, expressed / In an emotion as of 
two people, as of two / Emotions becoming one.’ (219). These figures are effectively 
aural daimons, sonic intermediaries in the ‘universal intercourse’ (145) between 
themselves and silence. They are personifications of the unintelligible blank at the heart 
of mere sound that operate in such a way as to render it eloquent for the receptive poet 
to act as mere amanuensis. In ‘Men Made out of Words’ the human species is sublimated 
into a singular meta-human poet: ‘The whole race is a poet that writes down / The 
eccentric propositions of its fate.’ (310), whereas in ‘Reply to Papini’ the poet-speaker 
says: ‘You know that the nucleus of a time is not / The poet but the poem, the growth of 
the mind // Of the world, the heroic effort to live expressed / As victory.’ (382-83). Here 
it is ‘the poem’ that underwrites its age. We have already seen in ‘A Primitive Like an 
Orb’ the sublimation of the central poem as Orphic compositor of the world. 
 Another variation of Stevens’ fictive beings can be found in ‘Angel Surrounded by 
Paysans’: 
 
One of the countrymen: 
There is 
A welcome at the door to which no one comes? 
The angel: 
I am the angel of reality, 
Seen for a moment standing in the door. 
 
I have neither ashen wing nor wear of ore 
And live without a tepid aureole, 
 
Or stars that follow me, not to attend, 
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But, of my being and its knowing, part. 
 
I am one of you and being one of you 
Is being and knowing what I am and know. 
 
Yet I am the necessary angel of earth, 
Since, in my sight, you see the earth again, 
  
Cleared of its stiff and stubborn, man-locked set, 
And, in my hearing, you hear its tragic drone 
 
Rise liquidly in liquid lingerings, 
Like watery words awash; like meanings said 
 
By repetitions of half-meanings. Am I not, 
Myself, only half of a figure of a sort, 
 
A figure half seen, or seen for a moment, a man 
Of the mind, an apparition apparelled in 
 
Apparels of such lightest look that a turn 
Of my shoulder and quickly, too quickly, I am gone? 
    (423) 
 
This ‘necessary angel of earth’ hearkens back to the glass man inasmuch as they both 
rhetorically function as metaphors for cleansers of vision. The primary difference, of 
course, is that this is not a meta-human fiction at all, but a transcendent being brought 
down to earth and made immanent. Stripped of its holy trappings, this angel declares, in 
typically Stevensian tautological logic, that ‘I am one of you and being one of you / Is 
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being and knowing what I am and know’. An identity between subject and pure 
perceiver is once again made, as it was with the glass man, only this time there is no 
guarantee of permanency.  Through the borrowed eyes of the angel the peasants are 
assured that they will come to see the earth again, in a wonderfully musical line: 
‘Cleared of its stiff and stubborn, man-locked set’ (the alliterative stops of ‘stiff’ and 
‘stubborn’, succeeded by the spondee ‘man-locked’, to be picked up again by an 
alliterated sibilant, are suitably evocative of the derisive tone of the angel). But there is 
a fulgurant ephemerality about this angel’s presence that risks its being easily missed. 
Whereas the angel of reality in the previous poem threatens imminent departure, the 
‘antipodal, far-fetched creature, worthy of birth,’ in ‘A Discovery of Thought’ is, properly 
speaking, a personification of anticipation, a thing not-yet-become. The anticipation is 
for the arrival of a new lease on the ‘first word […] / The immaculate disclosure of the 
secret, no longer obscured.’ (459). This poem, as I had discussed in the preceding 
chapter, promises the simultaneous rejuvenation of the earth and the poet’s powers. It 
recalls the earlier ‘Celle Qui Fût Hèaulmiette’: 
 
Out of the first warmth of spring, 
And out of the shine of the hemlocks, 
Among the bare and crooked trees, 
She found a helping from the cold, 
 
Like a meaning in nothingness 
   (376). 
 
Not to mention the poem Stevens’ chose to close his Collected Poems in 1954, namely 
‘Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself’, a poem that also ‘At the earliest ending 
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of winter,’ (452), yields ‘A new knowledge of reality.’ (452). This poem develops by way 
of a concentric gradation moving outward from the speaker’s mind. The bird’s cry from 
outside seems first ‘like a sound in his mind.’ (451). This is negated by way of a 
reaffirmation: ‘It would have been outside.’ (452), followed by another negation, ‘It was 
not from the vast ventriloquism / Of sleep’s faded papier-mâché . . .’ (452). Then 
another affirmation: ‘The sun was coming from outside.’ (452). Then comes the moment 
of revelation: ‘That scrawny cry—it was / A chorister whose c proceeded the choir. / It 
was part of the colossal sun, // Surrounded by its choral rings, / Still far away. It was 
like / A new knowledge of reality.’ (452). The ‘c’ of the bird’s cry does a lot of work in 
this line. It connotes a musical note; the disintegration of the words ‘cry’, ‘chorister’, and 
‘choir’, to their initial letter, inscribing in the very text itself the precedence of the bird’s 
cry; allusively echoes ‘The Comedian as the Letter C’ from Stevens’ first published 
collection; and has a defamiliarising effect inasmuch as the pronounced sibilant of the 
letter c is not a sound that birds produce. The concentric pattern of affirmation-
negation-reaffirmation-negation-affirmation, removing the sound of the cry and the sun 
itself further outward from the speaker’s seeming mind, is transposed into the image 
the sun’s choral rings synaesthetically fusing the bird’s cry with the sun’s aureole. 
Returning to Stevens’ figurations of fictive beings, we should by now be able to 
discern strong patterns. They are ostensibly vehicles for extra-human modes of 
perception that can only be imagined rather than seen, on the one hand, or projected 
satisfactions of certain desires or lacks, on the other. No poet of Stevens’ generation was 
given to his prodigious appetite for producing these sorts of fictive beings. This is 
primarily because, as we recall from Surette’s comments, Stevens chose ‘the more 
difficult course’ (Surette, Spring 2005, 145) of a rigorously immanent path than most of 
his major contemporaries. In choosing this path, he had to make over the ‘dominant 
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blank’ (407) of the world he had decreated. His fictive beings are important characters 
in his ongoing ‘war between the mind / And sky, between thought and day and night’ 
(351). The reader of Stevens, holding in mind his idea of believable fictions, may not 
necessarily find his fictive beings sufficiently believable, but I think this is beside the 
point.93 If I read Stevens properly, he is simply inviting us to entertain possibilities. In a 
letter to Henry Church, December 8, 1942, Stevens recounts an interaction that he had 
had with a student at Trinity College: 
 
One evening, a week or so ago, a student at Trinity College came to the office and walked home 
with me. We talked about this book. I said that I thought that we had reached a point at which we 
could no longer really believe in anything unless we recognized that it was a fiction. The student 
said that that was an impossibility, that there was no such thing as believing in something that 
one knew was not true. It is obvious, however, that we are doing that all the time. There are 
things with respect to which we willingly suspend disbelief; if there is instinctive in us a will to 
believe, or if there is a will to believe, whether or not it is instinctive, it seems to me that we can 
suspend disbelief with reference to a fiction as easily as we can suspend it with reference to 
anything else. (L, 430). 
 
                                                          
93 Gregory Brazeal takes Stevens’ challenge of a believable supreme fiction head-on and finds it sorely wanting. 
His argument draws upon William James’ rejection of the psychological possibility of willing ourselves into 
believing what we know to be untrue, as well as the logical impossibility of doing the same: 
 
It is not so much that we as human beings lack the capacity to believe what we know to be untrue, as 
though such belief were simply an ability like any other, and some race of aliens might possess it. 
Rather, our very concept of belief may imply that what is believed is believed to be true. Our 
customary ways of using the word “belief” simply do not allow for the possibility of believing what 
one knows to be untrue. In other words, our inability to will belief in fictions recognized as fictions 
may be less like our inability to fly or see through steel walls, and more like the “inability” of 
bachelors to be married, or triangles to have four sides. We can imagine a race of creatures with 
enormous wings and penetrating vision, but what would it look like for a creature to believe in 
something it knows to be untrue? (What would it look like if a bachelor got married but succeeded, 
through sheer force of will, in remaining a bachelor?) (Brazeal, Fall 2007, 97-98).  
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The Queen in Through the Looking-Glass admits to Alice: ‘Why, sometimes I've believed 
as many as six impossible things before breakfast.’ (Carroll, 1987, 149). This is, of 
course, spoken by a fictional character—but I think it strikes at an intriguing nub. With 
literature, whether it is poetry, prose, plays, what have you, even if we know that what 
we are reading is fictional, this knowledge does not necessarily preclude the fictional 
text from yielding insights that we may find entirely plausible to believe. We will now 




The notion of a pure percipient, such as we might imagine ‘The Snow Man’ to represent, 
unsullied by figurative trope or cognitive deviation, is a recurrent motif in Stevens. It is 
accompanied by his notion of ‘the first idea’, which is the prominent subject of the ‘It 
Must Be Abstract’ section of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. Stevens explains what 
he means by ‘A thinker of the first idea’ (333), in a letter to Henry Church, October 28, 
1942: ‘If you take the varnish and dirt of generations off a picture, you see it in its first 
idea. If you think about the world without its varnish and dirt, you are a thinker of the 
first idea’ (L, 426-27). Stevens’ indebtedness to Blake is clearly apparent here.94 In brief, 
Stevens’ ‘first idea’ carries the double sense of pure concept and original seeing (we 
recall the etymological root of ‘idea’ derives from the Greek ‘ideîn’, meaning to see).  The 
‘hard lesson’, as DeSales Harrison has it, for a thinker of the first idea, for the ‘ephebe’ 
instructed to perceive ‘the idea / Of this invention, this invented world, / The 
inconceivable idea of the sun.’ (329), is ‘the burden of paradox…one of the things the 
                                                          
94 One has in mind the famous Blakean proverb: ‘If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would 
appear to man as it is, infinite.’ (Blake, 2005, 53). Of course, for Stevens, the cleansing is a way to get at 
originary thought, rather than a vision of infinity. 
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ephebe will learn is something about what he cannot learn, cannot know, cannot do 
with words’ (Harrison, 2005, 59). The pedagogical speaker establishes this burden of 
paradox in the opening tercet by calling the idea ‘inconceivable’. The pedagogue never 
tells the ephebe what the first idea is, of course, but instructs him on how to go about 
arriving at it. One of the prerequisites is to cleanse the sun of its supernatural 
provenance, and ‘Let Purple Phoebus lie in umber harvest, / Let Phoebus slumber and 
die in autumn umber’ (329). Recalling the admonition of ‘The Man With the Blue Guitar’, 
to ‘Throw away the lights, the definitions, / And say of what you see in the dark // That 
it is this or that it is that, / But do not use the rotted names.’ (150), the pedagogue 
proclaims that Phoebus, now lying in rot, ‘was / A name for something that never could 
be named.’ (329). He then blatantly contradict himself in the succeeding tercet by 
reasserting that ‘The sun / Must bear no name,’ (330), only to immediately qualify this 
statement by naming it, ‘gold flourisher, but be / In the difficulty of what it is to be.’ 
(330). 
This difficulty of being opens a rupture between our inability to separate things 
as they are from how they seem to us. As early as ‘The Emperor of Ice-Cream’, the 
speaker delivers the following injunction: ‘Let be be finale of seem.’ (50), as though to 
suggest that the ultimacy of seeming, of phenomenal appearance, is the truth of that 
which is. It is a notion carried through the course of Stevens’ poetry. ‘The Latest Freed 
Man’, a possible precursor to the pedagogue of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, 
‘having just / Escaped from the truth’ (187) of the ‘old descriptions of the world’ (187), 
asserts that the sun, ‘(the strong man vaguely seen)’ (187), has overtaken ‘the doctrine 
of this landscape. Of him / And of his works, I am sure’ (187). Motivated by ‘how the sun 
came shining into his room’ (187) we are given a description of what it would entail for 
the freed man ‘To be without a description of to be,’ (187). The irony is not lost on us. 
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Nonetheless, the freed man, delivered of the ‘strength that is the strength of the sun’ 
(187), undergoes a peculiar transformation: ‘To have the ant of the self changed to an 
ox’ (perhaps troping on the Cattle of Helios), which, in turn, is what delivers the freed 
man of his freedom: 
 
It was how he was free. It was how his freedom came. 
It was being without description, being an ox. 
It was the importance of the trees outdoors, 
The freshness of the oak-leaves, not so much 
That they were oak-leaves, as the way they looked. 
It was everything being more real, himself 
At the centre of reality, seeing it. 
It was everything bulging and blazing and big in itself, 
   (187) 
 
This is possibly one of the plerotic benefits of successfully thinking of the world in its 
first idea: an accomplishment of the centre of reality from which everything appears not 
infinite, but merely enlarged and brighter. A later lyric, ‘The Red Fern’, reprises this 
visionary aggrandizement of seeing things, as Stevens’ phrases it in ‘A Lot of People 
Bathing in a Stream’, ‘in a world / Of nakedness, in the company of the sun,’ (321-22): 
 
The large-leaved day grows rapidly, 
And opens in this familiar spot 
Its unfamiliar, difficult fern, 
Pushing and pushing red after red. 
 
There are doubles of this fern in clouds, 
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Less firm than the paternal flame, 
Yet drenched with its identity, 
Reflections and off-shoots, mimic-motes 
 
And mist-mites, dangling seconds, grown 
Beyond relation to the parent trunk: 
The dazzling, bulging, brightest core, 
The furiously burning father-fire . . . 
 
Infant, it is enough in life 
To speak of what you see. But wait 
Until sight wakens the sleepy eye 
And pierces the physical fix of things. 
   (316-17)  
 
Ostensibly a poem about sunrise,95 the speaker in the final quatrain, acting, as with the 
pedagogue in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, in loco parentis, gives a contrary lesson 
to the infant. Admonishing that it ‘is enough in life/ To speak of what you see’, and 
further instructing, somewhat hermetically, to ‘wait / Until sight wakens the sleepy eye’, 
is entirely at odds with what has preceded these advisements. The sunrise is not 
referred to at all, but is represented by way of a metaphorical conceit. The sunrise is the 
subdued tenor to the red fern’s dominant vehicle. As such, the unfurling of this conceit 
does indeed grow quite wildly ‘Beyond relation to the parent trunk’, and becomes 
something of an object lesson of ‘A seeing and unseeing in the eye.’ (333). This seeing 
and unseeing in the eye is one of the very functions of metaphor. One does not see the 
                                                          
95 Miller describes the poem being ‘about the day as governed, centered, and powered by the sun’ (Miller, 
1985, 153), and points out that ‘[u]nlike some of Stevens's solar poems "The Red Fern" is explicitly about 
sunrise, the "appearance" of the sun out of its nighttime occultation at dawn’ (Ibid). 
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sunrise as a fern with the eye. However, in the unseeing eye, the eye of the secondary 
imagination (to borrow a Coleridgean distinction), resemblances between the two are 
visualised. Is this poem, then, a lesson by way of contrary example? Or is it in fact an 
exhibit of the speaker’s wakened sight? If the latter, then the implication of the poem is 
that wakened sight is susceptible to the metaphorical transfigurations of an ecstatic 
imagination. Piercing the physical fix of things, therefore, would be a piercing through to 
imperceptible relations, rather than a fixing in place of what the eye alone sees.96  
Later in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, in canto IV of ‘It Must Give Pleasure’, 
we are told that ‘We reason of these things with later reason / And make of what we 
see, what we see clearly / And have seen, a place dependent on ourselves.’ (346). ‘These 
things’ we later reason about, to skip back two cantos, are the things of the world—the 
sun, the sea, the moon—untransformed by our inherited doctrines and mythologies, 
that we are nevertheless ‘shaken by…as if they were’ (345). One of the social outcomes, 
then, of the labours of thinking through the first idea is to arrive at a self-reliant 
commonal. It is certainly not to go the way of the Englishman who had died in Florence: 
                                                          
96 Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of epoché in relation to metaphor is revealing in this context. Epoché signifies a 
theoretical moment of suspension wherein our assumptions and judgements of the external world are 
temporarily bracketed out in order to focus on phenomenal experience in and of itself. Ricoeur conceives of 
novel metaphor, of which Stevens’ ‘The Red Fern’ is an apposite case, as ‘the emergence of a new semantic 
congruence or pertinence from the ruins of the literal sense shattered by semantic incompatibility or 
absurdity’ (Ricoeur, 1978, 151). This newly arisen congruence is referentially split between the self-abolished 
literal sense and the emergent metaphorical sense, thus creating an ambiguity in reference (Ibid, 152). Epoché, 
specifically in this context, signifies the imagination’s suspension of ordinary descriptive reference as a new 
semantic congruence emerges. This is to say, the ordinary descriptive reference is not so much negated as it is 
superimposed by the emergent semantic congruence. Ricoeur contends: 
 
[T]hat one of the functions of imagination is to give a concrete dimension to the suspension or epoché 
proper to split reference. Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative assimilation 
between terms by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense thanks to 
the display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes 
concretely to the epoché of ordinary reference and to the projection of new possibilities of 
redescribing the world (Ibid). 
 
Ricoeur thus makes the claim that the interaction between metaphor and imagination reifies the tensive space 
opened up between the ordinary descriptive reference and the emergent semantic congruence of novel 
metaphor, thus bridging this cognitive gap to form a basis upon which to redescribe reality. 
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He stood at last by God's help and the police; 
But he remembered the time when he stood alone. 
He yielded himself to that single majesty; 
 
But he remembered the time when he stood alone, 
When to be and delight to be seemed to be one, 
Before the colors deepened and grew small. 
   (120). 
 
The pathos of the Englishman’s degeneration is heightened, in Stevens’ estimation, by 
his recourse to authoritarian institutions in his late life: ‘If men have nothing external to 
them on which to rely, then, in the event of the collapse of their own spirit, they must 
naturally turn to the spirit of others. I don’t mean conventions: police’ (L, 348). But 
more importantly, the Englishman has lost his grasp on ‘When to be and delight to be 
seemed to be one’. 
Perhaps Stevens’ most radical treatment of this rupture of seeming and being is 
in his poem ‘Description Without Place’. In this complex poetic sequence Stevens 
explores the ‘idea that we live in the description of a place and not in the place itself’ (L, 
494).97 It is among the most explicit of Stevens’ poems to explore the notion of linguistic 
mediation in the human apperception of experience. It reverses the direction of Stevens’ 
‘repeated thrusts for the thing itself and the first idea, his regular attempts at reaching a 
pure vision of the world untouched in language’ (Eeckhout, 2002, 207), by affirming 
                                                          
97 The poem is in seven parts and follows, as Cook outlines, the following schema: ‘(1) A hypothesis that “to 
seem—it is to be.” (2) Actual seemings, which give identity to an age. (3) Potential future seemings. (4) How 
things seemed to Nietzsche and Lenin. (5) The experience of a place as description without place. (6) 
Description as revelation. (7) The importance of the theory of description’ (Cook, 2007, 194). Unfortunately, I 
haven’t the space here to respond to each of the parts of this poem. 
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that descriptions of the world are transformative of the world. This in despite of the fact 
that our descriptions are without place in the sense that they are idealist formulations 
of the mind: 
 
Thus the theory of description matters most. 
It is the theory of the word for those 
 
For whom the word is the making of the world, 
The buzzing world and lisping firmament. 
 
It is a world of words to the end of it, 
In which nothing solid is its solid self. 
   (301) 
 
This Stevens picks up again later at the conclusion of ‘An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven’: ‘It is not in the premise that reality / Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses / 
A dust, a force that traverses a shade.’ (417). It is not in the premise that reality is a 
solid, nor that nothing solid is its solid self, if one accepts that the very concepts of 
reality and the world are themselves ‘fictions’, in the broadest sense of them being 
descriptions we humans have shaped. It could be that any number of descriptions of 
‘seemings that are to be, / Seemings that it is possible may be.’ (299) may prove more 
compelling than those we already have. There is an eschatology at play  The sun, too, 
Stevens’ primitive emblem of reality, becomes something seemed: 
 
It is possible that to seem—it is to be, 
As the sun is something seeming and it is. 
 
~ 168 ~ 
 
The sun is an example. What it seems 
It is and in such seeming all things are. 
 
Thus things are like a seeming of the sun 
Or like a seeming of the moon or night 
 
Or sleep. 
   (296) 
 
This is not an abstraction of the sun to the first idea, but a postulation of the possibility 
that what the sun seems it is. This entirely reverses Stevens’ materialist insistence on 
the thing itself by re-posing the thing itself as a purely mental construct: what it seems, 
that is, what our minds configure as the sun, is what it is—a thoroughly idealist position. 
Description, as we are told in canto VI, extends to one of the very foundations of 
numinous discourse: 
 
Description is revelation. It is not 
The thing described, nor false facsimile. 
 
It is an artificial thing that exists, 
In its own seeming, plainly visible, 
 
Yet not too closely the double of our lives, 
Intenser than any actual life could be, 
 
A text we should be born that we might read, 
More explicit than the experience of sun 
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And moon, the book of reconciliation, 
Book of a concept only possible 
 
In description, canon central in itself, 
The thesis of the plentifullest John. 
   (301) 
 
This continues from the previous canto in which description without place is qualified 
as ‘The spirit’s universe […] / Composed of sight indifferent to the eye’ (300). In ‘The 
Latest Freed Man’, the man was delivered of his freedom specifically because he was 
able ‘To be without a description of to be’. His revelation was purely an experiential 
enhancement of sight brought about by a concomitant sun-fuelled expansion of his 
animality.98 In the foregoing canto of ‘Description Without Place’, the freed man’s 
ecstasy is superseded by an ascetic denial of both self and world in favour of a sui 
generis artifice ‘Intenser than any life could be // A text we should be born that we 
might read, / More explicit than the experience of the sun // And moon’. This ‘thesis of 
the plentifullest John’ (an allusion to St John the Divine, author of the Book of 
Revelations) is even said to hold a prescriptive sway over our existence ‘we should be 
born that we might read’. What this book of reconciliation is supposed to reconcile us to 
is presumably the concept only possible in description, which, as has been established, 
is not to the world as it is in itself. It is perhaps a reconciliation to the reverse negative 
                                                          
98 Mutter describes the man’s freedom as 
 
…a condition of animal potency and autotelic desire ("being an ox"), a condition of pure visuality as 
opposed to hermeneutic discovery: "the importance of the trees outdoors, / The freshness of the oak-
leaves, not so much / That they were oak leaves, as the way theylooked." In that poem, knowledge 
("not so much / that they were oak leaves") and style ("the way they looked") are at odds. The 
immanence of visuality is more important than the understanding yielded in the linguistic act of 
naming. (Mutter, 2009, 79). 
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of the first idea, insofar as the possible is invariably bound to futurity, whereas the first 
idea is a desire to discover primal anteriority. Desire for that which is absent would 
seem to be their common meeting ground, as we are told in canto II of ‘It Must Be 
Abstract’ that ‘not to have is the beginning of desire. / To have what is not is its ancient 
cycle.’ (330). 
 Structurally speaking, the first idea and description as revelation are rhetorically 
generative renewals of vision (sight) and revision (translation of sight i.e. description) 
in Stevens’ poetry. The paradox of the first idea’s being inconceivable nevertheless 
functions as an immanently numinous site of poetic departure for Stevens. The 
numinosity of the first idea resides precisely in its ineffability. The first idea is ineffable 
because it is not, in fact, an idea at all. It is, rather, a process of reduction and 
detachment, which I will have more to say about shortly. This is why, over the course of 
ten cantos, we as participant ephebes in our reading of ‘It Must Be Abstract’, are never 
told what the first idea is. We are given instructions of what must be done in order to 
arrive at the first idea (‘Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea’ etc.); psychological 
motivations for wanting to seek it out (‘It is the celestial ennui of apartments/ That 
sends us back to the first idea, the quick / Of this invention’, ‘It satisfies / Belief in an 
immaculate beginning’ (330)); told that it inheres within ‘The poem’ (‘The poem 
refreshes life so that we share, / For a moment, the first idea . . .’ (330)); presented with 
second-order abstractions that supposedly follow from its unstated premise (It must be 
visible or invisible, / Invisible or visible or both: / A seeing and unseeing in the eye.’ 
(333)); informed of possessors, non-possessors, and antagonists of the first idea (It feels 
good as it is without the giant, / A thinker of the first idea.’ (333), ‘The first idea was not 
our own.’ (331), ‘These are the heroic children whom time breeds / Against the first 
idea’ (332)); elliptical statements that are effectively tautological (‘The first idea is an 
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imagined thing.’ (334)); before the final three cantos pass on to an investigation of 
‘major man’ (334-36), whom, it is to be presumed, is a fictive progeny of the first idea. 
The closest we come to positive content of the first idea are respectively seasonal 
(It is desire at the end of winter, when // It observes the effortless weather turning blue 
/ And sees the myosotis on its bush.’ (330) and meteorological (‘The weather and the 
giant of the weather, / Say the weather, the mere weather, the mere air: / An 
abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.’ (333) in their provenance. In the first case 
desire is categorically not an idea, so we can discount that immediately. The second case 
proves more promising, especially if we corroborate it with evidence from elsewhere: 
‘Well, the gods grow out of the weather. / The people grow out of the weather; / The 
gods grow out of the people.’ (191). This additional evidence appears to support the 
idea that the weather is somehow an anterior progenitive force in the world, which 
would seem befitting of a first idea. Moreover, if we return to the original quote, the 
quasi-mythological ‘giant of the weather’, by way of paratactic apposition, is 
metaphorised as ‘An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought’. ‘An abstraction blooded’ 
is arguably, on the one hand, a figuration of the instantiation of the first idea, as though 
the first idea is contingent upon the union of mind and body. On the other, to say that 
the giant of the weather is an abstraction blooded is to say that it is the reification of the 
concept of a giant of the weather, an abstraction given incarnated form, not unlike ‘a 
body wholly body, fluttering / Its empty sleeves’ (105) in reference to the sea in ‘The 
Idea of Order at Key West’, or the bodiless serpent of the aurora borealis in ‘Auroras of 
Autumn’, which is figured as ‘form gulping after formlessness, / Skin flashing to wished-
for disappearances / And the serpent body flashing without the skin.’ (355).99 Another 
                                                          
99 There is a sense in which the sea and the northern lights are more stably identifiable entities or phenomena 
than the weather. The weather is whatever the atmospheric conditions govern at a given time anywhere in the 
world, and is decidedly more localized in terms of a human being’s perception and evaluation of it. A person in 
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felicity about the first idea being the weather is that it is in keeping with Stevens’ 
reiterations of environmental determinism that we had touched on in the preceding 
chapter. My previous assertion that the first idea is not an idea but a process 
notwithstanding, there remains a crucial problem with settling for this solution. This 
problem is posed by what I would argue is the crucial canto in this entire section, 
namely the fourth: 
 
The first idea was not our own. Adam 
In Eden was the father of Descartes 
And Eve made air the mirror of herself, 
 
Of her sons and of her daughters. They found themselves 
In heaven as in a glass; a second earth; 
And in the earth itself they found a green- 
 
The inhabitants of a very varnished green. 
But the first idea was not to shape the clouds 
In imitation. The clouds preceded us 
 
There was a muddy centre before we breathed. 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
                                                          
Alaska and a person in Scotland will probably point at exactly the same things, or at least parts thereof, and say 
‘that is the sea’ or ‘those are the northern lights’, but their geographical perspective will undoubtedly produce 
entirely different characterizations of the weather: ‘It is dismally wet and grey’ says the Glaswegian on 
Tuesday, while at the same time the woman from Anchorage is enjoying the brilliance of the clustered stars 
above a crisp, clear, windless sky, and proclaiming its magnificence. The weather, in short, is whatever is 
climatically around at the time, and is more difficult to point to than either the sea or the northern lights 
(pointing to the weather would probably involve waving ones arms around in frantic circular motions while 
declaiming ‘This is the weather!’). I think the ubiquitous vagaries of the weather are precisely what attracts 
Stevens to it as a poetic figure and phenomenal source. Bloom, among several others, recognises that ‘for 
Stevens the prime materia poetica is the weather’ (Bloom, 1977, 186). Nonetheless, the type of metaphorical 
figuration involved in the examples of the sea and the aurora borealis, quoted above, is the embodiment of 
the respective metaphor’s tenors in bodiless vehicles, much like the implied figure of blooding the weather in 
the form of a giant. A little intellectual fidgeting is admittedly required to think of a giant merely as a concept. 
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Venerable and articulate and complete. 
 
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place 
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves 
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days. 
 
We are the mimics. Clouds are pedagogues 
The air is not a mirror but bare board, 
Coulisse bright-dark, tragic chiaroscuro 
 
And comic color of the rose, in which 
Abysmal instruments make sounds like pips 
Of the sweeping meanings that we add to them. 
   (331-32) 
 
This canto is Stevens’ decreation of Genesis. The knockdown is delivered in the first 
sentence: ‘The first idea was not our own.’ Neither Adam, the first namer and 
logocentric ancestor of Descartes, nor narcissistic Eve, are the possessors of the first 
idea. Eden is merely earth reflected back upon itself, and in that ironic reflection the 
green is amusingly ‘very varnished’. The clouds, synecdoches for the weather, tellingly 
enough, preceded us. Most importantly, though, ‘There was a muddy centre before we 
breathed. / There was a myth before the myth began, / Venerable and articulate and 
complete.’ The earth, as Stevens wishes to persuade us, was a complete myth unto itself 
before we breathed and fashioned our own genetic myths. And then we have, in the fifth 
tercet, possibly the most alienating lines in Stevens’ oeuvre. This is Stevens’ bluntest 
pronouncement on the division between humans and the nonhuman world. Not even 
the sun blazoning the days can relieve the hardness of the world’s recalcitrance. Thus 
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we find ourselves in a theatre resembling the world, the stage of which is empty of our 
reflections, and we are reduced to its scholarly mimes, adding the detritus of our 
meanings to the abysmal instruments of that give them the most diminutive voice. This 
is Stevens at his kenotic bleakest. Perhaps the only close rival elsewhere in the poetry is 
the conclusion of ‘The American Sublime’: 
 
And the sublime comes down 
To the spirit itself, 
 
The spirit and space, 
The empty spirit 
In vacant space. 
What wine does one drink? 
What bread does one eat? 
   (107) 
 
Curiously, both of these examples turn upon the despair of the numen abest. Without 
God and his attendant myths the spirit is empty, space vacant, and we do not even know 
what to eat or drink because the sacraments have been denied. Decreating the story of 
Genesis leaves us estranged players in a strange land. These are quite anomalous pieces 
in Stevens’ oeuvre, particularly for a poet who usually celebrates shaking off the musty 
garb of ancient doctrines in an otherwise companionable world. In saying that, there is 
nothing in the premise of immanent numinosity that presupposes the ineffable world, 
the articulate myth complete in itself, shares our concerns for belonging. It is the human 
listener who hears misery in the sound of windblown leaves, the snow man hears the 
nothing that is. 
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 In spite of the apparent bleakness of these two examples, they do give us a 
clearer idea, I think, of what Stevens means by the first idea. As I have said, the first idea 
is not an idea at all but a process of reduction and detachment. What I mean by this, and 
I think these foregoing examples provide excellent illustrations of what this process 
involves, is simply a reimagining of the world without any human or divine 
intervention. It is obviously impossible to do this, as any reimagining of the world is 
already an intervention. Nonetheless, it is, as an ascetic and meditative aesthetic 
praxis—of which Bevis would certainly approve—a useful method for stripping away 
preconceptions and assumptions about the world, in an attempt to perceive it in a new, 
or at least qualitatively different, light. And again, this is why Stevens merely posits the 
paradoxical notion of a first idea which supersedes conceivability. The fruits of the 
notion are the poems themselves. Rhetorically, tropes on kenotic emptiness, silence and 
darkness, on the one hand, and plerotic superlatives on the other, abstract and occlude 
both the extent and limit of positive conception and physically available experience. 
They motion toward a transcendence within immanence.100 And this is what Stevens’ 





Stevens positioned at close of his 1923 publication of Harmonium a small poem called 
‘To the Roaring Wind’. It takes the form of an apostrophic address: 
                                                          
100 Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, for instance, argues that Rilke and Stevens are ‘two of the most widely 
invoked poets in the phenomenological tradition’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, Summer 2010, 275), and are responsible 
for reorienting transcendence from a vertical to a horizontal projection, ‘a crossing of horizons between 
perception and imagination or imagination and reality’ (Ibid). 
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 What syllable are you seeking, 
 Vocalissimus, 
 In the distances of sleep? 
 Speak it. 
    (77) 
 
Cook provides a helpful gloss on the Latin epithet: ‘the superlative form, in the 
masculine singular vocative case, of the Lat. adjective vocalis, “that  utters  a  voice,  
sounding,  vocal, singing,” also in a rare poetic use, “causing or inspiring speech or 
song”’ (Cook, 2007, 86). Thus, the addressor bestows the title of greatest speaker on the 
wind. The syllable it seeks in the distances of sleep is not disclosed. In another poem 
from Harmonium, ‘Domination of Black’, leaves turning in the wind are commingled 
with the cry of the peacocks and the turning mind of the speaker sitting at night by a 
fire. The domination of black is attributed to the ‘color of the heavy hemlocks’ (7), which 
is in turn compared to the oncoming night ‘striding like the color of the heavy hemlocks’ 
(7). The poem follows the development of a fugue in which each of the above elements 
are played off one another contrapuntally to the point whereby it is difficult to 
distinguish what or who is turning where. It is a poem that tropes on turning, the root of 
trope, and is highly successful at accomplishing the perceptual vertigo it seeks to 
develop. These two poems and ‘The Snow Man’ establish early in Stevens’ career a topos 
of images and tropes that he would revisit often. The basic elements of this topos 
comprise wind, leaves, paradoxical figures of extra-linguistic utterance, and, more often 
than not, occur in the kenosis of autumn or winter. 
 In ‘Farewell to Florida’, the leading poem in Stevens’ second collection, the 
valedictory speaker leaving Key West by ship, looks grimly forward to his homecoming: 
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‘My north is leafless and lies in wintry slime / Both of men and clouds, a slime of men in 
crowds.’ (98). This poem is effectively a dramatization of the riddance of plerotic 
summer, here imaged as decadent, to return to the sharpness of the cold: ‘The palms 
were hot / As if I lived in ashen ground, as if / The leaves in which the wind kept up its 
sound / From my North of cold whistled in a sepulchral South,’ (97). ‘On the Way to the 
Bus’, a late uncollected poem, expresses, somewhat contrary to expectation, a plerotic 
fulfilment in winter: 
 
A light snow, like frost, has fallen during the night. 
Gloomily, the journalist confronts 
 
Transparent man in a translated world, 
In which he feeds on a new known, 
 
In a season, a climate of morning, of elucidation, 
A refreshment of cold air, cold breath, 
 
A perception of cold breath, more revealing than 
A perception of sleep, more powerful 
 
Than a power of sleep, a clearness emerging 
From cold, slightly irised, slightly bedazzled, 
 
But a perfection emerging from a new known, 
An understanding beyond journalism, 
 
A way of pronouncing the word inside of one's tongue 
Under the wintry trees of the terrace. 
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   (472) 
 
Journalism, mere reportage, is ironized as the fluency of poetic description. The 
journalist, a stand-in for the poet of description, confronts a revision of the glass man 
from ‘Asides on the Oboe’. This confrontation enables him to see the translated world 
transparently. The journalist sublimates from the winter’s elucidation ‘a perfection 
emerging from a new known’. The understanding beyond journalism, that is to say, 
beyond description, is this perfection emerging from a new known, a trope inverting the 
first idea from original seeing to the revelation of futurity. The word inside of one’s 
tongue is obviously unpronounceable. This poem, as we so often find in Stevens, sends 
us back to the limits of expressing that which can only be experienced. The sense of the 
poem is clear enough: standing outside on a winter morning is bracing. Stevens takes 
this basic experiential premise and synaesthetises it into a clarification of mind, which, 
as the logic of the poem goes, is next in line to revelation. A revelation, nonetheless, that 
can only be pronounced inside, not with, the tongue. 
In ‘Postcard from the Volcano’, an apocalyptic poem imagining the children of a 
future generation ‘picking up our bones’, the misery in the sound of the leaves from ‘The 
Snow Man’ is outdone: ‘The spring clouds blow / Above the shuttered mansion-house, / 
Beyond our gate and the windy sky // Cries out a literate despair.’ (129). The wind 
speaks, here as in ‘The Snow Man’, an emotional language to the human listener. The 
entreaty to the roaring wind to speak the syllable it seeks is, in both of these cases, 
extra-linguistic. In ‘Continual Conversation with a Silent Man’ it is a proliferation of 
meaning that provides interpretive difficulties: ‘…and the wind, / Of many meanings in 
the leaves, // Brought down to one below the eaves, […] // It is not a voice that is under 
the eaves. / It is not speech, the sound we hear // In this conversation, but the sound / 
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Of things and their motion: the other man, / A turquoise monster moving round.’ (312-
13). Who or what is the turquoise monster? Why is the conversation with this silent 
man continual? Is this monster the reeling leaves imbued with the colour from ‘the 
turquoise hen and sky’? (312). These questions are unanswerable, and the leaves’ many 
meanings will impart no more information than the sound of their motion. In ‘The 
Motive for Metaphor’: ‘The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves / And repeats 
words without meaning.’ (257). This is a flat negation of both verbal and emotional 
communication, an unintelligible blank. In ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’ the 
leaves merely resemble thought: ‘And leaves whirling in the gutters, whirlings / Around 
and away, resembling the presence of thought, / Resembling the presences of thought, 
as if, / In the end, in the whole psychology, the self, / The town, the weather, in a casual 
litter, / Together, said words of the world are the life of the world.’ (404). This passage 
reprises the concessions Stevens’ had made in ‘Description Without Place’, and, 
accordingly, the self, the town, and the weather speak in unison the thought that they 
resemble. ‘The Region November’, one of Stevens’ last poems, expands upon the 
unintelligibility of the wind as a critical rebuke to the anthropocentric desire to seek a 
human tongue in nature: 
 
It is hard to hear the north wind again, 
And to watch the treetops, as they sway. 
 
They sway, deeply and loudly, in an effort, 
So much less than feeling, so much less than speech, 
 
Saying and saying, the way things say 
On the level of that which is not yet knowledge: 
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A revelation not yet intended. 
It is like a critic of God, the world 
 
And human nature, pensively seated 
On the waste throne of his own wilderness. 
 
Deeplier, deeplier, loudlier, loudlier, 
The trees are swaying, swaying, swaying. 
    (472-73) 
 
Feeling too is denied. The critique is levelled not only at the anthropocentric desire to 
fix a world in language, but also at the theocentric desire to establish ultimate meaning. 
It is a radical gesture from Stevens, only to be outdone by the marvellous late palinode 
to ‘The Snow Man’, ‘The Course of a Particular’. But before we read that poem we will 
briefly look at the text that bridges the two. I am referring to section IV of ‘Extracts 
From Addresses to the Academy of Fine Ideas’: 
 
On an early Sunday in April, a feeble day, 
He felt curious about the winter hills. 
And wondered about the water in the lake. 
It had been cold since December. Snow fell, first, 
At New Year and, from then until April, lay 
On everything. Now it had melted, leaving 
The gray grass like a pallet, closely pressed; 
And dirt. The wind blew in the empty place. 
The winter wind blew in an empty place— 
There was that difference between the and an, 
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The difference between himself and no man, 
No man that heard a wind in an empty place. 
It was time to be himself again, to see 
If the place, in spite of its witheredness, was still 
Within the difference. He felt curious 
Whether the water was black and lashed about 
Or whether the ice still covered the lake. There was still 
Snow under the trees and on the northern rocks, 
The dead rocks not the green rocks, the live rocks. If, 
When he looked, the water ran up the air or grew white 
Against the edge of the ice, the abstraction would 
Be broken and winter would be broken and done, 
And being would be being himself again, 
Being, becoming seeing and feeling and self, 
Black water breaking into reality. 
   (230) 
 
It is mid-spring but winter has been long in leaving. The man ventures into the ‘winter 
hills’ after the snow has finally melted to investigate whether or not the lake is still 
frozen over. Stevens then revises the negations of ‘The Snow Man’. On a simple play on 
the definite and indefinite articles the question of a or the man’s existence hinges.101 No 
man echoes snow man, the dropping of the bookending letters revealing the snow man’s 
true self. The logic of this passage suggests that ‘a man’ is an abstraction, or, conversely 
any man, which amounts to the same, but ‘the man’ refers to an actual person. The same 
                                                          
101 Stevens’ performs a similar play on the definite article in ‘The Man on the Dump’: ‘Where was it one first 
heard of the truth? The the.’ (186). It is, as I understand, an extreme example of Stevens’ tautology. Truth is 
reduced to the definite article, suggesting that anything predicated by a definite article is closer to the truth 
than anything predicated by an indefinite article. Or, perhaps more radically, the definite article is the truth, 
period. I think the full stop at the end of this poem is suggestive. 
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applies to place. ‘No man that heard a wind in an empty place’ is a very blatant 
restatement of the earlier poem’s famous crux. What is actually more arresting in this 
section is the man wanting to see if the place ‘was still / Within the difference’. What 
would it mean for a place to be within the difference of the and a? The breaking of 
winter being equated with the breaking of the abstraction would seem to suggest that 
winter is abstract. It belongs on the side of ‘a’ as opposed to ‘the’. But if when he arrives 
and beholds the ‘Black water breaking into reality’ then he would be able to be himself 
again. What this implies is that the man’s journey into the winter hills is a kenotic 
descent into approximating the state of the snow man, frozen from being. Only the 
confirmation of the defrosted lake will free him from this abstraction. 
 ‘The Course of a Particular’, as with its predecessor, is a poem of five tercets: 
 
Today the leaves cry, hanging on branches swept by wind, 
Yet the nothingness of winter becomes a little less. 
It is still full of icy shades and shapen snow. 
 
The leaves cry . . . One holds off and merely hears the cry. 
It is a busy cry, concerning someone else. 
And though one says that one is part of everything, 
 
There is a conflict, there is a resistance involved; 
And being part is an exertion that declines: 
One feels the life of that which gives life as it is. 
 
The leaves cry. It is not a cry of divine attention, 
Nor the smoke-drift of puffed-out heroes, nor human cry. 
It is the cry of leaves that do not transcend themselves, 
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In the absence of fantasia, without meaning more 
Than they are in the final finding of the ear, in the thing 
Itself, until, at last, the cry concerns no one at all. 
   (460) 
 
The particular whose course is being plotted in this poem is the ‘cry’ of the leaves. We 
notice that in a poem of only fifteen lines the word is repeated nine times. We 
remember from our reading of ‘The Region November’ that the trees in that poem, 
although they were saying ‘On the level of that which is not yet knowledge’, somewhere 
less than feeling and speech, they nonetheless were providing a critique. The cry of the 
leaves in this poem is not anything else than crying. There is no misery. This is late 
Stevens, allowing things to be in and for themselves, without fussing over evasions, 
deviations, qualifications, seemings, and so on. We have seen a similar letting be in our 
reading of ‘Not Ideas About the Thing But the Thing Itself’. In ‘A Note on Moonlight’, 
another poem from this late period, he writes: ‘The one moonlight, in the simple-colored 
night, / Like a plain poet revolving in his mind / The sameness of his various universe, / 
Shines on the mere objectiveness of things.’ (449). There is a noticeable change of tone 
and priority in these marvellous late poems. A spare equanimity in the face of numinous 
otherness: ‘And being part is an exertion that declines’. The cry of the leaves do not 
transcend themselves. The final finding of the ear is the sound of the cry itself and 
nothing more. It is not a universal cry, no appeal is being made to gods, heroes, or 
humans, it is a particular self, and, finally, concerns no one at all. The gradual 
relinquishment of this letting be emphasised by the three commas in the final line 
separating ‘Itself, until, at last,’. 
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 To finish I will look at one last poem. It takes us away from the world of winter 
and recalls the setting of Stevens’ Florida poems. It is, however, not Florida, it is, in fact, 
nowhere at all. The poem I have in mind is ‘Of Mere Being’: 
 
The palm at the end of the mind, 
Beyond the last thought, rises 
In the bronze distance, 
 
A gold-feathered bird 
Sings in the palm, without human meaning, 
Without human feeling, a foreign song. 
 
You know then that it is not the reason 
That makes us happy or unhappy. 
The bird sings. Its feathers shine. 
 
The palm stands on the edge of space. 
The wind moves slowly in the branches. 
The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down. 
   (476-77) 
 
Cook explains that the title of this poem puns on the double sense of ‘mere’: ‘This is 
mere (bare, only) being and also mere (utter, very) being’ (Cook, 1988, 312). The pun is 
apposite for on the bare side of the pun the syntax and imagery is spare. The scene 
depicted is of a cohesive and singular piece. On the utter side of the pun the poem is a 
projection that exceeds thought, it is beyond reality. It is, to be sure, a poem in extremis. 
Many critics have pointed out its similarities to Yeats’ Byzantium poems, so I would only 
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deem it obligatory to mention what is an apt comparison. In the same vein, certain 
critics have wondered whether or not it is a vision of imaginary paradise, or a threshold 
poem en route to death. The bird who sings in the palm at the end of the mind is 
unmistakably a phoenix. Cook also points out that ‘[t]he Greek word for this fabulous 
sacred bird is also used for a date-palm’ (Ibid), and thus draws the inference that the 
bird both sings in and is the palm. It is, to my knowledge, the only poem like it in all of 
Stevens’ poetry, inasmuch as it is an otherworldly depiction that is neither being 
employed as an ironic takedown, nor is it being transposed to an immanent social 
imaginary. It exists in a nonhuman, paradisal foreignness all on its own. 
CONCLUSION: 




‘The lean cats of the arches of the churches, / That’s the old world. In the new all men 
are priests.’ (229), so says the speaker in ‘Extracts from Addresses to the Academy of 
Fine Ideas’. The aim of this thesis has been to interpret Stevens’ poetry in such a way 
that it does justice to its inherently numinous elements without doing violence to the 
dispossession of traditional religious belief upon which it is predicated. I have used 
Weber’s theory of the disenchantment of the world as a framing device in which to 
situate the occasion of Stevens’ poetry. I have not attempted to argue that Stevens’ 
poetry is a substitute for traditional religious observance, as the two practices are and 
should be kept distinct. Poetry, to paraphrase Barzun, calls its reader to enjoy but not to 
be enjoined. That said, Stevens’ poetry, as I hope to have convincingly demonstrated, 
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evinces many qualities that could be construed as religious in their orientation. That is 
why I have chosen to interpret Stevens’ poetry in the context of what I have been calling 
immanent numinosity. The basis of my argument has been that the concept of the 
numinous pertains to that which is ineffably other, and therefore falls within the 
purview of the mysterium. The presence of divinity is not required to make this concept 
hold. One need only be a non-omniscient conscious subject. I have taken the polarities of 
plerotic and kenotic ritual and abstracted them in order to plot the coordinates of my 
rhetorical analysis of Stevens’ poetry. In so doing, I have shown just how replete it is 
with figures of fullness, emptiness, darkness, illumination, silence, renewal, desolation, 
centrality and finality. Stevens is through and through a poet of utmosts and extremes. 
Furthermore, I would maintain that Stevens, in his ongoing engagement with the ‘idea 
of God’, and his numerous variations upon this idea, can be construed as at the very 
least an aesthetic, experimental theologian. I have also traced through the poetry what I 
have identified as a panpsychic-physiomorphic axis underpinning much of Stevens’ 
peculiar figuration. Nowhere in my reading of the secondary literature have I found 
anybody else making these profitable connections. 
In Stevens’ poetry, early through late, the world, the earth, the cosmos, nature, 
are treated as ineffably other entities in and of their own right. Stevens frequent 
recourse to the use of logologically resecularised religious language is indicative of this 
orientation. As are his poems that mimic forms of devotional address or ritualised 
veneration. He is a poet who works on a large canvas. Also, his reiterations of the 
adequacy of the world, of lived immanent experience, signifies a poet thoroughly 
engaged to a reconciliation with the world as it is, without any reaching out for an 
improved hereafter or transcendent dispensation. That is why I have argued in my first 
chapter that Stevens’ poetry can be read under the aegis of religious naturalism. 
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Religious naturalists dispense with God, but retain what Nagel calls a religious 
temperament. That, I hope to have persuasively demonstrated, is an entirely befitting 
characterisation of Stevens’ work. As Stevens’ writes in ‘Landscape with Boat’: ‘He never 
supposed divine / Things might not look divine, nor that if nothing / Was divine then all 
things were, the world itself’ (221).  
 In the second chapter I argued that in decreating the world, that is, of stripping it 
down to its phenomenological basis without any recourse to divine origins, sent Stevens 
on a search for what he called the ‘first idea’. The first idea, an impossibly elusive blank, 
nonetheless proved an enormously productive stimulus of rhetorical generativity. I 
have also examined a number of his fictive beings, which, as we have seen, are figurative 
experiments in states of consciousness or modes of perception unavailable to ordinary 
human experience. I also began and finished the chapter with an examination of a series 
of poems that push intelligibility to its limits. 
 The limit and extent of immanent numinosity in Stevens’ poetry are the very 
things that are most germane to its representation. The first, and perhaps the most 
recurrent in the poetry, is paradox. Paradox is an effective means of figuring 
inconceivable states of affairs. We have seen, to take but one example, that in ‘The Snow 
Man’, the triple negation that concludes that poem is, ultimately, insoluble. Hence the 
plethora of interpretations that have grown up around such a very small poem. If you 
are going to write on Stevens, it is almost a rite of passage that you will sooner or later 
have to cut your teeth on that Gordian knot of a sentence. The second is Stevens’ 
extensive use of superlatives. Most superlatives bear no empirical test. They are pure 
rhetoric. Stevens not only frequently uses superlatives, but also compounds multiple 
superlatives into condensed stretches of syntax. Moreover, he is not shy of neologising 
superlatives if it suits his rhetorical ends—delicatest, extremest, savagest, and 
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plentifullest, are just a few examples. A third technique, is, as Stevens says, to resist the 
intelligence almost successfully. The greatest contributor here is ambiguity, especially 
when mysterious figures, who enter the poems without explanation of what or who 
they are, body it forth. We recall, for instance, the turquoise monster from ‘Continual 
Conversation with a Silent Man’. Stevens’ poetry abounds with these sorts of numinous 
beings. 
 I would like to finish with a brief reading of Stevens’ poem ‘Final Soliloquy of the 
Interior Paramour’. I think it is one of the poems that best exemplifies what I have been 
arguing for throughout this thesis: 
 
Light the first light of evening, as in a room 
In which we rest and, for small reason, think 
The world imagined is the ultimate good. 
 
This is, therefore, the intensest rendezvous. 
It is in that thought that we collect ourselves, 
Out of all the indifferences, into one thing: 
 
Within a single thing, a single shawl 
Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor, a warmth, 
A light, a power, the miraculous influence. 
 
Here, now, we forget each other and ourselves. 
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole, 
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous. 
 
Within its vital boundary, in the mind. 
We say God and the imagination are one . . . 
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How high that highest candle lights the dark. 
 
Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
In which being there together is enough. 
   (444) 
 
This poem elegantly weaves together Stevens’ superlative rhetoric with his consolations 
of adequacy. The addressor of the ‘we’, the interior paramour, is the most difficult thing 
to determine about this poem. I am attracted to B. J. Legget’s reading. Legget finds it 
‘curious that “Final Soliloquy” has so often been read as a poem about the power of the 
human imagination, the elevation of the self to Godlike status. As is the case with all the 
late poetry, the endeavour of the poem is in the opposite direction, effacing the 
individual imagination or mind as a mere inhabitant of a larger imagination, a “central 
mind.”’ (Legget, Spring 2005, 171). He explains that by definition a paramour is the 
person beloved in a relationship, not the lover. He maintains that it follows from this 
that the soliloquist is the contained and not the container (Ibid, 174-76). That is to say, 
the soliloquist is the beloved of ‘the central mind’, within which he is contained. This 
clearly holds quite significant implications for the famous crux: ‘We say God and the 
imagination are one . . .’ For if the central mind is the embodying companion of the 
soliloquist, and they are both saying that God and the imagination is one, then, as 
Stevens’ reasons in the Adagia: ‘the thing imagined and the imaginer are one. Hence, I 
suppose, the imaginer is God’ (914). How high that highest candle lights the dark 
indeed! Could this be a reconciliation, late in Stevens’ life, with God the imaginer? There 
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is of course the matter of his alleged death-bed conversion to Catholicism.102 But this, of 
course, is the stuff of mere speculation. And after all, it is a poem not a confession. In the 
world of the poem, at least, the companionship struck between the interior paramour 
and the central mind, whatever the latter might be, is enough. James Merrill recites this 
poem for the Stevens episode of the 1988 documentary series Voices and Visions. After 
finishing his recital, his eyes lowered, he wears a brief look of astonishment, as he raises 
his eyes back to his interlocutor he releases a short chuckle, and says: ‘Sometimes I feel 
about this poem the way other people feel about the 23rd Psalm’ (Pitkethly dir., 1988). 




                                                          
102 See: Janet McCann, (Spring 1984), ‘A Letter from Father Hanley on Stevens’ Conversion to Catholicism’, The 
Wallace Stevens Journal, 18:1, 3-5. 
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